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Since the early 1990s Croatia has defined membership of the European Union 
as one of its primary goals. However, the immediate post-war period and the difficult 
transition to democracy left Croatia in relative isolation from Western European 
states and its aim of joining the European Union seemed unattainable and distant. 
Croatia’s involvement in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and President 
Tuđman’s politics proved to be great obstacles to its further democratisation and 
development. The parliamentary and presidential elections in the year 2000 and the 
defeat of Tuđman’s party offered a unique opportunity to change the direction of 
Croatian politics and to move closer to achieving the goal of EU membership. 
This thesis addresses changes in Croatia’s identity and it does so through the 
analysis of discourses surrounding Croatia’s cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its changing attitudes 
towards the protection of minority rights during the year 2000. Both cases fall under 
the Copenhagen Criteria of Accession whose implementation was crucial for 
Croatia’s moving closer towards EU membership. They are also closely linked to 
Croatia’s identity and are rooted in the civilisational discourse that juxtaposes ‘the 
West’/ EU and ‘the East’/ the Balkans as both geographical and civilisational spaces. 
The two case studies are both concerned with questions of sovereignty, justice, 
victims of the Homeland War and the role of Serbia in Croatia’s recent past and in its 
future. Serbia features as Croatia’s radical other and is discursively constructed as an 
embodiment of the Balkans civilisation.  
The study of cooperation with the ICTY and of discourses surrounding 
minority protection analyses the links between different civilisational spaces that 
Croatia navigates and their implications to the reconstruction of discourses central to 
Croatian identity. Despite different subject material both case studies reveal the 
centrality of the Serbian other for the Croatian identity and the need to redefine that 
relationship without undermining Croatia’s identity as a Western country and 
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1 Introduction: Conducting a poststructuralist study 
in the post-Tuđman Croatia 
    
1.1 Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century Croatia’s political landscape 
started to change dramatically. After a long period of communist rule that started 
after the Second World War, independence and democratisation in the early 1990s 
came at great cost. The entire decade was spent in difficult political circumstances 
that challenged all aspects of the new sovereign state, such as the Homeland War, 
fought against Yugoslav forces, and the post-war period of recovery and 
democratisation that included cooperation with international institutions that posed 
further challenges to Croatia to adapt to the new circumstances. Membership of the 
European Union (EU) was put forward as a major foreign policy goal and in the mid-
1990s there was an increase in cooperation between the two actors. However, in the 
period of the late 1990s Croatia was led into political isolation, never officially 
announced but whose effects were felt nevertheless. President Franjo Tuđman’s
1
 
politics increasingly alienated the international community and Croatia’s hopes of 
joining the European Union became more and more remote. 
The start of the year 2000 was received with excitement and hope. The 
parliamentary and presidential elections that took place in January, after the death of 
Tuđman at the end of the previous year, signalling the possibility of a new direction 
that would lead the country towards membership in the European Union and away 
from the isolationist politics that characterised the previous ten-year period.  The loss 
of Tuđman’s party, the HDZ
2
, to a coalition of six parties opened up possibilities for 
reform and a rearticulation of Croatia’s national goals and values in accordance with 
contemporary European positions.  
                                                 
1
 Franjo Tuđman, President of Croatia between 30
th
 May 1990 and 10
th
 Dec 1999  
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 The Copenhagen Criteria of Accession, established by the European Union, 
required stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law, protection of minorities, 
ability to adhere to the acquis communitaire and a functioning market economy. An 
additional requirement was demanded of Croatia: to fully cooperate with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established by the 
United Nations in 1993, with the purpose of trying individuals responsible for war 
crimes in the Yugoslav conflict. In the second half of the 1990s the level of 
cooperation was low and Croatia faced growing dissatisfaction from the international 
community. President Tuđman’s approach to international cooperation was one of 
suspicion and resistance, which led the country to a stand-still. The election of a new 
leadership thus represented not just an opportunity for further democratisation but the 
beginning of a new era that would transform Croatia and require a profound change 
in its political identity.  
 On 4
th
 October 2005, the European Union’s Council of Ministers opened 
accession talks with Croatia after a period of rather strained relations between the 
two parties over the status of The Hague indictments. The launch of negotiations 
with the EU was immediately portrayed in the media as a historical event, something 
almost equal to the 1992 recognition of Croatia as an independent state.
3
 It was with 
the elections of 2000 that the new era for Croatian politics really began and this study 
seeks to contribute to the understanding of the events that led to the opening of 
accession talks several years later. 
The focus of this thesis is the question of Croatian national identity and how 
that has changed after the Parliamentary and Presidential elections of 2000 and why. 
In order to understand this occurrence the thesis will analyse the changes in the 
official government discourse regarding the questions of cooperation with the ICTY 
and the protection of minority rights in the immediate post-Tuđman period. After 
several years of resistance to full cooperation with the EU and the ICTY it is 
necessary to ask questions about the nature of the change that occurred. Why did it 
not happen earlier? Who was responsible for it? Is the European Union the most 
important agent that has the capacity to change norms and values in European 
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countries? What were the factors that led to such a profound change of attitude 
towards the European Union and the ICTY? Equally, questions arise concerning the 
issue of national minorities and their status in Croatia. What made the change in the 
discourse possible? Who was behind it? Were minorities actively involved in this 
process? What steps were taken in the process? 
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to analyse not just the 
institutional changes that facilitated the processes in question, but to look deeper into 
the conceptual level that allows for a more complex understanding of the changes 
that happened in Croatia.  With the aim of examining these changes within Croatia’s 
political landscape in the light of the discursive shift in the construction of its 
identity, this thesis takes a broad poststructuralist approach with an emphasis on 
language and identity construction. Poststructuralism claims that all political 
decisions can only exist in discourse and stresses the inseparability of speech and 
acts. My point of departure is that discourse and identity are mutually constitutive 
and that their interplay is a necessary predisposition for transformation in a society. 
According to poststructuralist principles discourses of Croatian national identity are 
constantly reinterpreted and manifested in social and political practice.
4
 This 
theoretical assumption requires a deeper examination of the process of identity 
construction and re-construction.  
The study analyses the relationship between policy choices and political 
identity within the process of Croatia’s transformation into a democratic, Western 
European country within the framework of the European Union enlargement. The 
argument presented in this study is that Croatia’s particular understanding of what it 
means to be a Western European country had a great influence over certain policy 
choices that were made during the period of study. The analysis looks at the way the 
West, the European Union and the Balkans are constructed in the official Croatian 
discourse and the way these relationships are involved in shaping of the Croatian 
political identity. The study is conducted on two case studies: the basis of first is the 
question of cooperation with the ICTY and second is concerned with the problem of 
minority protection. The analysis chapters will demonstrate how each case study is 
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closely connected to the problem of Croatia’s identity and how its reconstruction 
developed in several stages. 
As will be discussed in the following chapter, many poststructuralist studies 
analyse identity in terms of a relationship between the subject of analysis and its 
‘other’. Although poststructuralist epistemology and ontology challenge the idea that 
identities are pre-given and fixed, a close reading of a number of studies reveals that 
in practice identities seem to be understood as rather unchanging. To be more 
specific, it is often assumed that the identity of the other is stable, in terms that the 
other has no potential to change and assume a different role. I argue that this 
assumption is problematic because it is locked in a dynamic that is difficult to 
explain within the given theoretical parameters of poststructuralist thinking that 
challenges conceptions of identity and relationships between actors as being static 
and defined. Thus we face a theoretical problem of an unchanging other that requires 
further discussion, backed up by empirical analysis.  
In order to contribute to the resolution to the problem, this thesis takes a step 
further in this direction and seeks to answer how the relationship changes when an 
other undergoes an identity reconstruction towards a less ‘radical other’.  The thesis 
builds upon the existing literature on the process of identity construction and the 
process of othering, and seeks to fill the gap that concerns the static relationships 
between the subject of analysis and its others. The Croatian case challenges the 
assumption about the non-changing other and allows us to question its identity, as 
well as the relationship and the process of othering between the subject and the 
radical other. In doing so the study examines how discursive shifts occur when 
important political changes take place, and how that affects identity of the subject of 
analysis. Furthermore, the thesis explores how the change in the other influences the 
identity change within the subject of analysis, and what the implications of that 
development are. In this way the contribution of the thesis is about the Croatian case, 
as well as a discussion on an important theoretical concept and its development.   
The two case studies, as well as the analysis of the Balkans as a civilizational 
and geographical space that precedes them, offer a fruitful avenue for researching 




poststructuralist understanding of identity and the process of othering that is central 
to it. The reconstruction of Croatian identity within a framework of international 
cooperation and development, and its relationship with the Serbian radical other, thus 
forms the core of the study. It demonstrates the complexity of relationships between 
a variety of political actors, both at home and in the international sphere. 
Looking at the relationship between Croatia and the European Union, which 
serves as a broader context for the two case studies, will identify the factors central 
to this process and thus serve as a venue for applying poststructuralist principles to 
an empirical analysis. The encounter between the European Union and Croatia is not 
of two equal parties. The EU determines the political and financial measures that 
Croatia must respond to and adopt. The journey towards EU membership thus 
becomes a space for new discursive articulations on what is possible and what is 
desirable within the Croatian political setting.  
I argue that the prospect of joining the EU has changed the nature of Croatian 
politics in three ways: it led to the defeat of the isolationist nationalism of the second 
half of the 1990s, it has helped to bridge the gap between various ideological and 
ethnic segments of Croatian society, and thirdly, Croatia’s foreign policy has 
changed in terms of opening up to regional cooperation with Serbia, Montenegro and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of these things were unimaginable during the Tuđman era 
that promoted Croatia as a ‘regional power’: as being Western but unwilling to come 
to terms with contemporary interpretations of the definition of a Western European 
country. 
However, it is important to clarify what the role of the European Union is in 
this study. Cooperation with the ICTY was closely related to the European Union, as 
well as the requirement for minority protection. The presence of the EU in the study 
remains at this level of a broader framework where Croatia has to respond to certain 
requirements from above. This allows us to search for the specifics within the two 
case studies of ICTY cooperation and minority protection, in terms of domestic 
politics and the way EU requirements were interpreted and discussed at the domestic 
level. In doing so, special attention to Western European identity is paid in this study, 




will be discussed later, in the official government discourse the EU was presented as 
a unified actor that had a defined identity and as such embodied what it meant to be 
Western European and democratic. The official government discourse neglected 
internal differences and tensions within the EU, and so constructed the relationship 
between Croatia and the EU in a specific way.  
 
  
1.2 Methodology and analysis of text 
 
The use of specific research methodology implies taking on certain 
ontological and epistemological positions about the nature of the social world and of 
knowledge. The poststructuralist ontology challenges positivist assumptions about 
the nature of the social world as being ‘objective’ and its idea that political research 
has the aim of capturing that objective world by operationalising concepts and 
measuring them in ways that mirror the methods employed in the area of natural 
sciences. In this respect poststructuralism is anti-positivistic and rejects the notion of 
the world which can be discovered and explained by employing methods such as 
gathering statistical data or relying on mechanisms of causality that explain social 
action.  
Its methodology emphasizes the importance of language and interpretation of 
social action and as such relies on qualitative methods of research. The concept of 
qualitative methods refers to a variety of techniques that range from observation, 
interviews, and discourse analysis, all with the goal of focusing on the context within 
which social action takes place. Qualitative methods have been associated with 
interpretive epistemology that is concerned with the social construction and the 
changing nature of the social world. For that reason qualitative methods are good for 
capturing meaning, process and context.
5
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This proposed approach focuses on the discursive level which is closely tied 
to the identity of an actor undergoing change. The key assumption is that discourse 
and identity are mutually constitutive and this relationship is crucial for any kind of 
social and political development within a country.
6
 During the period in which an 
actor’s identity is being redefined or defined for the first time, a normative space is 
created that offers a possibility of taking in a new norm that is aligned with the 
developing identity. If norms really do have the power to induce change it is not 
enough to look at the structure and the institutions but to examine more closely the 
actual context: the actors, the setting and the discursive space. In this way identity 
becomes central to the study and in the context of this thesis we are looking at the 
specificities of Croatia as an actor and the way in which it has accepted the norms of 
cooperation with international institutions and of minority rights protection within 
the context of the EU accession conditions. 
 
 
1.3 Contribution of the study 
 
This study is important for several reasons. It adds to the body of literature on 
Croatian politics more generally, and more particularly, it discusses political events 
from a poststructuralist perspective that has not yet been employed in this area. In 
this way the study also contributes to the body of poststructuralist work that seeks to 
apply the theory to empirical case studies.  
As discussed in the previous section, the main theoretical contribution of this 
study is the development of the idea that otherness does not have to be radical and 
that the subject of analysis is normally involved in a number of relationships with 
others of different degree. By taking this assumption as a starting point the study will 
demonstrate how a number of different others play different roles in the construction 
of Croatian identity. This aspect of the study will fill the gap in the existing literature 
                                                 
6





on identity construction and the process of othering, which is crucial for these type of 
studies.  
The empirical contribution of the thesis concerns looking into a European 
country that has emerged from a more or less authoritarian rule and was looking for 
new connections and allegiances in the international community. Lessons and insight 
from the study of Croatian identity and transition can be used to apply the same 
approach to other case studies and look for possible similarities, and equally, for 
variations and peculiarities within them.  
Finally, this study examines the Balkans as an area of historical animosities 
and analyses the discourses that shape it. In doing so it addresses the Western 
discourses about the Balkans that have heavily influenced Croatia and traces the 
variation of the discourse in the Croatian context. In this way the study contributes to 
the material on the Balkans from a Croatian perspective that has not been included in 
the academic debates. 
Before introducing the Croatian historical and political context as a 
background for the case studies I will briefly engage with positivist and 
constructivist approaches and their epistemologies and argue for the need to include 
a greater amount of poststructuralist work to the existing body of literature in the 
studies of political identity and political change in general. 
 
 
1.4 Epistemological and ontological questions in studying politics and 
the area of identity studies 
 
 The International Relations field has witnessed an increase in different 
theoretical approaches in the course of the last few decades. The dominant paradigms 
of positivist/empiricist schools that supported the view of social and political 
sciences as akin to natural sciences have been challenged by theoretical approaches 
that stress the constructed nature of the social world. Traditional International 




producing the desired effect of change and look to sanctions and conditionality for 
means capable of delivering. Some theories allow for the possibility of changing 
beliefs and behaviour through means of socialisation, such as persuasion and 
communicative action. These processes are nevertheless dependent on the power 
structure inherent in the relationship between those who impose and those who 
accept the required conditions.
7
  
Social constructivism developed as a response to the positivist conception of 
the world and it challenged some of its core assumptions. The name ‘social 
constructivism’ first appeared in 1989 in the book World of Our Making by Nicholas 
Onuf
8
 but it was with an article by Alexander Wendt Anarchy is What States Make of 
It: the Social Construction of Power Politics
9
 that the social constructivist approach 
gained popularity and started to significantly influence international relations theory. 
It has appeared as a critique of the orthodox IR theories such as neo-realism and neo-
liberalism and as an alternative for explaining the nature of the international 
system.
10
 Constructivism considers knowledge to be intersubjective, just like social 
reality is intersubjective. From this it follows that it is impossible to take a position 
outside of society, to be in that sense ‘objective’ in one’s observations and 
deductions in respect to the observed phenomena. The one who observes always 
engages with the problem with a set of pre-defined concepts and ideas. The observer 
thus already has a specific ‘knowledge’ of reality which in turn shapes their 
understanding and the ability to analyse and explain. From this follows that all 
categories used by social scientists are social constructs.  
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This view is a radical move away from the positivist approaches that on the 
whole support the idea of an objective reality which can be measured, tested, 
presented with models and finally, predicted.
11
 For constructivists and 
poststructuralists all knowledge is always and exclusively social. Their criticism of 
positivism mostly focuses on their attempt to reduce social reality to models and to 
arrange the objective findings through quantitative methods of analysis. Instead, 
social constructivism focuses on the peculiarities of every case and its 
complexities.
12
 However, it is important to note that this rejection of a particular 
understanding of empiricism does not mean that poststructuralist scholars reject all 
empirical data about the world. Rather, it is a question of the way they understand 
facts and the way they construct empirical analysis around them. Poststructuralism 
rejects the notion that we can understand and study facts in a systematic way with the 
use of models that resembles the methods of natural sciences. Poststructuralism 
stresses context and meaning as crucial for understanding the world around us and 
suggests that all empirical reality cannot be separated from the meaning we attach to 
it. Hence, it stresses the importance of looking at all reality, both empirical and 
social, as two sides of the same coin that cannon exist without one another, and as a 
consequence cannot be analysed in isolation. This feature of poststructuralist 
thinking will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter, as part of the 
theoretical framework of the thesis.   
There are a number of points that can be discussed regarding different 
theoretical approaches and identity, but I would like to focus on one that is relevant 
to my own study, and which will be central to my own poststructuralist argument, 
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elaborated in the following chapter. This point concerns the role of identity in 
political research and its nature.  
The most important element that distinguishes the social constructivist 
agenda from positivist perspectives is the stress on learning and change that takes 
into account features and actors that are discarded by positivist approaches.
13
 These 
main features include the identity of actors, processes of identity and preference 
formation, and the role of ideas and norms that shape actors’ preferences. 
Constructivists claim that there is no ‘objective’, external reality in the social world 
which dictates the behaviour of states and other actors on the international stage, but 
that the social and political world of today is a construction, a result of on-going 
practices that have shaped the identity of actors together with their interests. 
Constructivists do not dismiss the power of structure altogether but argue that 
identities and interests are shaped by the interaction between structure and units.  
One of the central concepts to all branches of constructivism is identity. 
Empiricist schools do not provide an answer to the question of how states acquire 
identities and interests.
14
 Changes of identity are not even an option for empiricists 
since the very concept does not fit into their ontological framework. They tend to 
assume that a state’s identity is exogenously given and not dependent on historical, 
social and political context, and therefore is fixed, without an ability to change. 
According to this logic, identities shape state interest and these interests do not 
change, and thus in these approaches we always encounter struggle for power and 
material gain as determining principles of political action. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that identity is simply not a consideration for positivist approaches because it 
is not necessary for the explanation of occurrences that this epistemological position 
tends to analyse. 
On the other hand, social constructivists acknowledge the importance of a 
state identity. Their reasoning rests on a fundamentally different principle, that 
identity is the result of intersubjective practices between actors, of the reading and 
interpreting of social acts, of interplay between the structure and its units. 
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Constructivists challenge positivist belief that identities are exogenously given and 
claim that they are results of interaction.
15
 They claim that meanings are assigned to 
situations on the basis of institutionally defined roles. However, if situations are 
unprecedented in the actor’s experience, the actor must construct the meaning of the 
given situation, by analogy or invention, and it must define its interest accordingly. 
In this way interests are not fixed and not necessarily material.  
The understanding of ideas in IR is therefore crucial for a deeper awareness 
and analysis of identity. Positivist approaches tend to describe the role of ideas in 
narrow ways, keeping them on the level of serving instrumental purposes. Rationality 
is understood as a ‘natural’ concept, rather than constructed, where ideology is only 
employed for rational calculations of actors, and causal force of social facts is always 
subordinated to the materialist or rationalist view of the world. Constructivists seek 
to identify a whole range of ideational factors that shape the identity and preferences 
of actors, which include culture, ideology and norm driven behaviour. According to 
this position, the structure of the international society is socially constructed and 
therefore depends on these factors.
16
 Ideas, when understood as collective 
knowledge, are seen as a driving force behind social action.
17
 Constructivists are also 
interested in preferences but unlike positivists they understand preferences to be 
dependent on the identity of actors. These preferences are not necessarily defined as 
being material, but can be defined in non-material (or ideational) terms as well.
18
 
In this way constructivism demonstrates a higher degree of theoretical 
development in this area of study. However, the problem with this kind of theorising 
and research is that it always keeps returning to the same debate and is centred 
around the issues such as the nature of rationality, state centric approaches, or the 
structure and agency debate, to name a few. I argue that looking for mechanisms and 
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causal explanations limits enquiry to a tracing of processes based on observable and 
measurable features, without paying enough attention to subtleties in communication 
and discourses present within a given context. In these types of approaches, both 
positivist and constructivist, the inclination is to separate incentives and norms, to 
allocate them distinctive functions and to view them in the strict ‘material vs. 
ideational’ divide which relies on the notion of causality. It is a very one-dimensional 
outlook which in turn produces an unsatisfactory account of change within the 
political sphere.  
I argue that both positivist and constructivist approaches offer a valuable but 
limited explanation and understanding of such complex processes because of their 
ambition to provide overall, universally valid explanations. Their epistemological 
positions prevent them from placing more focus on the actors and the complexity of 
their interaction. On the other hand, I stress the importance of being sensitive to the 
context and specificity of a process, rather than looking at a series of causal 
mechanisms in order to produce a matter-of-fact explanation. A complete, wide-
ranging analysis of a process of change demands looking into several elements. 
This thesis employs a poststructuralist approach to studying Croatia and the 
reconstruction of its political identity and in doing so if offers an alternative reading 
of political events that took place. The thesis is informed by the previous studies 
conducted from a rationalist and constructivist frameworks and has drawn valuable 
insight from them, such as the relevance of understanding the processes of 
international cooperation, the role of individual actors who have the power to 
influence political events, and a number of points about identity construction. Its 
contribution, however, is to be found within the growing number of poststructuralist 
studies that apply theoretical insight to empirical studies. The following chapter will 
start by discussing poststructuralism in general terms, and proceed to focus on a 
specific field that addresses politics and identity and their complex relationship of 
mutual constituitivness.  
The following section looks at Croatia’s historical and political context that 
will offer a background for a better understanding of the case studies analysed later 




and several events leading to its independence, the war, and the Tuđmanist 
discourses on statehood and Europe. Another purpose of the historical overviews is 
to highlight a number of emerging discourses that proved to be important for the 
analysis of events that form the focus of this thesis. The discussion will thus focus 
both on historical facts and the way they were interpreted in the subsequent periods, 
and thus shaped political debate in a particular way.  
 
 
1.5 Croatia and its place in Europe: between the East and West    
 
One of the central aspects of this study is the problem of where Croatia 
belongs on the map of Europe. The events that took place in the year 2000 witness of 
a confusing and challenging period where difficult decisions had to be made and 
ways of moving towards European Union membership were sought. Controversial 
questions were raised and often the answers were weak, unconvincing and even 
contradictory. At the heart of it all stood the question that politicians struggled to 
answer: how can we leave the Balkans and move closer to the Western world? 
 
The end of Yugoslavia and the Croatian proclamation of independence 
 
 In the late 1960s Croatia and Slovenia started opposing the politics of 
centralisation and territorial redistribution of economic resources in Yugoslavia. In 
Croatia the movement acquired supporters from various backgrounds and 
subsequently turned into a political as well as a cultural movement.
19
 The first 
revival of Croatian national consciousness began among intellectuals with the focus 
on language and cultural questions. The important centre of the movement was 
Matica Hrvatska, a publishing house that argued against the Croatian language being 
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downgraded to a dialect of the so-called Serbo-Croatian and portrayed the Serbs as 
ruthless and backward, brutally oppressing the more advanced Croats.
20
 The 
movement ended with police action and the threat of army intervention. The leaders 
were dismissed and many of those involved were imprisoned, while a number of 
leaders of the Croatian League of Communists were removed from office. The period 
that followed saw the repression of every nationalist and liberal sentiment in Croatia 
which was from then on referred to as the ‘silent republic’. Its communist leadership 
avoided all confrontation with the authorities for the next 20 years and all who 
supported the opposition movement were seen as dangerous nationalists and were 
persecuted, jailed or forced to emigrate.
21
  
 The political stillness in Croatia ended in 1989 when new political parties 
were established. The question of nationalism was something that featured heavily in 
all of the parties, albeit in different ways regarding their understanding about the 
position Croatia should have within the Yugoslav federation.
22
 In June 1989 Franjo 
Tuđman founded the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – 
HDZ) that became the strongest contender at the forthcoming elections. Tuđman was 
an ex-general in the Partisan army in the Second World War and a reformed 
nationalist whose call was to ‘national reconciliation’ between all of the levels of 
Croatian society, especially between the left and the right. Another feature of 
Tuđman’s programme was decreasing the power of Serbs in favour of ethnic 
Croatians.
23
 In eastern Slavonia a section of the Serb elite started to organise its own 
party under the name Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)
24
 that argued in favour of 
establishing autonomy of the Serbian districts of Croatia. They were supported by 
Slobodan Milošević and other Serb-nationalist politicians in Belgrade.  
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 The final break-up of the Yugoslav Communist Party happened at the 14
th
 
Party congress in Belgrade on 23 January 1990.
25
 At the centre of the debate were 
two competing views on the future of Yugoslavia that clashed openly. Serbian 
communists wanted the return of the centralised party structure while the Slovenian 
Communists, supported by Croats, argued for a loose association of republican 
parties. However, after all the amendments proposed had been overruled by majority 




 In Croatia’s first democratic elections on 22 April 1990 the HDZ defeated the 
Communist Party. The first meeting of the new Croatian Parliament was held in May 
1990 when amendments to the republic’s constitution were introduced and the word 
‘socialist’ was dropped from the name. In December 1990 a new constitution was 
introduced and declared Croatia to be the homeland of the Croatian nation. The new 
Government introduced discriminatory policies against the Serbian population and 
defined the new state as belonging to the ethnic Croats. In eastern Slavonia where the 
Serbian population had a provisional majority, many did not recognise the new 
government and started establishing their own institutions.  
The Croatian Constitution proclaimed the republic’s sovereignty and the right 
to secede from the Yugoslav federation. It also established a bicameral parliament 
with a lower house-the House of Representatives and an upper house-the House of 
Counties. A new Citizenship Law was passed that allowed ethnic Croats who lived 
                                                 
25
 The following titles represent a selection of a variety of approaches to the topic of disintegration of 
Yugoslavia: B. Denitch (1994), Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia, University of 
Minessota Press, Minneapolis, MN, L. J. Cohen (1993), Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration 
And Balkan Politics,  Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado; I. Banac (2001), Raspad Jugoslavije: eseji 
o nacionalizmu i nacionalnim sukobima, Durieux, Zagreb; S. L. Woodward (1995), Balkan Tragedy: 
Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War,  Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC ; S. P. 
Ramet (1996), Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, 
 
Westview Press, Boulder Colorado; D. Jović (2003), Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla, Prometej, 
Zagreb; D. Jović (2001), ‘The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: A critical review of Explanatory 
Approaches’ in European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 4 No.1, Sage Publications; London, 
Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi; D. Ljubišić (2003), A Politics of Sorrow: The Disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, Black Rose Books, Montreal, I. Goldstein (1999), Croatia: A History, Hurst & Company, 
London
 
, M. Glenny (2000), The Balkans 1804-1999, Granta Books, London
; 
S. Malešević (2002), 




 G. Uzelac (2006), The Development of the Croatian Nation: an Historical and Sociological 




abroad the right to apply for citizenship and to vote in elections without being 
residents, but at the same time non-ethnic Croats had to prove their right for 
citizenship by presenting evidence of their residence in Croatia for the period of at 
least five years and proficiency in the Croatian language.
27
 The new Constitution 
caused alarm among the Serb population because it appeared to downgrade their 
status as citizens from ‘constitutional nation’ to ‘national minority’.
28
 The political 
parties did not secure an accord between the Serbs and Croats in this process of 
gaining independence and the added fuel to the fire was the anti-Croatian propaganda 
of the Belgrade press that was widely read by the Serbian population in Croatia.  
 
  
The ‘Homeland War’ 
  
On 18 May 1991 Croatia held a referendum for independence. The result was 
an 84 percent turnout and 93 percent in favour. However, 600,000 Serbs in Croatia 
boycotted the vote. A month later, independence was declared with the 
‘Proclamation of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia’. On 15 January 
1992 Croatia was recognised by the international community, together with Slovenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia.
29
   
Croatia had a big Serbian minority population in some parts of eastern 
Slavonia, and Milošević’s policy was to incorporate these areas into a new ‘Greater 
Serbian state’. The crisis rapidly grew and at the end of August 1991 the JNA – 
Yugoslav National Army
30
 expelled the Croatian population in the region of Baranja. 
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In September a major offensive was launched by the JNA in eastern Slavonia and in 
Dalmatia. This officially marked the beginning of the Homeland War. The most 
violent battle of the war was fought in Vukovar, a town in eastern Slavonia. It was 
besieged for two months, completely destroyed and finally conquered by the JNA. 
Most civilians had fled by that time but about 300 people were killed in its local 




The European Union managed to pressure the warring parties into signing an 
agreement in The Hague to end the war, according to which Croatia would be 
recognised and the JNA would withdraw from its territory, while the breakaway 
regions of Krajina and Slavonia would be demilitarised and patrolled by UN 
peacekeepers. UN Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992 authorised 
the deployment of UNPROFOR in the region with 15,000 peacekeepers.
32
 The JNA 
withdrew but Serbian militias continued to operate in the area and prevented the 
return of Croatian refugees which made the UN and EU involvement controversial 
and highly criticised in the following years.  
 The period of 1992-1994 was one of relative peace. By 1995 the Croatian 
Army was significantly increased in strength and capability and launched a series of 
offensives to regain territories lost to rebel Serb forces. Operation Flash (Operacija 
Bljesak) was launched in May 1995 and removed Serb forces from the Krajina region 
in western Slavonia. One of the results of the operation was an estimate of 30,000 
displaced Serbian civilians. The largest of the offensives, Operation Storm 
(Operacija Oluja), began on 4th August 1995 and in a few days the Croatian forces 
took almost all of the territory previously occupied. In 1997 this transition of 
authority over the occupied territories was carefully completed.
33
 
 The Homeland War and its aftermath were spent in rebuilding of the country 
and attempts to improve relations with the international community. The process was 
difficult and progressed slowly. Dissatisfaction grew among the population and 
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public criticism of Tuđman and his politics was becoming more vocal. It was with 
his death in December 1999 that the period ended and provided an opportunity for a 
radical change in Croatian politics.  
 The Homeland War has been a defining feature of the modern Croatian state. 
It has been defined a war for liberation and a final step in achieving long desired 
freedom from foreign rule and sovereignty. The theme of fighting for freedom was 
coupled with the interpretation of events that took place during the Yugoslav period. 
These discourses gained a status that was difficult to challenge and the period studied 
in this thesis is when these things are starting to be critically examined. Operations 
Flash and Storm turned out to be highly controversial and a reason for a number of 
trials in The Hague. Discourses of justice and the need to reveal the truth about the 
war dominated the political discussion in the year 2000, and continued afterwards. 
The subsequent analysis will refer to these events and look for the way these 
discourses that were crucial for the construction of Croatian identity were defended, 
reconstructed, as well as openly challenged in the new political context. 
 
 
The Tuđmanist discourse 
  
The following section will analyse the Tuđmanist discourse that defined the 
entire period of the 1990s and determined the way political questions were posed in 
the new government discourse in the early post-election period in 2000. The analysed 
Tuđmanist discourse revolves around a number of nodal points that continued to 
structure the political discourse of the following period, although they required a 
reconstruction of their meaning to become more in line with the European 
requirements. The following discussion will thus provide an opportunity to compare 
the two and to reveal the development of political discourse over a short period of 
time. 
This analysis is based on my own reading of Tuđman, as well as a number of 




overview is to draw relevant discourses from Tuđman’s rhetoric that were still 
present in the following period, and underpinned many political debates of the time. 
This analysis will demonstrate that there are very strong links between these two 
time periods and that it is important to acknowledge this discursive 
interconnectedness in order to more clearly understand the subject matter of the 
thesis.  The following discussion addresses discourses of sovereignty, freedom, 
justice and what constituted Croatian identity over a period of time.  
 During the period of the 1990s Croatian national identity was shaped 
primarily through the discourse of the historical statehood that proposed that Croatia 
held continuous statehood since the medieval times and had preserved its statehood 
through many guises.
34
 The discourse on the historical statehood starts with the 
articulation of the ‘centuries-old’ dream, placed in the medieval times. A continual 
line of political independence was traced, between the tenth century when Tomislav 
assumed the title of King of Croatia and Dalmatia, and the Formation of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. The central signifier in the 
discourse was sovereignty and its meaning was reinterpreted and confirmed 
throughout the history.  
The continuity of statehood was understood as the basis of ‘Croatianess’, the 
main source of the people’s national identity. The discourse of continual statehood 
challenged the legitimacy of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918) and the 
Socialist Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia (1945) because the Croatian Parliament 
had not freely chosen to enter into the union.
35
 The stress on voluntary action that 
justifies modifications to the meaning of sovereignty will be encountered once again 
in relation to the cooperation with The Hague tribunal, which demonstrates a direct 
connection with Tuđman’s discourse on sovereignty. With the elections of 1990 
Croatia again introduced the notion of statehood into the mainstream political 
discourse of the new regime. By invoking the Croatian right to an independent state 
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as the central political aim of society, the new regime managed to use this tradition in 
order to present itself as being responsible for the realisation of this ‘900-year old 
dream’.36 
Croatia saw itself as developing along the lines of Western liberal democracy 
and was keen to show its progress. However, despite the regime’s attempts to present 
Croatia as a case where the rule of law has been achieved, many argued that that was 
very far from the truth and that the regime’s source of legitimacy was rooted 
elsewhere – in the charismatic authority of the leader.
37
 Tuđman’s charisma and 
authority was a big part of the 1990 campaign. Many compared him to Tito: a 
prophetic leader who would fulfil the 1,000 year old dream of establishing an 
independent Croatian state. It was generally accepted that he accomplished 
something close to a miracle: under his leadership, poorly armed Croats managed to 
defend themselves against ‘the fourth military force in Europe’.
38
 This feature of 
Croatian victory over Yugoslavia that was made possible by Tuđman, was another 
central element in Croatian identity construction. It led to the construction of the 
Serbian other in negative terms, as aggressor, backward and an inherent enemy of 
Croatia. This construction will prove to be central for the analysis of Croatian 
identity later on. 
The linking of the HDZ with Croatia was a recurrent theme in the party’s 
rhetoric, like in the following example: ‘This election has shown that all enemies of 
the HDZ are also the enemies of the sovereign Croatian state.’
39
 In the media the 
relationship between Tuđman and the Croatian people was depicted as being one: ‘In 
that expression of togetherness it became clear that Tuđman was not making 
decisions alone, but it was the history and people in Tuđman; that one man is not an 
accident of free will but of collective identification and a thousand –year-old 
ambition with which an individual Tuđman is not an individual Tuđman any more 
but Croatian destiny. In that way his decisions are the decisions of the Croatian 
people.’
40
 The HDZ members openly stated this relationship as not only natural but 
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necessary for the preservation of the Croatian state, which is evident in the following 
text: ‘If this Croatia, established by the HDZ, this Tuđman’s Croatia would fall 
through, I am sure that would be the end of Croatian people’.
41
 Or again: ‘In my 
opinion one can put a symbol of equality between new Croatia and Tuđman.’
42
  
The linkage between party, president and the state was the cornerstone of the 
HDZ project in the 1990s.
43
 To spread the HDZ vision of a unified and independent 
Croatia, Tuđman established a political movement in which he embodied the 
Croatian nation and was the personification of Croatian unity. The thread that 
connected them all was the desire to have a Croatian state. He saw himself as 
necessary and needed to bridge the rifts between all different levels of Croatian 
society and the programme of the so-called ‘national reconciliation’ was committed 
to bringing back political émigrés and their descendants. In this way Tuđman was to 
be ‘the president of all Croats.’
44
 In this sense the HDZ looked more like a national 
movement than a regular political party. In Tuđman’s opinion that was a desirable 
status, and is best demonstrated in the following quote: ‘Unlike all the political 
parties before, based on neither class or ideological-political differences, the HDZ 
appeared as a nation-wide democratic party focused on bringing together all nation-
building forces in all layers and classes of society, from the radical right through the 
moderate position to the revolutionary left.’
45
  
Another strategy for the unification of Croats was a clear definition of the 
Serbian ‘other’. Tuđman argued that their ‘otherness’ was based on three levels: 
cultural, historical, and geographical.
46
 He argued that Croats had culture while Serbs 
did not, that Croatia’s culture was Western while Serbia belonged to the East, ‘like 
Turks and Albanians that belong to the Byzantine culture.’
47
 Tuđman claimed that in 
historical terms, it was the foreign powers that brought Serbia and Croatia together in 
1918, two nations that up to that point had a different national consciousness, cultural 
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make-up and ‘general historical, state-political and religious tradition’.
48
 He argued 
that Croatia and Serbia were geopolitically and culturally separate: Croatia being at 
the heart of Europe, both geographically and politically, while Serbia was on the 
Balkans. Furthermore, Tuđman stressed that the difference between the two were not 
simply differences between two countries but between two civilisations.
49
 This is one 
of the central discourses in this study and shall be examined in detail in chapter four 
in terms of the civilisational discourse of ‘the West’ versus ‘the East’. Croats were 
the civilised entity versus the uncivilised, Balkan Serbia, a backward country that 
had impeded Croatia’s progress in the past. Croatia was perceived as being Western 
and thus different from/opposed to the Serbs which were in turn Eastern, backward, 
primitive, Balkan people. It is a matter of differences between civilisations and not 
only nations. In order to protect Croatia from the East, Tuđman desired a state for 
ethnic Croats exclusively.  
  
 
Croatia and the European Union in the 1990s 
 
The following section looks at developments during the 1990s that concerned 
Croatia’s relations with the European Union.  Like in the previous sections the aim is 
to identify a number of relevant events and how they were discursively constructed 
in the official discourse. This will allow us to more clearly see the connections 
between them and the post-Tuđman discourses and how they eventually underwent 
reconstruction. This section introduces identity, the question of national minorities 
and the civilizational discourse that are central for the analysis in this thesis.  
In the early 1990s the official Croatian Discourse insisted that Croatia was a 
Western European country and it expected the European Union to help it on the way 
to recovery and progress. However, in the years after the war, Tuđman lost faith in 
Europe because his perceptions of Croatia and ideas about where it was supposed to 
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be heading were in sharp contrast with the EU agenda. The European rejection of 
Croatia and the demands imposed were understood as an injustice and a lack of 
support. Tuđman accused the EU of being vindictive towards Croatia because of the 
role it played in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and blamed the EU for not wanting 
to face the truth of having an ‘untidy area’ it was not capable of managing during the 
wars of the early 1990s.  
Another point that Tuđman liked to stress was the EU’s failure in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina due to Croatia’s close links with the USA. It was because of that, 
Tuđman claimed, that the American concept prevailed, formulated in the Dayton 
Peace Accords.
50
 In this element he saw another reason for the EU to be against 
Croatia, embodied in the ‘Western Balkans’ approach. When the EU pointed to the 
eviction of Ethnic Serbs in 1995 after the operation Storm and heavily criticised 
Croatia for it, Tuđman angrily replied: ‘Some European states dare to teach us 
lessons on how to treat minorities. They have forgotten that a democratic France, for 
example, does not even recognise the existence of minorities on its soil. Or, they urge 
us that we must return all Serbs who fled from Croatia during the war, but they forget 
that they could not solve problems like that between Czech Republic and 
Germany.’
51
 This statement demonstrates his understanding of internal differences in 
the European Union with regard to minority rights and a number of problems that 
exist within that domain.   
 In 1997 the EU introduced the Regional Approach policy for the countries of 
the Western Balkans. The very concept of the ‘Western Balkans’ had an ugly ring in 
Croatia and suggested that Croatia was a Balkan country instead of a European one. 
The Balkans linked Croatia to Serbia, Bosnia, and Albania, among others, all seen as 
undeveloped and backward societies. Being placed in the Western Balkans group 
rather than with the Central European countries was seen as a major step back and 
even an insult. Tuđman responded in anger, claiming that the use of the concept 
suggested European hostility towards Croatia and a threat to Croatian sovereignty.
52
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 Over time Tuđman’s rhetoric became more and more like the one he used to 
employ against Belgrade. Croatia was a ‘small nation’, unimportant in international 
politics, under the mercy of great powers. The European Union, just like Yugoslavia 
before that, was called an ‘artificial creation’, a project based on idealistic visions 
that are unrealistic.
53
 Europe and Brussels became the other in the new rhetoric.  
Fighting the mighty neighbour again was to become a new myth on which his 
nationalism would feed and around which he tried to gather followers. The rhetoric 
of self-sufficiency changed the target (Brussels instead of Belgrade) but not 
fundamentally the content. Internal and external enemies remained a constant threat 
to Croatian stability and worked to undermine its sovereignty. Tuđman’s ideas could 
not survive the modern European democracy. The failure to change and reinvent the 
discourse on the Croatian nation and statehood became a very obvious drawback. 
 This overview has focused on relevant events and discourses that are needed 
for a deeper understanding of events that are the focus in this thesis. It is important to 
demonstrate the links between the domestic context and political choices being 
made, especially when the analysis addresses complex periods of transition and 
profound change. Discussing Croatia’s position in Yugoslavia and a development of 
a number of issues that occupied the political discourse of the time reveals a link 
with a number of political discourses encountered in the analysis. The same applies 
to the Homeland War and its role in the Croatian identity construction, underpinned 
by the hegemonic discourse of Tuđman and his followers. The new government was 
faced with the remains of the legacy of the 1990s and a country struggling to 
reconcile the demands of the international community and its own sense of identity. 
The outlined events and discourses will aid the analysis of changing Croatian identity 
within the area of cooperation and minority protection, by placing them within a 
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1.6 Research questions and thesis structure 
 
This thesis applies the poststructuralist framework  in order to analyse the 
reconstruction of Croatian identity in the post-Tuđman period, within the wider 
framework of European Union enlargement initiatives. In doing so it analyses 
discursive changes on cooperation with the ICTY and minority rights protection.  
The study starts with the hypothesis that political identity and policy choices are 
mutually constitutive and that this relationship is crucial for understanding political 
change in a given context. The main questions concern the reconstruction of Croatian 
identity and how that came about, which actors were involved in the process, and 
what the outcome was. This thesis attempts to answer these questions in regard to the 
Croatian case but also seeks to go beyond them and address some theoretical 
questions regarding the process of identity construction and the process of othering. 
More specifically, the following research questions are explored in the thesis: 
1. How was Croatian identity discursively reconstructed in the immediate 
post-Tuđman period?  
2. What is the position of the Serbian other and can it be changed? 
3. What are the implications for the identity of Croatia if the Serbian 
radical other changes into a non-radical other?  
Therefore, the main contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, it contributes 
to the understanding of the Croatian case in terms of empirical work conducted from 
a poststructuralist perspective. And second, it contributes to the development of 
theory regarding the process of othering, the relationship between the subject of 
analysis and its others and the changes within the other’s identity.  
These questions are explored over seven chapters. Chapter 2 addresses 
poststructuralist approaches and discusses the basic tenets of its ontology and 
epistemology.  It discusses several crucial concepts for poststructuralist analysis and 
the way they will be used in the data analysis chapters. Furthermore, it discusses a 
body of poststructuralist work that addresses the question of identity and the 




framework for the analysis of data in subsequent chapters and will point to existing 
problems in the literature and suggest ways to bridge this gap. 
 Chapter 3 elaborates on methodology used in the study and the way it will 
feature in the analysis of data. The process of analysis is outlined step by step and 
particularities of the study are placed within the methodological context. Links 
between the methodology and poststructuralist theory are highlighted, as well as the 
way they will be employed in the analysis of data.  
 Chapter 4 contains an overview of events and of the new political agenda in 
the immediate post-Tuđman period, as well as the debates on the Constitution, the 
range of presidential power and the nature of democracy. It proceeds to analyse the 
civilisational discourse of the West versus the Balkans that has a function of a basic 
discourse in the study, which organises other discourses around itself. This is 
followed by an account of the Serbian radical other and the meaning of the Balkans. 
It addresses the Balkans as a geographical and civilisational space and Serbia as an 
extension of the Balkans near and within Croatia. The last section of the chapter 
analyses Croatia’s role in the region as working ‘for Europe’, and its role in 
democratising the neighbouring countries.  
The material discussed in this chapter is crucial for the study of cooperation 
with The Hague and of the question of minorities. It sets up the scene for the 
following analysis by rooting the two case studies in the civilisational discourse that 
adds an extra dimension to the study by relating it to the wider context of Croatian 
historical and contemporary debates. 
 Chapter 5 contains an analysis of discourses surrounding cooperation with the 
ICTY. It looks at the rearticulation of the concept of sovereignty that is crucial for 
the discourse of Croatian historical statehood. It carries on addressing the othering of 
Croatia’s own past and of separating the legitimate defenders of the war and war 
criminals. The last step in the process concerns the change from constructing Serbia 
as a threat to the existence of the sovereign Croatian state towards the reconstruction 
of danger that is interpreted as remaining in the Balkans.  
 Chapter 6 studies the discourses around the protection of minority rights. The 




extension of the Balkans within Croatia. The analysis revolves around the concept of 
the radical other and the gradual change towards a less threatening other that 
becomes acceptable to Croatia and does not threaten its Western democratic identity. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 address different issues but share important links between 
them. The civilisational discourse is present in both cases and provides guidance for 
a deeper understanding of the events. Also, it brings to the surface hidden meanings 
present in both case studies and their close connections. The nature of the Serbian 
radical other, the changing subject position of ‘victims’ of the war and ‘aggressors’ 
become evident through the reading of the civilisational discourse and shed more 
light on the questions of cooperation and minority protection. 
 Chapter 7 concludes the study with a discussion of the previous analysis and 
offers critical insight into some methodological and theoretical implications that 
emerged from the analysis. The chapter concludes with possibilities for future 
research and the contribution of the study to the existing literature on Croatia, as well 











2 Theoretical framework  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter considers the theoretical foundations of poststructuralism and 
seeks to highlight key concepts that will subsequently be employed to analyse 
identity change in the context of my Croatian case study. I will address key 
ontological points that underpin this theoretical approach and introduce a set of 
concepts that are necessary for the study of changing Croatian identity in a new 
political setting. The second part of the chapter discusses several studies that belong 
to the Copenhagen School that are essential for my approach to studying political 
identity. The case studies that are discussed contribute to the existing application of 
poststructuralism to empirical analysis, as well as to the study of identity in more 
general terms. These studies are relevant for this thesis because they provide 
examples of how poststructuralist analysis can be conducted, as well as allow for 
further discussion and development of several theoretical points they bring up. 
It is important to demonstrate not only the benefits to be found in using a 
poststructuralist approach  rather than alternative frameworks, but also to attempt to 
broaden the use of poststructuralist approaches and discourse analysis in new case 
studies. Looking at the foundations of poststructuralist thought and its application in 
the Copenhagen School will allow me to develop conceptual tools that are needed for 










2.2 Conceptual framework 
 
Poststructuralism is not a unitary school of thought and serves as an umbrella 
term for a number of thinkers who addressed structuralism from different 
perspectives. They include Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Julia 
Kristeva, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as some of the most prominent thinkers 
who have influenced its theoretical developments in the last decades. The principles 
of these and other scholars with whose work I have engaged with is that they all hold 
anti-positivist positions and challenge the effects of the Enlightenment, which is 
evident in their particular understanding of rationality and positivism.
1
 
Poststructuralism has further developed in the last two decades and found its way 
into contemporary social science, developing its basic ideas along the way and 
broadening the scope of the approach in terms of the application and types of 
analysis. Despite internal differences all poststructuralist scholars reject the 
distinction between the material and the ideational, the discursive and non-
discursive, and the behavioural and linguistic in social practice, and maintain that 
‘objects’ gain meaning in discourse while every discursive structure has a material 
character.
2
 They argue that all objects are constituted in discourse when they acquire 
meaning, and conclude that linguistic and behavioural practices are ontologically the 
same. Much of the criticism aimed at poststructuralist thought focuses on this 
question of discourse that rationalist-empiricist scholars understand as being 
separated from objective reality. But such claims are misleading and demonstrate a 
lack of understanding what poststructuralism is and what its ontological and 
epistemological bases are. Poststructuralist scholars do not reject the notion that 
things exist ‘out there’, but claim that in order to make sense of these objects there 
must be a context, a way for us to understand what they are – or in other words, 
meaning is always attached to them.   
The concept of discourse has a rich history behind its deployment and 
meaning in social sciences. For example, it can refer to a linguistic level only and 
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focus on utterances. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) distinguishes between the text 
and the social, where language, both written and spoken, replicates the social.
3
 Their 
understanding of discourse is thus different from the rest of poststructuralist scholars, 
as they see social action existing at a different level and having a different 
relationship with language. At the other end of the spectrum discourses are seen as 
all-encompassing social meanings and activities. Jacques Derrida’s approach –
‘deconstruction’, focuses on the logic of difference, around which all human activity 
is structured, and which can subsequently be deconstructed. The aim is to discover 
the oppositions on which the text is based and to reveal the complex systems of 
meaning. The binary oppositions in question are not just a part of linguistics, but 
according to Derrida they form the basis of distinction in Western thinking where 
concepts (‘insides’) are defined by their ‘outsides’.
4
 In Foucault the concept of 
discourse refers to historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities 
of subjects and objects.
5
 Discourses are here understood as actual systems of social 
relations and social practices: thinking, talking, political action and policies are 
discourses.  
These authors have left an important legacy in the field and all subsequent 
theorising is in one way or the other related to their work. Derrida’s deconstruction is 
central to poststructuralist understanding how features are related in discourse and 
much of poststructuralist work still examines data from a standpoint of binary 
oppositions and ‘inside’-‘outside’ distinctions between subjects. Foucault’s method 
is still relevant if we want to get to the core of things and understand developments 
within discourses over a long period of time. 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe are two thinkers who have further 
developed poststructuralist thinking and are still considered to be influential and 
relevant to the current developments in the field. In their seminal work, Hegemony 
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, Laclau and Mouffe critically examine the history of Marxist 
thought. They reject its structural determinism and essentialism of class identity.  
They argue for the necessity to recognise the unfixity of every social identity and the 
way that the unfixity produces its effects, and that meaning is never given from the 
start but it depends on the hegemonic discourse within which it exists. According to 
this approach the social order has no essence of its own but it is organised around 
articulatory practices. Articulation establishes a relationship between elements in a 
way that their identity is modified as a result of that articulatory practice. The 
structured totality that results from it they call discourse.
7
  
It is important to note here that poststructuralists do not claim that objects do 
not exist outside of discourse, but that they do not have meaning outside of 
discourse. In this way they never abandon the material character of discourse. Laclau 
and Mouffe thus define discourses as inclusive of all social practices and 
encompassing all social relations. The following passage well demonstrates the 
point: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has 
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with 
the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is 
an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, 
independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is 
constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath 
of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied 
is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different 
assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any 




 Poststructuralist discourse theory assumes that all objects and actions are 
meaningful and that their meaning is a product of historically specific systems of  
rules. It looks into the way in which social practices construct and contest the 
discourses that constitute social reality.
9
 In doing so it stands against the 
epistemology that concentrates on laws and structures, and ‘objects’ and ‘facts’ that 
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speak for themselves and are waiting to be discovered. Poststructuralist approaches 
all reject causal mechanisms in favour of interpretation and understanding. This 
means that one of the main goals of discursive inquiry is to discover the historically 




In my study of Croatia I will examine how discourses of cooperation with the 
ICTY and respect for minorities have evolved within the wider setting of 
democratisation under the EU initiative, and what their role is in the reconstruction 
of Croatian identity. The focus will be on the links between Croatia’s geographical 
and political setting with specific normative implications. The study will aim to 
reveal how certain discursive constructions emerge and how they constrain the 
political debate. 
Poststructuralism emphasises language as being central to political study. 
Language is not just a tool for description but something that constructs those tools 
as well. Positivist epistemology understands that language is essentially about social 
and political phenomena, that it describes the visible and serves as a reference tool. 
Such a theory of meaning has ‘led to the neglect of the value of commitments, 
institutional presuppositions, and models of individual and collective responsibility 
and interest implicit in the concepts employed in political inquiries’
11
 A 
poststructuralist analysis requires a different model of a relationship between 
language and reality that is based on the understanding of language as constitutive of 
social and political phenomena. We cannot speak about the world and experiences 
we have before we establish boundaries that separate one object or concept from 
another. In this way language contains rules that present these boundaries for 
distinguishing phenomena and in this way create the objects and concepts that our 
speech then refers to.
12
 Placing language at the centre of analysis radically departs 
from traditional approaches to international relations because it allows the possibility 
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that tools of analysis can be studied and deconstructed themselves.
13
 Furthermore, it 
suggests a completely different conception of society than the one offered by 
scholars working within the rationalist/empiricist traditions. In this view the language 
does not merely mirror the ‘real’ world but is involved in its shaping, together with 
the actors that influence the structure of society by reproducing certain discourses. 
Interpretation is seen as dependent on a shared system of codes and symbols, 
languages and social practices. The knowledge of ‘reality’ shared in a specific social 
and political context is therefore socially constructed as well.
14
   
Language is a concept that exists on several levels: the philological level, the 
cultural level and the political level.
15
 The three are not necessarily separated but the 
political level is of particular importance for this study since language is used to 
legitimise political moves and to establish what might be interpreted as a fixed set of 
meanings which are difficult to challenge. The result of that is the creation of certain 
constructions of truth that obtain the natural way of being, a taken for granted 
quality. Laclau and Mouffe refer to this phenomenon as hegemony.
16
 The state of 
hegemony is achieved when interpretation and understanding of certain phenomena 
acquire a taken for granted quality in a given society and are understood to possess 
objective validity. It as an articulatory practice instituting nodal points that partially 
fix the meaning of the social in an organised system of differences. Hegemonic 
practices involve ‘the linking together of different identities and political forces into 
a common project, and the creation of new social orders from a variety of dispersed 
elements’.
17
  In this sense hegemony does not simply equate the end result of 
domination, but encompasses the entire process of normalisation and its 
consequences. It is this very phenomenon of normalisation that makes social orders 
possible and apparently stable. The so-called floating signifiers in a given discourse 
have no fixed content and are able to embrace a series of meanings as a 
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 In that process they are rearticulated and become a part of the 
discourse and are constructed according to the nodal points around which the 
hegemonic discourse is centred. The result of this process is that the hegemonic 
discourse becomes ‘objective’ in a society and establishes facts in that social context.  
Hegemony thus refers to a construction of a principal discursive formation. Later on 
I shall demonstrate how this translates into the Croatian context. 
 
 
Nodal points, signifiers, discursive field, and antagonism 
  
This thesis relies upon a number of authors but it is worth looking into 
several concepts developed by Laclau and Mouffe, given their importance in the field 
generally as well as for this thesis in particular. Following from the previous 
discussion about language and meaning, it is now necessary to look into the way that 
meaning becomes established and temporarily fixed. Poststructuralists reject the 
possibility of closure and exhaustion of meaning in the social setting. That suggests 
that meaning can only be fixed temporarily, rather than permanently, and the result is 
that the social is always in a state of flux. As discussed previously, this stabilising of 
systems of meaning or ‘hegemonic formations’
19
 is revolved around nodal points, 
which partially fix meaning and organise social orders. The authors say: 
 
If the social does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and 
instituted forms of society, the social only exists, however, as an 
effort to construct the impossible object. Any discourse is 
constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to 
arrest the flow of difference, to construct a centre. We will call the 
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Every discourse is comprised of a number of nodal points that temporarily fix 
the stability of that discourse. Nodal points are concepts that acquire a specific 
meaning in a given discourse. They have a prominent role in a discourse and have 
the power to define the meaning of other concepts that are related to them. For 
example, the concept of civilisation that works as a nodal point in the thesis defines 
the way that the concept of democracy is articulated in the Croatian context. The 
concept of civilisation is central for the functioning of political life in Croatia. As the 
analysis will show, all political discourse is to a degree linked to the nodal point of 
civilisation. Just like the concept of democracy, sovereignty and rights are also 
defined in relation to civilisation and their articulation in the political discourse 
depends on it. When mapping out the discourse during the analysis it is important to 
recognise which concepts play this role and how they relate to other relevant 
concepts encountered in a discourse. In this way we can draw a grid that 
demonstrates the discursive connections between concepts and how their mutual 
relationships shape the development of a discourse. 
In this way nodal points create and sustain the identity of a discourse by 
constructing a knot of definite meanings in a particular setting.
21
 Discourses of 
westernisation and progress revolve around this concept and depend on the meaning 
that it carries. This means that as Croatia defines itself as Western country and 
belonging to the Western civilisation (rather than the Balkans that belong to the East) 
signifiers ‘democracy’, ‘the state’ and ‘sovereignty’ depend on the nodal point of 
‘civilisation’. In this case it is the Western civilisation that works as a nodal point in 
the Croatian discourse, and ‘democracy’ is as a consequence defined in a very 
specific way that depends on the meaning of that nodal point. This leads us to 
conclude that nodal points structure a discourse and in doing so are able to unify 
various currents in society. For example, despite internal differences, several political 
parties have formed a coalition before the 2000 elections, and their coming together 
was made possible by the existence of this particular nodal point of civilisation. The 
discourse on westernisation was tied together and transformed the direction of 
Croatia’s politics. This example thus confirms the theoretical assumption that nodal 
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points allow coherence and stability in a given discourse by providing points of 
(temporary) fixity of meaning.  
 It may seem that a discourse is completely stable or resilient to change, given 
its level of sedimentation in society. However, poststructuralism stresses that such 
stability is only superficial and temporary and that no matter how successful a given 
discourse is in dominating a discursive field it can never completely articulate all of 
its elements because there will always be existing features against which that 
discourse is defined.
22
 Or to put it differently: something is always excluded. Closure 
is thus impossible with the absence of a fixed centre of a structure and there is 
always something that escapes the processes of signification within discourse. This 
means that through discursive articulation both nodal points and signifiers will 
undergo change at one point. To illustrate this I will look at several signifiers that 
were crucial for the Croatian case that underwent significant discursive changes. 
Sometimes this process is subtle and takes a long time, and sometimes, as in the 
Croatian case, the change is more abrupt and it is easier to pinpoint the exact moment 
when the change occurred.   
 Another important feature of Laclau and Mouffe’s work is the concept of 
antagonism. They argue against traditional understandings of social conflict as being 
a clash of social agents with entirely developed identities and interest. Laclau and 
Mouffe argue that antagonism occurs because social agents are unable to attain their 
identities and interests and that an ‘enemy’ is to blame for that failure.
23
 Antagonism 
positions boundaries between the inside and outside and works as a negative 
experience of the established discourse. In this way they play an important role in the 
construction of a discourse as something against which it identifies. At these points 
the boundaries of a discourse can be identified and analysed and it is there that the 
identity is least stable.
24
 This limit of the social is not something like a frontier that 
separates two territories; there is no perception of anything beyond. The limit of the 
social is thus given within the social itself as something that threatens to subvert it, 
and to thwart its attempt to achieve final closure and stability. Society never manages 
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to fully be, because everything in it is penetrated by its limits, which prevent it from 
constituting itself as an objective reality.
25
   
 Therefore we can understand antagonism as a clash of identities of sorts. 
Identities constitute each other through positive and negative identification, or to put 
it differently, they articulate and rearticulate each other in a complex web of 
interaction. For example, Croatia ‘needs’ the Serbian other that is defined in a 
negative way in order to build its own identity as being different to Serbia. The 
relationship between them is one of antagonism. There is a frontier between them 
and their identities are clearly defined. However, this does not mean that Serbia 
exists outside of this discourse. On the contrary, it is a part of the discourse and it 
presents the limit of the social in the Croatian context because it is perceived as 
something threatening that can subvert it. It is because of the phenomenon of 
antagonism that discourses show the impossibility of closure.
26
 Croatian identity as a 
western country will never be complete or final because of the antagonistic 
relationship with Serbia, who at the same time plays an important role in the 
construction of Croatian identity in the first place.  
 The concepts discussed in these sections are important for most 
poststructuralist analysis, although the emphasis on certain aspects varies among 
them. The following section of the chapter will look into the relationship between the 
subject and identity and discuss the way these concepts are related. Afterwards, 
several studies will be discussed and their importance for the development of this 
approach will be looked at, with the specific aim of placing this thesis within a body 
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The subject, self and identity in poststructuralist thought 
 
A study of identity deserves a closer look into the way that we define the term 
and what its position is in the wider poststructuralist framework. In order to keep 
with the previously examined literature I believe that it is useful to first examine 
the work of Laclau and Mouffe on the topic before proceeding to find another way 
of discussing and defining identity. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy the authors 
consider the subject to exist only as a position within a specific discursive 
formation. They claim that a subject position is an identity that is defined in 
relations to all other identities/subjects that exist within that discursive formation. 
The subject here is therefore an effect of the particular hegemonic system, rather 
than an actor being capable of action. This suggests that individuals hold a certain 
subject position that is the source of their identity. It is possible to occupy a number 
of different subject positions at the same time, depending on the discursive 
structure.
27
 For example, a person can at the same time be Scottish, a father, a 
teacher and a supporter of a political party. These subject positions exist 
independently of one another and are not in conflict.  
As a general rule, these positions or identities depend on the overarching 
hegemonic articulation and the nodal points that appear in the discourse. These 
identities/subject positions will be compatible if they relate to one another 
according to the relationship between the nodal point and the signifiers. However, 
it is equally possible for these subject positions to be in conflict if they do not 
conform to the logic of the links between the positions within that particular 
discourse. Thus, it is not impossible for a person to hold several identities that are 
in less harmonious relationships. Such combinations then create difficulties for the 
stability of that identity and show instabilities in the given discourse that allows for 
such combinations in the first place. Such identities cannot be sustained given their 
instability and always undergo some kind of a discursive shift that will bring them 
in alignment to the overall hegemonic articulation of a given discourse. The 
Croatian case will serve as an example of this situation where the country’s identity 
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needs to be reconstructed in order for it to be compatible with the nodal points that 
govern the official political discourse, and will be explored in detail in the 
following chapters.  
The problem with Laclau and Mouffe’s theorising of subjectivity is that there 
is no explanation of how subject identities are rearticulated in the process of the 
rearticulation of the hegemonic discourse. The subject seems to depend on the 
structure in occupying certain subject positions, rather than actively constructing its 
identity. As a consequence of this apparent fixity, the discursive structure becomes 
impossible to re-articulate and it becomes sedimented and difficult to change. For 
this reason Laclau and Mouffe’s model resembles a structuralist account in which 
agency is passive and thus problematic and incompatible with poststructuralist 
theorising. I argue that it is necessary to develop the poststructuralist theory further 
in order to take greater account of the active ways in which identities are 
constructed and reproduced. In this way poststructuralism will be able to defend 
itself from criticism for not being able to theorise change. I propose a direction that 
is more dialogical than what Laclau and Mouffe suggest, which allows us to 
analyse this question by looking critically within the structure and addressing the 




It is important to note that all the authors discussed in this chapter essentially 
discuss very similar things. They all address the problem of identifying a political 
actor but do that from different angles. All political analysis always returns to the 
question of who acts and why. As discussed previously, answers vary depending 
where one stands on the ontological and epistemological spectrum. The shared 
assumption of all scholars working in a poststructuralist tradition is that social 
actors do not have an essence in themselves. Since meaning is crucial for all 
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communication, and meaning is created in discourse, it follows logically that who 
the actor is and what it does is also created and reproduced in discourse.  
Another argument against the essentialist understanding of a political actor is 
simply that unless we are dealing with an actual human being, the actor in question 
does not have a physical, biological body but is a kind of a collective being, 
something that does not exist in the natural world. A political institution is assumed 
to act as a unified body, but it is comprised of a set of laws, norms and a number of 
people who make it work. It is therefore impossible to view such an actor (or a 
subject) as something autonomous, and equally it is impossible to attribute to its 
existence qualities that human beings possess. Although in everyday speech we 
talk of a national psyche, of national psychology or national consciousness, such 
expressions vaguely address the issue in question. Staying true to poststructuralist 
principles of this thesis, I argue that these things only exist as symbolic expressions 
of more complex phenomena that are found in particular discursive formations. In 
other words, discussing changes in the way Croatia defines itself and the way it 
behaves on the international stage has nothing to do with a supposed ‘national 
being’ that possesses certain psychological features or any other aspect of a human 
person, but is rather a question of a number of discursive constructs that operate 
within the given discursive structure. 
  The following discussion concerns a group of authors from the Copenhagen 
School of security studies who examine the process of identity construction in the 
area of foreign politics and security. The analysis moves away from the agent – 
structure debate towards a process in which actors define and re-define their 
identity through interaction with other actors. This section will demonstrate a 
practical use of how a study of identity can be applied to different case studies in 
the field of politics, as well as allow for a further development of identity 







2.3 The Copenhagen School and the study of identity 
 
The Copenhagen School’s 1988 publication Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis
29
 opened up new debates in the field of security studies and made 
significant contributions by broadening the debate of the discipline and re-defining 
the meaning of security. While retaining the traditional view that security should 
primarily be understood as the survival of a state against existential threats they 
added a number of areas that were not traditionally linked to security and by doing so 
recognised the importance of non-military issues. These include political, economic 
and ecological areas, among others. The Copenhagen School departed from a 
rationalist framework and moved closer to poststructuralist thinking in claiming that 
security issues are created as such and call that process ‘securitisation.’
30
  
Although the main focus of the Copenhagen School is security their relevance 
for this thesis is twofold. Their theorising of identity that has made significant 
contributions to the study in the field of politics has provided a foundation for my 
own understanding of the subject. Secondly, the case studies upon which their 
theorising has been built in many ways resemble my own research interest. The 
poststructuralist aspect of the school’s theoretical underpinnings demanded an 
emphasis on the social aspect of security, which is where we find a distinct focus on 
identity as a crucial factor for their work. Discourses of security are closely linked to 
constructions of identity, since they tend to bring communities together and call upon 
difference between those who are ‘inside’ and those who are ‘outside’. This process 
is thus conducted through the process of othering where actors are outlined and 
defined as being the opposites of each other. They are referred to as self and other 
and stand for the subject of analysis and its antagonist. The other is defined and 
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understood as a source of fear and therefore it becomes a security question in specific 
contexts.  
Furthermore, their emphasis on language that treats this process of 
securitisation as a speech act makes their work open to interdisciplinary use.
31
 As I 
have already noted, the following works have been an immense source of both 
inspiration for my own research project and for identifying possibilities for further 
refinement of their ideas and research material within the poststructuralist framework 
generally. They all address security in different ways but what is important for this 
thesis is their focus on identity construction and its relationship with politics. I will 
first look into these studies and assess their relevance for the area of identity studies 
as well as for my own work, and discuss the theory that underpins their analyses of 
identity, which also provides the foundation of data analysis in this dissertation.  
Iver Neumann’s book Uses of the other: ‘the East’ in European identity 
formation
32
 addresses region building in Europe as a wider topic and focuses on the 
emergence of identities in Nordic countries in relation to its others: Europe and 
Turkey. His study demonstrates the complexity of identity formation on three levels: 
civilisation (Europe), region (Norden and Central Europe), and nations (Russia and 
Bashkotorstan). The theoretical emphasis is on the collective self and international 
cooperation, as well as an in-depth discussion of the development of the self-other 
theorising in the Western thought. 
The first part of the book studies the self-other relationship at the 
civilizational level and compares Russia and Turkey that have existed as European 
others for several centuries. The Turkish case addresses a radical other that has 
always been an outsider and never managed to achieve the status of a European state, 
despite at one point in history having ruled over a quarter of European territory.
33
 
The case of the Russian other is different in that its status is different from that of 
Turkey. The main question that Europe has tried to answer is the question of where 
Russia belongs, which reveals that there has always been ambivalence about Russia’s 
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identity in Europe. Although problematic in that respect, the European discourse 
demonstrated a degree of possibility for Russia to be recognised as European, which 
does not exist in relation to Turkey. The study proceeds to examine a change in the 
construction of Russia and its potential to become civilised, i.e. more like Europe by 
internalising European values. However, the study demonstrates the problematic 
position of Russia as still being barbaric under the layer of European civilised front. 
The concluding remarks introduce the notion of ‘Russia as a learner’ (from Europe) 
and a possibility of its radical otherness to evolve into a less radical other.  
This aspect of Neumann’s study was quite innovative in respect of the other 
work conducted on identity within the political domain. Recognising that the other 
can have different degrees of its otherness regarding the subject that is being studied 
has important implications. It becomes obvious that the self-other relationship cannot 
be treated in a way that assumes that these identities are static and that the 
international system is static also. Both the position of Turkey and Russia change in 
terms of politics and the way Europe relates to them over a longer period of time. 
Neumann reaches a point in analysis where he briefly discusses the possibility of 
Russia changing and being recognised as European but does not go deeply enough 
into the material and as a result this notion has remained largely unexamined. Also, 
there is no discussion about theoretical implications of this finding and the author 
does not explain how the change within Russia occurred. He also does not explain 
why Turkey does not follow the same discursive change and why its otherness 
remains more radical than that of Russia. Neumann’s findings thus serve as an 
indicator of what can be done regarding this question of a changing radical other and 
are a good starting point for elaborating on the process of identity change both in 
terms of the self and its (radical) other. 
In the cases of making of regions Neumann addresses the problem of regions 
in IR literature and examines the concepts of Northern and Central Europe. He 
argues that both are relatively new concepts that during the Cold War existed 
between ‘the East’ and ‘the West’. This East/West divide is seen as crucial for the 
identity of these two regions, and it is something that I will address in more detail in 




examining the genesis of a region and the way it develops, a feature that was 
previously not recognised. He looks at different discourses on the same region and 
strategies employed in the discursive construction of their identity. The case of 
Central Europe features Russia as the other, which was revealed as a necessary 
component in the development of the discourse on Central European and the forging 
of the self that was highly compatible with European representations of Russia. We 
can thus conclude that region building is thus always a political project in which 
actors ‘describe a readily observable reality, in which certain peoples inhabiting 
certain lands happen to share certain cultural traits’.
34
 Neumann demonstrates how 
the discourse on Central Europe offers endless variations on the use and application 
of geopolitical and cultural criteria to delineate a physical space. This is a very 
important aspect of Neumann’s findings but perhaps what is missing here is a more 
explicit link with the ethical component of identity construction. As I shall argue 
later on, the two are always connected and mutually reinforce one another.  
 In the section on making of nations, Russia and Bashkotorstan offer 
interesting case studies of the uses of the other in national identity formation. In 
doing so, Neumann takes a different perspective – the perspective of the other. The 
two cases show how communities that are ‘othered’ deal with it in their own 
discourses. This feature is very interesting and something that is often missing in 
most studies since authors tend to focus on a particular political problem and address 
it from their own perspective. There is nothing wrong in such an approach in itself if 
we assume that all points of view will have equal value and will be readily available 
for readers. The reality, however, is rather different. Local voice is rarely heard and 
when it does appear in the academic circles it tends to be assessed from the 
perspective of the dominant paradigm. To relate this to the case of Croatia and the 
Balkans, there is a plethora of available literature that addresses a variety of topics 
related to the two, but it mostly comes from the English speaking world and remains 
on the level of study where ‘objective’ outsiders look in and explain the observed 
phenomena. Neumann’s inclusion of two discourses that look back at Europe is a 
laudable effort to bring something new to studies of identity, by being sensitive to the 
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local voice and what they have to say for themselves. My study on Croatia is in a 
similar way contributes to the number of studies that look at the local discourses and 
the way they respond and interact with international discourses that concern them 
directly.  
 My overall assessment of Neumann’s study is that it successfully 
demonstrates how the construction and reconstruction of identity exists on several 
levels and how they ought to be conceptually captured in order for us to fully 
understand the complexity of the process. One of the central findings of this book is 
the outlining in great detail how ‘the West’ discursively features in the forging of 
European, regional and national identity, albeit in different ways.  Neumann’s study 
allows us to recognise regions as variations of nation-building and to look for 
similarities in their discourses. Furthermore, the role of political actors (who are 
region builders in this case) is central to the process. This claim does not erode 
poststructuralist belief in mutual-constitutiveness of identity and policy, but it can 
open up some questions about the extent to which international actors influence 
domestic politics and identity, such as the extent to which the European Union has 
helped to constitute the modern day Croatia.  
Looking at domestic political actors brings the focus back home and opens up 
the space for studying the nature of social and political action more generally. 
Neumann’s findings challenge those of Laclau and Mouffe and other scholars who 
follow their theorising by demonstrating that there is indeed more to actors than their 
subject position within a discursive structure. However, it must be noted that the 
study does not go into sufficient detail about the way domestic actors influence 
particular discourses. The study is a great example of looking into history and 
following the emergence of specific discourses on the self and other and linking them 
to contemporary political and social events. Such a Foucauldian type of study is 
indispensable for a clear understanding of the world of today. The scope of the book 
did not allow for an even wider study of self and other, which is not necessarily a 
great fault, given that one piece of research cannot answer all the questions in one 
volume. But this lack in Neumann’s work serves as an inspiration to do that and 




the following chapters is to fill this gap and look at the way political actors are 
involved with identity construction and what their role is in promoting new 
discourses in a particular sphere.  
European Integration and National Identity edited by Lene Hansen and Ole 
Waever
35
 is another study of Nordic countries, but this time the focus is on national 
debates on European integration and examining the high level of Euroscepticism in 
all of the countries. All four studies examine the debates preceding the referenda in 
each of the Nordic countries and examine how concepts ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are used 
in the national debates on Europe. Because of this they are to an extent studies of 
national identity because they looks into how the concept of ‘nation’ is related to 
‘state’ in particular national contexts and how that relationship defines each 
construction of national identity. But the analysis also does more: it demonstrates 
how these concepts and the way they are discursively related on a national level 
shape political debate on the European Union in specific national contexts. Each 
study demonstrates how political actors present political issues through a 
clarification of how that question fits with the country’s particular discursive 
construction of its identity. Europe is thus understood in relation to how a country 
defines itself and how the concepts of ‘state’, ‘nation’ and ‘the people’ have been 
shaped historically. The studies show that the EU project is constituted in positive or 
negative terms, depending on whether it poses a threat to national discourses and 
towards the ideas and concepts that are critical to a country’s identity. 
  The book looks into the debates on European integration in Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway and Finland and each study proceeds in the same way. An account 
of the situation in the period of the 1990s is given, followed by an account of 
historical formation of the key concepts of the studies: ‘state’, ‘nation’ and ‘the 
people’ and the way they are linked to one another in each national discourse. The 
analysis of the debates focuses on the relationship between these key concepts and 
‘Europe’, and the way that political debate developed in each of the countries. The 
findings share many similarities and several significant differences that are worth 
mentioning. All countries had in common the way signifier ‘the people’ was at the 
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core of national identity. In Denmark ‘the people’ was closely linked to any political 
discourse, rejecting all that seemed to threaten this construction of identity based on 
the people-nation-state constellation. The study proceeds to show how the European 
Union integrationist project fit (or to be precise, did not fit) with this particular 
construction of Danish identity and the problems between the two. In the case of 
Norway what was central to the national identity discourse is separation from 
Denmark and its culture on one level, and the separation between ‘the people’ and 
‘state’ which is here understood in terms of its bureaucratic apparatus. The European 
Union was discursively tied to the state and as a consequence it shared its negative 
connotation and was discursively placed in direct opposition to ‘the people’.  
 While Norway and Denmark showed a degree of similarities, Finland and 
Sweden painted a different picture. Euroscepticism in Finland seemed to be less 
strong and the referendum was passed with relative ease. For Finland the main 
problem was cultural identity they wished to preserve from possible imposition of a 
‘EU cultural identity’. Even federalism would have proven acceptable for Finland if 
it were a case of purely economic and political union that would allow the national 
culture to remain free and intact. This case demonstrated a duality between cultural 
and political nation that makes it singular among the Nordic states. Sweden, on the 
other hand, demonstrates a strong discursive link between ‘the people’ and ‘state’, 
but what makes it different from Denmark and Norway is that in those two we find a 
anti-elitist conception of the people who are constructed as being essentially different 
and separated from those  individuals who work for the state. Sweden links the 
‘state’ and ‘the people’ in a positive way and leads to a relationship that in this 
particular circumstance requires a profound rearticulation of both concepts in order 
for them to  be able to accommodate the EU integrationist project.  
 Despite showing differences between the countries, the study demonstrates 
that in all four countries the relationship between signifiers was central to the debate 
on EU integration. National identity was shown to be central to the debate, and that it 
encompassed political and economic questions, as well as cultural ones. This finding 
is compatible with broad poststructuralist claims about discourses and material 




about the way discourses work and how they are related to foreign policy. The 
analysis in this volume offers a detailed historical account of the discursive changes 
of the signifiers ‘people’, ‘fatherland’, ‘state’ and their relationships. The study 
demonstrates how to identify signifiers in a clear way and how to read the data in 
order to follow the political debates for which these signifiers are crucial. Socio-
political context is examined in a step-by-step process, and the changes that occurred 
throughout the centuries are convincingly presented in that attempt. What this 
volume has offered for this thesis is a good starting point for reading identity and 
relating it to the political sphere. It has highlighted the importance of history and 
discursive development of signifiers that are crucial for a study of this type. The 
analysis has demonstrated the need to take into account a variety of domestic factors 
and discursive links between them. It has also given a good example of how to study 
a region and how to go about looking for explanations in variations of the same 
question that is normally applied to the national context.  
The volume’s theoretical findings stimulate further the debate between 
poststructuralist scholars and their intergovernmentalist critics, which would seem to 
be somewhat out of date at this point, because poststructuralism has entered the 
mainstream managed to gain some ground in the wider field of international relations 
and politics. It has demonstrated its relevance by providing new insights into the 
ways in which politics can be studied and understood. However, the authors’ 
theorising on agency has been most insightful and fruitful. The question of agency 
and structural determinism has not vanished from the poststructuralist debates about 
its own scope and nature. The authors in this volume bring us closer to understanding 
political change and at which level we can expect to find it. To be more specific, they 
point out that changes within structure carried out by political agents generate 
change. At the same time they allow the possibility that external factors could be 
responsible for generating significant change in particular circumstances, but that in 
their case studies that was not the case. Their work is thus directly related to Iver 
Neumann’s, both in terms of regional focus and theoretical insights. It becomes clear 
that empirical analysis of this kind is of utmost importance for further development 
of theory in the field. Equally, it demonstrates how theory informs empirical analysis 




As with the previous volume, my study on Croatia has used some of the 
elements that concern the relationship between politics and identity construction. My 
study will take into consideration the existence of one key external factor – the 
European Union, and demonstrate how its role was crucial for the reconstruction of 
identity in the Croatian case. I will use the insights provided by the authors of this 
volume and build upon them in terms of using a different region as well as taking a 
step further in discussing identity and the question of radical otherness in relation to 
politics. 
This leads me to the last book that addresses international politics and 
identity in this section. In her book Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the 
Bosnian War,
36
 Lene Hansen ambitiously embarks upon several tasks. The book 
addresses criticisms that have emerged amongst from mainly empiricist scholars 
about the nature of poststructuralist inquiry and argues for its relevance in the 
international relations field. In order to do so, she takes a critical approach to the 
question of poststructuralist methodology and argues that empiricist criticism can 
best be refuted with a thoroughly worked out system of doing research. The book 
thus functions as a long overdue handbook on poststructuralist methodology, 
exemplified on the case of Bosnia and the conflict in the Balkans.  
Hansen’s primary assumption is that identity and foreign policy are mutually 
constituted. She explains identity construction through the self – other relationship 
and the process of othering, discussing different variations of the self – other 
relationship and elaborates on different analytical lenses for studying that 
relationship. The level of inquiry in this volume is foreign policy, where the research 
programme is based on the assumption that policies are dependent upon 
representations of threat, country, security problem, or crisis they seek to address, 
which places the book within the Copenhagen School’s main research interest on 
security. It is argued that foreign policies need to ascribe meanings to the situation 
and to construct the objects within it, and in doing so they articulate and draw upon 
specific identities of other states, regions, peoples, and institutions as well as on the 
identity of a national, regional, or institutional subject. 
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Several chapters of the book address the need of having a well-designed 
methodology, something that mainstream social science finds lacking in 
poststructuralist analyses. Hansen argues that this kind of work requires clear 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that are able to provide a set of rules 
and guidelines for conducting research, not so different from positivist principles. It 
is the clarity of guidelines that allow for a logical and thorough analysis that can 
progress from one stage to another and show how different elements in a piece of 
poststructuralist research are not accidental, but a well-designed project that has a 
coherent basis for its analysis. Hansen points out that it is important to have a well-
designed starting point but that it is possible to be flexible as research progresses, 
because the whole process often provides opportunities for exploring new ideas and 
unexpected findings. This attitude allows for a degree of flexibility and openness that 
can prevent a researcher from becoming too dogmatic and confined by their own 
methodological principles. But at the same time in order to be able to stay true to 
initial methodological points, the researcher has to be able to account for every single 
decision made during the analysis, in order to remain within the proposed 
methodological framework.  
Hansen’s book relates to other studies of identity but it takes the discussion a 
step further by offering a clear methodological framework. While the work of 
Neumann thoroughly looked into the self and other relationships, it does so in a way 
that to a degree seems intuitive to the reader. Likewise, the other studies discussed 
previously were also based on thorough historical research and connected to 
contemporary questions, but there was a lack in clear setup of the study. As a result, 
the studies are difficult to grasp for those readers who are not well acquainted with 
poststructuralist work and fail to connect to the wider international relations field. 
Hansen manages to bridge this gap without compromising poststructuralist principles 
and takes the reader through the theoretical and case study material in a step-by-step 
manner. 
 The case of Bosnia that follows in the second part of the book shows the 
theory put into practice, and gives an in-depth study of how different representations 




successfully demonstrates how identities and foreign policy are indeed articulated 
and mutually constitutive in discourse, and as such is an exemplary piece of 
poststructuralist research, as well as a good contribution to the literature on the 
Balkans more generally. Although the focus is on the Western debates about Bosnia, 
the study manages to shed some light on the identity of the Balkans as a reflection of 
the on-going debates and existing discourses on the subject.  
It has to be said that this book discusses discourses about Bosnia in a very 
interesting way, but it does so from a perspective of an outsider looking in – the 
focus is after all how the West has debated Bosnia and how that influenced certain 
political decisions.
37
 What is missing here is a domestic voice: a discourse on Bosnia 
from Bosnia. This mirrors the majority of studies on the Balkans where locals rarely 
get a chance to speak for themselves and are always represented through a foreign 
fantasy. This study is extremely valuable for the information it provides, as well as 
its theoretical-methodological discussions, but it leaves us wondering what could be 
added to the existing knowledge if a local perspective was somehow included. My  
thesis seeks to rectify this in a sense, by looking at the domestic sphere and domestic 
discourses about identity, by conducting the analysis of the data in the original 
language, and from a local perspective.
38
 In doing so it directly contributes to the 
literature on the Balkans, and it does that from a standpoint of a local. Security as 
Practice is used as a starting point in terms of methodology and a model of analysing 
data. The proposed analysis it raises questions about the nature of co-operation and 
political action generally. 
Both Neumann and Hansen address the question of geographical space in 
identity construction. Norden, Central Europe and the Balkans are shown to be recent 
political constructs rather than ‘natural’ regions. In the case of the Balkans and 
Central Europe this is particularly evident since there is no final definition of which 
countries belong to them. Both authors demonstrate that region is a political concept 
primarily and Hansen in particular provides an important framework within which it 
is possible to study the geographical aspect of identity formation and link it to a 
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wider set of questions. While Neumann discusses the relationship between culture 
and geography, Hansen links geographical space with a temporal and ethical 
dimension. It can be argued that culture is a part of this ethical dimension and that it 
is also closely related to the temporal element as well, since culture assumes an 
amount of time that it has been in existence, and it cannot exist without a reference to 
morality in some way. Hansen has suggested a way of studying these three 
dimensions of identity construction by looking for references to each during data 
analysis. In this way we can establish a web of meanings that shows how the 
discourse functions. As these authors have demonstrated, a geographical space 
always has a political underpinning, and so it cannot be analysed in isolation from 




2.4. Identity studies in the wider international setting 
 
The following studies address the question of identity in a wider political 
setting, with an emphasis on the European Union and its role in collective identity 
formation and policy issues in its neighbouring countries. This section will discuss 
the relevance of poststructuralist work and its focus on identity in broadening the 
scope of research topics, as well as showing the existing diversity in the field. 
 Identity and regionalism has been researched by Michelle Pace, with the 
focus on the Mediterranean and the discursive construction of its identity. In The 
Politics of Regional Identity
39
 Pace goes beyond a definition of region as a 
geographical-political unit and seeks to highlight the process of how a region comes 
to be defined in specific discursive settings. Her case study is the Mediterranean and 
the emergence of the European Community’s bilateral relations from the 1960s 
onwards. The study looks at how different discourses about the Mediterranean have 
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influenced the development of the European Union’s policies. The study is based 
upon two discourses: that of the European Union (derived from discourses of its 
member states Italy, France and Spain), and that of Greece, Morocco and Malta. The 
study revealed how policy-makers define a geographical and political space and the 
way that translates into policy.  
 Although identity is not the main focus of the study it is a central underlying 
concept and the study addresses some of its relevant aspects. The study looks at 
national identity as well as the identity of a region and problems that arise from this 
development. In the aftermath of 9/11 there was an increasingly negative image of 
the South – the Mediterranean Arab world that was linked to illegal immigration, 
drug trafficking, Islamic radicalism and international terrorism. Creating an area of 
peace and stability in that area was seen as crucial for Europe and its security. The 
in-depth discussion of these discourses reveals a number of internal and external 
others who play different roles in identity formation, from a threatening radical other, 
to a non-threatening other that has positive connotations. The book discusses the 
process of EU identity formation in the context of the Mediterranean area and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that was launched in November 1995.  
Discourses of Italy, France and Spain have been examined in detail with the 
purpose of showing how national discourses on the Mediterranean have found their 
way onto the EU’s agenda and the EMP. The identity of the Mediterranean is 
contested and the relationship between the two entities are quite complex, which is 
discussed within the framework of the EU’s foreign policy. The way that EU 
member states discursively construct the Mediterranean region reveals a complex 
self-other relationship, where the Mediterranean is not European and carries a set of 
characteristics that are in opposition to the way Europe is constructed in the EU’s 
discourse. This relationship between the superior Europe that is the teacher, and the 
inferior Mediterranean that is a learner, forms the basis of the cooperation found in 
the EMP. 
The analysis reveals temporal, spatial and ethical elements to the othering of 
the Mediterranean. One of the things that become increasingly apparent is that 




timeline as itself, but is late in its development. However, despite this potential for 
development and moving closer to Europe, its otherness remains constant despite 
discursive developments and variations among the EU’s member states. What 
remains common among them is the discursive construct of a threat. The author 
concludes her analysis by stating that the Mediterranean is one of Europe’s many 
others that are necessary for the identity construction (and reconstruction) of Europe. 
One of the study’s strengths is the analysis of both the discourse of Europe 
and of three Mediterranean countries, which allows for an interesting comparison 
between the insiders and the outsiders. This kind of comparative work is not often 
found, since a significant number of studies look at the other from the perspective of 
an actor looking from the outside, which tends to be a position of power and self-
confessed superiority.  
In Rethinking the Mediterranean: Reality and Re-Presentation in the 
Creation of a Region
40
, Pace also discusses the Mediterranean as a region and pays 
special attention to the process of region building in IR theory. An examination of 
EU discourses on the Mediterranean reveals practices that give this area a fixed 
meaning, where the Mediterranean as a region is again revealed as an other in 
Europe’s process of identity construction.  
The theory that underpins the study is not strictly concerned with regionalism, 
but is rooted in identity politics and its theorising. Region building is seen in terms of 
how geopolitical space is defined by a number of actors, where critical geopolitics 
questions the nature of identities and other processes found in the production of 
knowledge about a geographical and political space. Identity is thus a result of 
discursive practices, where the identity of the Mediterranean, articulated by the EU, 
reflects back upon the EU’s identity and reveals a number of features that define it. 
This is a two way process where identity and identity construction reveal complex 
relationships between actors and various aspects of their interaction.  
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Pace argues that the way Europe determines the boundaries of its political 
space and of its identity can be considered under the heading of a common threat. 
This aspect of her work keeps her close to the theorising of the Copenhagen School 
and their contribution to a more complex understanding of the relationship between 
security and identity. In the European discourse the Mediterranean has a negative 
connotation of a threat because it is articulated as a space that is not stable and is 
inherently dangerous. The analysis shows that although the EU has had a particular 
relationship with the area through a series of initiatives, it is still not clear what the 
Mediterranean is and how to best identify its features, as well as the on-going 
problem of establishing its boundaries. Pace’s work demonstrates that despite the 
inconsistencies in defining the Mediterranean and variations among the discourses of 
the EU’s member states, what is constant is the perception of a security threat that 
the Mediterranean represents, and its inferiority in regards to Europe. This area of 
diversity becomes discursively unified through the discourse of securitisation of the 
Mediterranean in the EU’s discourse. This allows us to identify the Mediterranean as 
one of Europe’s radical others, where it features as a mirror image to the stable, 
peaceful Europe. It is here that the EU reveals its understanding of the Mediterranean 
countries through the prism of its own concerns, which are mainly security issues.  
 It can be argued that in this way the Mediterranean functions as a radical 
other to the peaceful, stable, organised Europe, and is constructed as an entity that 
does not show much potential for change, despite EU efforts to civilise that space. 
National discourses and the EU’s discourse, defined through the EMP, can in this 
way coexist together, despite their internal differences. Pace suggests that EU 
member states require a radical other that is defined as a threat in order to defend 
their interests in the area.
41
  
Pace’s work demonstrates that identity is crucial for understanding a variety 
of political processes, including foreign policy and security, as well as learning about 
identity construction at a supra-national level. It acknowledges the complexity of the 
process and raises important questions about the range of otherness that is present in 
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the case study. However, despite its meticulous reading of the Mediterranean’s 
identity from various perspectives, the study does not look into the way an other can 
change. The author stresses that othering is crucial for identity construction and treats 
the Mediterranean other as a radical other throughout, despite the acknowledgement 
that various parts of that area carry different degrees of otherness in respect to the 
European Union and its member states. 
In Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU’s 
mode of differentiation
42
 Bahar Rumelili discusses how different constitutive 
dimensions produce different relationships of othering. She looks at the nature of 
difference, social distance and the response of the other. Her analysis is based on 
three case studies: Morocco, Turkey and Central and Eastern European states and 
their relationships with the European Union. The starting point of the study is the EU 
and the question of othering in its identity formation. The argument put forward is 
that the diversity of the EU’s interactions with states on its periphery has not been 
adequately explained, and that a different perspective of looking into these modes of 
differentiation is required. While Rumelili supports the claim that othering is crucial 
for identity formation, she states that this does not imply a relationship based on 
mutual exclusion and the perception of the other as a threat, and argues for a need to 
consider variation and degree when looking into an other.  
 Stressing the social construction of the discourses of difference, Rumelili 
argues that, on the one hand, if difference is constructed as deriving from inherent 
characteristics, such as the other being a separate entity from the subject of the study, 
then it is not possible for the identity of the other to ever change, as it will always 
remain a separate entity. If, on the other hand, the other’s difference is constructed in 
terms of acquired characteristics, there is a possibility for change in the other’s 
identity. In this way Rumelili distinguishes between the ontological question of who 
the other is, and the behavioural practices that are linked with acquired 
characteristics of the other.  
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Her discussion of the EU’s interaction with Morocco, Turkey and CEE states 
shows how differences in their relations lead to different relationships of othering 
and the conditions under which these processes take place. In the case of Central and 
Eastern European states, their shared European identity, based on geography and 
culture, has allowed for EU membership. The relationship between the two is that of 
superiority (EU) and inferiority (CEECs), of teacher and learner. Thus, according to 
Rumelili, CEECs’ inherent characteristics (geography and culture) are shared with 
the EU, while the acquired ones (democracy and capitalism) were subject to 
development and change. In this way CEECs were able to join the EU through their 
identity of a non-radical other that is sufficiently similar to the EU and not a threat.  
Morocco does not share the same geographical space or culture and is thus 
inherently different and non-European, and so without the possibility to become an 
EU member state. Its acquired characteristics have added to the inherent ones and so 
secured its status as an outsider without any possibility for change. The case of 
Turkey is more complex, according to Rumelili, and demonstrates fluctuating 
discourses about Turkey and its characteristics. Discourses on possible Turkish 
membership thus depend on the way Turkey is discursively constructed both in terms 
of inherent and acquired characteristics.   
Rumelili’s work on Turkey demonstrates the earlier theoretical discussion 
about the process of othering. Examining Greek-Turkish relations within the wider 
framework of the European Union shows how the EU’s discourse influences the 
change within the discourse of the Turkish other.
43
 In her analysis Rumelili closely 
examines the relationship between the EU as an institution that proclaims to 
represent a European collectivity and Greece and Turkey through a number of 
discourses. She identifies a change in identity and interest re-definition in relation to 
both Greece and Turkey. A new, pluralistic perception emerges, closely connected to 
the discourse of Europe.  
                                                 
43
 B. Rumelili (2005), The European Union and Cultural Change in Greek-Turkish Relations, Working 




In Transforming the Greek-Turkish conflicts: the EU and ‘what we make of 
it’
44
Rumelili examines the role and development of the European Union in the 
conflicts between the two countries. She argues that the positive impact of the EU on 
Greek-Turkish relations depended on domestic actors who were willing to use the 
EU framework as the basis for cooperation. These actors have depended on the EU to 
provide the framework of incentives, ideas and norms within which they can 
conceptualise their policy changes. This relationship of mutual dependency was 
established after Turkey gained EU membership candidacy. A closer look at the case 
study reveals that identity is an important aspect in the relations between Greece and 
Turkey, as well as between the two countries and the European Union. The 
fluctuating relations between Greece and Turkey always retained radical otherness at 
their centre, up until the very end of the 20
th
 century. The involvement of the EU has 
opened up an avenue for a different dynamic between the two states and closer 
cooperation between them. Since 1999, when Turkey gained candidacy status, 
Rumelili argues that it ceased to perceive its neighbours as security threats, and 
accepted the link between EU membership and the resolution of conflicts with 
Greece. Previously antagonistic and oppositional identities gradually started to 
change in the direction of a less radical other. For example, the EU’s discourse 
represented Turkey as unable to change and inherently non-European before the 
1999 turning point. Equally, Greece positively identified with the EU as long as the 
EU’s discourse was sceptical towards Turkey and excluded it from the discourse on 
Europe. In the post-1999 period the Greek discourse on Turkey changed and 
represented Turkey as pluralistic and able to change, together with a closer 
identification of Greece with Europe and European norms and values. In Turkey a 
similar discursive shift took place, and the tension between the construction of the 
EU as both an aspiration and a threat started to change, and the positive identification 
with the EU (that is its aspiration) became dominant and gained prevalence over the 
discourse of threat. The author argues that Turkey’s new identity as an EU candidate 
allowed for acceptance of European norms that included the requirement for 
cooperation with its neighbours and fixing the problem of border disputes. Another 
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result of this discursive change was the construction of Greece as a model for Turkey 
on its journey towards EU membership.  
The study demonstrates how the EU played an important role in the relations 
between Greece and Turkey where the collective identity of ‘Europe’ functioned as a 
reference point for the reconstruction of the two countries’ identities. The discourse 
on Europe has reconciled two conflicting identity discourses in Greece and Turkey, 
where European Greece and non-European Turkey were reconstructed into European 
Greece and Europeanising Turkey. This development demonstrated the discursive 
change from radical otherness to non-radical otherness and implications for policy 
and relations between the two countries. The role of the EU was crucial for the 
change that took place because it functioned as an actor with authority that had the 
capacity to influence discourses of national identity in both countries. The case study 
demonstrates the complexity of the othering process and the variety of discursive 
positions that are crucial for the change from radical to non-radical otherness.
45
 
Rumelili’s work serves as a good example for further research to be conducted in this 
area, both in terms of theoretical development and empirical analysis.
46
  
Moving away from the EU to the wider international community Helle 
Malmvig discusses the way that sovereignty is constructed and practiced in 
international politics in different political contexts.
47
 In State Sovereignty and 
Intervention her poststructuralist analysis of the relationship between sovereignty and 
intervention uses case studies of Kosovo and Algeria to demonstrate how different 
discursive constructions of sovereignty directly influence political decisions related 
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to international conflict about whether intervention is possible in a particular case. 
The main theoretical question of the book is regarding how practices of intervention 
and non-intervention rely on and constitute meaning to state sovereignty. Malmvig 
looks at the way the conflicts in Kosovo and Algeria were discursively constituted: 
ethnic tensions and violations of human rights between the Serbs and Kosovars in the 
case of Kosovo, and the problem of Islamic fundamentalism in the Algerian case. 
The comparative study shows how sovereignty and (non) intervention were mutually 
constituted in the two cases. 
In Malmvig’s book the role of the other is present as one of the elements that 
determines relationships between political actors, although her main research focus is 
on the discursive construction of sovereignty and its implications for political 
action.
48
 However, the Algerian case reveals in rather explicit terms that the way an 
other is constructed makes all the difference to a number of political processes. 
Malmvig’s study focuses on the question of military intervention and under which 
circumstances this can be justified. When comparing Kosovo and Algeria, their 
geographical characteristics immediately send a message: one is in Europe, the other 
is not. These geographical characteristics, as we have seen in Rumelili’s work, tend 
to be related to a number of discourses, which include culture and politics.  
As the study shows, the Algerian case was discussed as a potential Islamic 
threat, a combination of terrorism and fundamentalism as a response to the country’s 
political and economic crisis.
49
 This discursive move is not neutral: it is closely 
connected to security questions and the political situation in Algeria was immediately 
seen as a threat both to the secular Algerian state and westernised Algerian people 
and to the Western world. However, the reason why military intervention was not the 
result of Western debates, according to Malmvig, is that the conflict in Algeria was 
seen as taking place between the government and the Islamists. Western intervention 
would have disregarded Algeria’s democratically elected regime and would have 
implied support for Islamists and their presumed anti-Western agenda. This 
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illustrates the complexities of trying to define the self-other relationship, particularly 
for outside actors with only a partial understanding of the context. 
Malmvig’s discourse analysis revealed that Algeria was articulated as a 
democratic, open and pluralistic community; it was referred to as a whole, a unified 
subject speaking with one voice. However, at the same time this was combined with 
articulations of massacres, people living in fear and the presence of fanatical 
extremists. By drawing on poststructuralist theory on self and other, Malmvig argues 
that the Algerian society could only be portrayed as plural, tolerant and free by 
articulating “fundamentalist terrorism” as the other. Through a series of discursive 
practices “fundamentalism” was articulated as a radical other, a threat to Algeria and 
its identity. Malmvig proceeds to demonstrate how “fundamentalist terrorists” were 
differentiated and excluded from the Algerian community, and then describes how 
this other was articulated as a threat.
50
 By being geographically located within 
Algeria but possessing characteristics that were the antithesis of Algeria and its 
people, the Islamists were constructed as an internal radical other. The analysis 
shows that dialogue was excluded as a possibility with this radical other and that 
imagery of war and conflict was invoked in relation to them. Islamists were 
articulated as a subject that is not rational and not capable of change, which was 
further reflected in the development of the discourse of threat and danger in the 
political discourse of the international community.  
In the case of Kosovo the process of othering took a different direction. 
Milošević was represented as the sole acting subject who had unlimited power and 
who was responsible for genocide. Subjects of his illegal rule were referred to as the 
people of Serbia (both Serbs and Kosovars), but it was Kosovar Albanians who were 
the victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This demonstrates two distinct ethnic 
groups with distinct roles in the conflict. At the same time differences and conflicts 
between these groups were downplayed; they were both victims. The main divide 
was between the ruler – Milošević, and his people. Discourse on the Balkans as a 
place of inherent hatred and nationalism, which will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters, was replaced, in the case of Kosovo, with a discourse on 
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Milošević as the sole responsible perpetrator of violence, separate from the people 
who were discursively constructed as victims. This common identity of Serbs and 
Kosovars allowed for an articulation of a multi-ethnic community that shared a wish 
for democracy, pluralism, tolerance and coexistence.
51
 In this way we do not 
encounter an other present in the construction of community identity as in the case of 
Algeria, but rather the other was one person who had turned against his people. It is 
thus possible to analyse the Kosovo case as one where the community has potential 
to fulfil its true identity, a case of self-realisation, in contrast to the case of Algeria 
where the Islamist threat to Algerian identity had to be eliminated.
52
  
The studies discussed in this section demonstrate the relevance of studying 
identity in the wider field of international cooperation. Collective identity building 
and the question of cooperation, both within the context of regions and individual 
states, has been shown as closely related. The relevance of the process of othering 
was again confirmed to be central to these studies, and important theoretical 
implications were discussed. Radical otherness and difference had a prominent place 
in the above studies, both in terms of empirical analysis and theoretical insight. 
Rumelili’s work especially contributed to the development of theorising on that topic 
and offers a good model to be followed in terms of conceptualising the problem of 
identity. The following chapter will discuss in detail how theory can be put into 
practice and in doing so it will summarise the knowledge gained from all the authors 
mentioned above. 
The relevance of the above studies for the work undertaken in this 
dissertation is evident in the relationship between politics, geography and identity. 
Geographical characteristics are discursively linked with national, regional and 
civilizational identity in the Croatian case. The problem of defining the borders of 
“the Balkans” and “the East” resemble the above discussed Western criteria of 
determining the level of Europeaness in its neighbours and the possibility of 
becoming more like Europe through processes of interaction. My analysis of Croatia 
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will fit with the above studies regarding the link between the construction of an other 
and the success of political initiatives. In its own particular way my study will 
contribute to the discussed work on demonstrating the role of the other in the way 
political actors interact on the international stage.  
Furthermore, the study of Croatia will add to the existing work on the 
interconnectedness of spatial, temporal and ethical process of othering, elaborated by 
Hansen. Although it is not always explicitly stated, all the studies analysed in this 
chapter to some degree demonstrate a close relationship between spatial and ethical 
elements of the othering process. The relevance of geography thus features as a great 
example of such theoretical insight, and allows us to take a close look into the 
politics of space and its relationship to identity construction in international politics.  
After having discussed some of the relevant literature in the field and its 
theoretical and empirical contribution in terms of informing this thesis I will now 
turn to the process of othering and the question of what happens when self and other 
become linked in unprecedented discursive ways. 
 
2.5 Reflexive communities in transition: the process of othering and 
identity construction 
 
‘Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference 




Discussing identity and political actors has so far been focused on several 
cases where an actor was defining its identity in a context that included an 
antagonist, or an ‘other’. That relationship to a degree defined the subject in its 
rejection of certain identity features and thus served as an integral part of the process 
of identity construction. It is now necessary to look more closely into this process 
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and to pinpoint some key elements within and apply them to the broader question of 
identity formation, as well as the topic of the study.  
The process of identity building is best analysed in terms of the process of 
‘othering’ because it allows us to look beyond the mere subject and to include a 
number of actors that are in a relationship with the subject. ‘Othering’ distinguishes 
between the ‘self’ that is the subject of analysis, and the ‘other’ - an outsider against 
whom the self identifies. As I argued previously, identity needs other subjects in 
order to be formed because self-formation is essentially about learning from other 
actors and it happens through a process of socialisation. The subject requires other 
subjects to know what it is and to know what it is not. Identity is therefore always 
relational which suggests that othering can be both negative and positive, depending 
on the relationship between the subjects of analysis.
54
 Traditional approaches to 
studying identity maintain that through repeated encounters with otherness our own 
identity is reinforced and the other being constructed in a negative way is most 
common in such work.  
The criteria by which communities understand the world are particular and 
tend to differ among various groups. They construct discourses about themselves 
which regulate the ethical norms of that particular group. These norms sometimes 
develop a taken for granted status and become difficult to question – they acquire the 
status of hegemonic discourses. In order to reach such status they can rely on myths 
(narratives about the subject), symbols (charging objects and events with particular 
significance) and rituals (collective action that generates solidarity).
55
  In the Balkans 
the following perspective can be applied:  
 
Identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of 
difference. One is a Bosnian Serb to the degree to which one is not a 
Bosnian Moslem or a Croat…What is shocking about these 
developments, is not the inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that 
they display but rather the atavistic belief that identities can be 
maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness. 
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The negotiation of identity/difference…is the political problem facing 




This question of negotiating identity will be analysed in detail in the 
following chapters and the way that otherness is constructed will be at the centre of 
that analysis. It is crucial to understand this dynamic and to question the way 
discourses work and how identity develops in changing political circumstances.  
 
An emphasis on the linguistic element in a poststructuralist study reveals that 
ideas, norms and identities are all a part of discourse and cannot exist separately of 
one another, as I have argued previously. From this follows that language is central 
to our knowledge of reality and to our knowledge of who we are. It does not serve as 
a mirror of nature or some objective reality that exists out there and waits to be 
discovered but rather it is only possible to perceive reality through linguistic 
construction, as well as further deconstruction and reconstruction.
57
 Analysing the 
discursive construction of norms and values and relating them to the discourses of 
identity of political actors such as states exposes a very close relationship between 
these concepts. The power of discourse is such that it forms our conceptualisation of 
these phenomena rather than it being a question of description. Political 
developments are therefore observable to us within specific discursive contexts and 
we can interpret them within the given discursive framework.  
There are several strategies of constructing self and other in international 
politics.
58
 They include: 
• Representing the other as an existential threat through a speech act of 
securitisation. 
• Representing the other as inferior. 
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• Representing the other as violating universal principles by setting the 
standards of the self as universally valid, with the consequence that the other should 
be convinced or otherwise brought to accept the principles of the self.  
• Representation of the other as different. This strategy differs from the 
previous three because it does not place a value judgement on the other that is 
essentially hostile. This strategy is not completely innocent but unlike the other three 
reduces the possibility of legitimising damaging interference with the other.  
The third strategy outlined above, that represents the other as violating 
universal principles, has so far been used by the European Union in relations to its 
others. The European practice is perceived to be the desired standard for others to 
follow. The Copenhagen criteria that set up the political, economic and 
administrative standards for EU membership provide an excellent example of this 
strategy. The EU has defined within these criteria what it is or what it aims to be and 
accordingly what the candidate countries should become. In other words the 
European Union has been represented as a normative power.
59
 Ian Manners 
introduced this concept in relation to the EU and defined it as a power that is neither 
military nor purely economic but one that works through ideas and opinions. The 
discursive construction of the European Union as a normative power is a 
precondition for other actors to accept it as a normative authority and to accept the 
norms the EU promotes, and to impact what might appear as normal in global 
politics. This discursive construction also builds a particular sense of the EU’s 
identity, while at the same time attempts to change other actors through the spread of 
its norms.
60
 The EU candidate countries are put in an inferior position and will 
remain there until they fully take on the obligations and criteria as well as particular 
discourses associated with the EU.  Although it is questionable whether the EU 
works as a unified actor and whether it holds a distinct identity, this assumption does 
exist in some political discourses and it has considerable power, which is the case in 
Croatia.  
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In the case of the European Union and its near abroad the transfusion of a 
norm from one actor to another involves the interaction between these actors’ 
identities and the norm in question. The problem of protecting minority rights first 
entered the national debate in Croatia as a question of ethics, in the sense of 
questioning the ethicality of the demand to protect some, (Serbian) national 
minorities whose home country was Croatia’s enemy in the past. The change of the 
understanding of both the nature of minority protection and the Serbian Other made 
it possible for the debate to continue on European terms. Accepting these terms and 
identifying with them was what made Croatia receive approval from the EU, which 
consequently helped the process of legitimating them at home. Thus, the way these 
actors perceive their particular conceptions of the self and how this self relates to the 
other actor determines to an extent the outcome of the transfusion of the norm.  
Again, change is possible if meaning is not eternally fixed and if points of 
dispute between various discourses change.
61
 Shifts seem most probable if there is a 
considerable overlap between the two discourses in question. On the basis of such 
similar languages the alternative is not automatically rejected and opens up the 
possibility of change. The way identity relates to this claim is that when an actor 
perceives another actor to be similar to itself it is more likely to accept the discourses 
of the other and to find ways to identify with it. I will elaborate more on this point in 
the analysis on Croatia and its identification with the Western world.  
It is important to note at this point that identity construction does not revolve 
out of a single self-other dichotomy but as a number of different combinations and 
relationships arising out of processes of socialisation.
62
 Because there might not be 
only one endogenous dominant self-other relationship when we look at data over a 
number of studies, scholars like Campbell, Connolly and Hansen theorise that 
identity does not have to be constructed through so-called radical otherness. They 
suggest that identity of the subject can thus be constructed through a variety of actors 
that can have different degrees of otherness. An actor can define itself as radically 
different from another, but at the same time perceive itself to be not as different from 
someone else. It is possible to interpret the discourse of ‘returning to Europe’ of 
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Central European states as an example of such a complex web of identities, where 
the new states perceived the Western European self to be superior to them but at the 
same time similar to them. It appears that temporal and spatial dimensions of identity 
construction were at play in that case and that ‘Europe’ was in any case not radical 
but rather very close to the searching Central European identity.
63
  
In a similar way, the Croatian search for its ‘true’ identity as a Western 
European Country features the same tendency to articulate itself as being the same as 
the other (European Union) in terms of ‘naturally’ belonging there, but at the same 
time is divided from it through self-confessed differences. The other is here viewed 
in positive terms – the European Union which is superior to Croatia. This case 
demands an explanation of this rather unorthodox articulation of an other that is 
positively constructed, and thus runs contrary to traditional understanding of the 
process. The European Union here functions as a discursive community that brings 
together actors whose identities are not the same but the actors in question are 
nevertheless connected through a number of nodal points that structure the European 
discourse. The EU thus has the potential discursive power to reconcile difference and 
to deeply influence both its members as well as other states that wish to join them. 
Examining the process of adjusting the identity and policy discourses on the Croatian 
political stage and the change in the status of Croatia’s others is the central concern 
of my discourse analytical approach. 
Such an understanding of otherness as being both positively and negatively 
constructed has moved away from a traditional understanding of the process of 
othering that assumes a more radical difference between the subject/self and the 
other. The possibility of having a range of actors with a different degree of otherness 
has broadened the understanding of the relationship between identities and political 
action. Hansen’s work remains one of the few that address this question and this 
thesis seeks to fill this gap by looking at a context in which a radical other changes 
and reaches a point when it can turn into a non-radical other. Neumann’s study of 
Russia has hinted at this scenario but has not gone deep enough into the subject 
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material and leaves us without a satisfying account of possible developments. A 
detailed analysis in the following chapters will reveal the stages in discursive 
changes regarding the particular self-other relationship in the Croatian context and 
will also address the theoretical implications of the findings.  
 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter it was argued that poststructuralist theory holds specific 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that challenge traditional, rationalist-
empiricist views of the social world. As such it has the capacity to offer scholars 
novel ways of approaching and studying the political realm and in doing so it 
introduces the concept of discourse. The chapter has discussed some basic precepts 
of poststructuralist thought, with a special focus on identity and its importance for 
conducting a poststructuralist analysis.  
Introducing the Copenhagen School of Security Studies has allowed us to 
broaden the thinking on identity and to place it within empirical studies whose main 
focus is international cooperation and identity construction. In this way some 
shortcomings of the Laclau and Mouffe theorising were highlighted and an 
alternative understanding of subject identity has been looked at. 
 Poststructuralism seeks links between concepts that are central to a specific 
discourse and it analyses them in terms of nodal points and signifiers that organise a 
discourse. Identity is here understood in the same way and the study of national 
identity in Croatia is closely related to political questions that were central to the 
country at the time of study. Special attention was given to the process of othering 
and novel ways of studying relationships between the self and other that depart from 
traditional understanding of other as being radically different from the subject of 
analysis.  
Having set out the main concepts of poststructuralism and having discussed 




national identity in a changing political context that requires redefinitions and 
reconstructions of both the identity and political concepts that are central for the case 
study. In the following chapter I shall set out the methodology I will use in the 
analysis of changes of Croatian identity and discourses concerning the ICTY and 



















The term discourse analysis refers to several distinct ways of analysing text 
that is often used in poststructuralist research. It can be used with several types of 
data: written, spoken or performed. Discourse analysis is best understood as an 
umbrella term for analysis of text that has a common epistemological and ontological 
foundation. Language is at the centre of this approach and the main differences relate 
to different connections assumed to exist between the social realm and language. The 
basic difference between discourse analysis and other kinds of data analysis lies in 
the concepts that are used, the epistemological foundations, and ultimately, the type 
of questions that can be asked accordingly.  
This chapter will set out the way in which poststructuralist theory can be 
applied to the question of changing Croatian national identity. It seeks to connect the 
theoretical discussions with the process of conducting research and applying 
discourse analysis to data. Section 3.2 introduces discourse analysis and discusses its 
epistemology and ontology and what that implies for analysis of data. Section 3.2 
discusses discourse analysis as a method, the choice of texts, the question of their 
reliability, some challenges in conducting discourse analysis and reflects about the 
relationship between the researcher and their project. The last section discusses the 
case study, the choice of materials to be analysed and elaborates in detail the entire 








3.2 Discourse analysis as a method of analysing text  
 
As I have elaborated in the previous chapter, a poststructuralist study begins 
with language and its role in the constitution of meaning. What this generally implies 
for conducting research is that we need to look at texts and the way they fit within 
the wider social and political context. In this thesis discourse analysis is used in order 
to show how the discourse of Croatian national identity developed in the context of 
increased cooperation with the European Union. Discourse analysis approaches texts 
on a level that goes beyond description and process tracing and in this thesis it is 
used to explore discourses on national identity that have developed in the process of 
Croatia’s adaptations to the EU membership acquis and on the new meanings that 
emerge out of that relationship and dictate the understanding of the European norms 
regarding cooperation with the ICTY and minority rights protection. Poststructuralist 
scholars argue that institutions cannot exist outside discourse.
 1
 This area of study has 
traditionally been examined in terms of tracing processes and underlying 
mechanisms of action that normally remain at the level of studying the institutional 
structure. A strong emphasis on language in terms of conducting discourse analysis 
of different texts offers an opportunity to engage with norms and values essential for 
the subject under study with even greater reflexivity, and to get a more complex view 
of social action.
2
  In The Archeology of Knowledge M. Foucault wrote: ‘We must 
question those ready made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before 
any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset’.
3
 He 
argued for the necessity to look into the ways of how meaning is produced and 
reproduced over time in specific contexts. Making use of his insight would allow us 
to understand the nature of the knowledge of phenomena apparent in this study. 
Discourse analysis must be compatible with the theoretical framework. It is 
not just a tool for analysing data but a part of certain epistemological positions about  
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knowledge. Poststructuralism and discourse analysis depend on philosophical 
premises (epistemological and ontological) about the role of language in the 
construction of reality, and on methodological guidelines for building a research 
design, as well as on more specific techniques of analysis.
4
 In poststructuralist 
discourse analysis theory and method are intertwined and thus basic philosophical 




The method of discourse analysis aims to find structures and patterns in 
public statements that regulate political debate.
6
 It explores specific discursive 
constructions and how they arise from particular social and political contexts. It is 
focused on language and the way ‘objective truths’ are constructed in society, which 
in turn shape our perception and understanding of reality. In this way certain things 
can be said and are considered meaningful and true, while others are perceived as 
meaningless or simply less reasonable and as a consequence less powerful.
7
  
 Despite the similarities and a shared epistemology different poststructuralist 
strands differ on the topic of the scope of discourse analysis. They diverge on the 
question of whether discourses constitute the social complexity, or are themselves 
partly constituted by other aspects of the social.
8
 The most frequent distinction is 
usually placed upon the differences between critical discourse analysis (CDA) that 
looks strictly into text and considers it as a part of the social whole, and the strand 
that maintains that the whole of society and social action is discursive action, and 
that there is nothing outside discourse.
9
 In this second version power relations in 
society are investigated and normative perspectives reformulated, from which a 
critique of such relations can be made with an eye on possibilities for social 
change.
10
 In this type of poststructuralist discourse analysis the focus of study is 
concerned with a larger context, often referred to as ‘culture’ or ‘society’, where the 
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analyst looks for the relationships between language and different social processes 
and activities.
11
 The aim of the analyst here is to identify patterns of language and 
related practices and to demonstrate how they constitute various aspects of society.
12
 
This approach is thus concerned with the socio-historical nature of society and seeks 
to study realities that have gained a taken for granted status. An analysis performed 
in this way studies relationships of power as well as contested discourses and 
instabilities in meaning within them. It is this relationship that makes discourse 
analysis more than just a study of language: the whole of the social practice is thus 
incorporated in the analysis. For practical matters it is not possible to study the whole 
of society and to precisely mark its borders, but it is important to be aware of the 
width of the study and to look into as many levels as possible.  
We find that the focus of this type of a study is often on identities and 
political action and their mutual constituitivness, as I have elaborated in the previous 
chapter. As argued previously, language is not referential and descriptive but has a 
constitutive role, while the term discourse refers not only to language but the whole 
of society. It is this approach that I use in this thesis in studying the wider Croatian 
setting. My outline of a civilisational discourse (chapter 4) is crucial for the two case 
studies since it provides a context for Croatia’s discursive constructions, without 
which it would not be possible to critically engage with the changes in its political 
identity and the way Croatia interacts with the European Union, as well as with its 
neighbouring countries. These levels of analysis will be further discussed later on in 
this chapter as part of the research design section. 
Researchers working in the poststructuralist tradition do not aim to capture 
the truth of reality but to offer an interpretation. The researcher is thus looking for 
patterns in the data but is not entirely sure what these will look like or what their 
significance will be. The analysis involves going through the data over and over 
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again. As possible patterns emerge, it is useful to note them but to continue 
searching. Eventually there will be a range of possibilities to explore further. It will 
almost certainly be necessary to focus on some at the expense of others, leaving 
unfinished avenues for later exploration.
13
 It is thus impossible to exhaust data and 
the variety of meanings within, and to ‘complete’ the analysis once and for all.  
 
 
Discourse analysis and identity  
 
When identity is investigated in discourse analysis, the starting point is to 
identify which subject positions (individual or collective, depending on the study) are 
relevant in the discourse. That can be done by looking at the nodal point around 
which a specific identity is organised. That can be, as used in my previous example, 
‘teacher’, ‘brother’ or ‘Scottish’. The following step is to look into the way that the 
nodal point is filled with meaning relationally, by being linked positively to some 
signs, and the way it is differentiated from them through other, opposing signs.
14
  
 Concepts of self and other, as I explained in chapter 2, are central to 
poststructuralist discourse analysis. They are closely linked to the concept of identity, 
through which we can make further links with political action as a venue where 
identity is played out. Discourse analysis identifies terms that reveal unambiguous 
constructions of the self and the other such as ‘evil’, ‘good’, ‘primitive’ or 
‘advanced’, to name a few. One should be careful not to allocate just one sign to self 
and one to the other because the relationship between the two is never so simple: 
they exist within a complex network of identities. What this means in the context of 
this thesis is that Croatian identity  is not just constructed as ‘Western European’, 
‘democratic’, and ‘advanced’, but also as ‘not Balkan’, ‘superior to Serbia’ and as 
‘non violent’. Each of these signs can be further linked to other signs, until a 
complex web or relationships is established.  
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What is required is looking into how identity is constructed by positioning 
signs within the discourse and how they achieve stability in that process. It is 
important to look into its relationship with other signs in the wider context and how 
that relates to the concrete policy. These processes of linking offer a methodological 
means for an empirical analysis and enable the study of discourses, how they achieve 
stability and subsequently instability, the means for the deconstruction of discourses 
and processes of change. For purposes of the feasibility of a study it is necessary for 
the analysts to establish boundaries around the field that they research. In doing so 
the analyst must be aware of these limits and ought to be able to justify why one path 
was taken in the analysis rather than the other.    
As discussed previously, discourse analysis is closely connected to the 
theoretical approach employed in this thesis. It is a methodological tool used for 
analysing text, rooted in the same ontological and epistemological assumptions about  
the social world. Discourse analysis is more than a study of language: it incorporates 
the whole social practice. With discourse analysis we aim to study the realities that 
have gained a taken for granted status and are understood as natural in a particular 
social setting. When discussing the subject of the study – Croatia, it is important to 
clarify what ‘Croatia’ means and how that features in this thesis. Poststructuralist 
approaches hold that identity and political action are mutually constitutive. Speaking 
and doing are inseparable, and language is understood to have a constitutive role, 
rather than a descriptive one. It follows that when we engage in discourse analysis 
we interpret both the linguistic and the social levels of the case study and look at the 
way policy and identity are intertwined.  
Traditionally, the identity of a political actor, which is the state in this 
context, has been taken for granted, as I discussed in the previous chapter. What a 
state is tends to be fixed in a number of theoretical approaches, and the unit that is 
the state is normally a starting point for analysis. The state so defined has a number 
of intrinsic properties, such as sovereignty, foreign policy, and political culture, 
among others. In this view a state has a specific identity that distinguishes it from 
other political actors and it is possible to analyse it in a certain way and to place it in 




discourse analysis questions these basic assumptions about the state as a political unit 
and looks at the problem from a very different perspective due to its particular 
ontological and epistemological positions. Discourse analysis looks at the process 
rather than the end result, and how a state acquires its defining characteristics. In the 
context of this thesis the question is not who or what Croatia is, since that is not an 
ontological possibility to start with, but rather how Croatia is. In other words, 
discourse analysis will reveal how the Croatian state has come to define itself in a 
certain way and why. The study of Croatian identity then becomes a study of a 
process. What we will learn from it regards the way a number of actors interact in the 
changing political setting that requires adapting to new requirements and new 
interpretations of what constitutes Croatia.  
To talk of identity of a political actor can potentially be misleading because 
using this term can suggest fixity, an assumption that identity exists as something 
unchanging. This would be contrary to poststructuralist principles and therefore it 
has to be stressed that when we speak of identity we imply that although a certain 
degree of fixity exists, there is still a vast range of openness and potential for change. 
Change is always assumed in this kind of work, and when we look at the identity of a 
particular actor we are aware that such a thing as identity is possible in a given point 
in time, and that it will continue to change. This is in line with one of the main 
poststructuralist assumptions that meaning cannot be fixed, as discussed in more 
detail in the previous chapter.  
To sum up, knowledge about identity means focusing on the process of how a 
specific identity is discursively constructed or reconstructed. To ‘know’ what Croatia 
is becomes a problem of finding how discourses operate within the discursive field 
and in what way one articulation becomes temporarily fixed. Or in other words: how 
it becomes a hegemonic discourse. In this way we never leave the realm of 
interpretation and never exhaust possibilities that a particular context possesses.   
Related to this epistemological question of what and how we can know 
something in poststructuralist research is the question of the relationship between 
Croatia’s self and its various others, and what we can know from that relationship. 




to establish this difference in terms of radical otherness, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. In this way boundaries were drawn between the subject of analysis and its 
others and the identity of the subject was then analysed in terms of difference from 
the other (or more others). This type of study departs from the self-radical other 
dichotomy and looks into a range of otherness in terms of degree, as well as othering 
within the subject along the temporal and ethical dimensions. In this way we are 
facing a different dynamic when analysing data and are led towards different 
discoveries than what can be found in traditional approaches to the study of identity. 
Poststructuralist work that engages with a range of otherness demonstrates that 
difference matters in the subtlety of degree, and that sometimes this difference is 
more a question of similarity between the subject and the other. This allows for a 
more positive relationship between the two.  
It is here that another poststructuralist principle becomes crucial for the 
understanding of identity and the process of othering. Poststructuralism rejects 
causality in identity construction and suggests that the process should be looked at in 
light of mutual constituitivness instead. Discourse analysis focuses on the discursive 
practices of the subject in relation to an other(s) and in the context of this thesis, this 
will, among other things, reveal how the other is discursively constructed in a 
particular setting. Consequently, if we are committed to the principle of mutual 
constituitivness, we will be aware of the impact of othering on the identity of our 
subject. This means that through the process of othering what the subject says about 
the other will reflect back on the very identity of the subject. While engaging with 
the other, the subject (or the self) will at the same time develop discourses about its 
own identity that are closely connected to discourses on the other. Since the other 
cannot be excluded from identity building of the self, but is central in that process, it 
follows that the two processes will be closely linked. In reality we will encounter a 
number of others and a variety of othering processes, as this study will show. It is 
here that we can learn more about the relationship between the self and the other, and 
enrich our knowledge about identity construction. For example, the temporal 
othering of the Croatian state reveals how the present identity is constructed through 





This awareness will help the researcher to carefully examine data and look 
for a number of clues when engaging with discourses. Understanding othering and 
the self and other relationship as a mirror image between the entities will allow for a 
more complex study and deeper understanding of the phenomena in question. 
 
 
3.3 Designing a research project and conducting the analysis 
 
In this section of the chapter I will discuss several aspects of conducting 
discourse analysis that are relevant for this thesis, and link them to the wider 
epistemological foundations of poststructuralist theory, discussed in the previous 
chapter. I will discuss my choice of data, justify the selection of texts and discuss 
some of the difficulties in accessing data that I encountered. I will also address some 
common questions regarding the reliability of poststructuralist analysis and suggest 
an alternative way to assess the value of the discourse analytical method and its 
contribution to the field. The last part of this section will engage in detail in the 
process of analysis, from the first stage of data collection to the final result.  
The underlying idea about conducting a discourse analytical study suggests 
that methodology can be understood as following a set of rules and justifying one’s 
choices at every stage of analysis.
15
 In this way the very concept of methodology 
does not compromise the poststructuralist position that is anti-positivist, but offers a 
way to apply its concepts to an empirical case study in a systematic way. The 
following discussion will address the question of research design and data analysis, 





                                                 
15




Defining the study and establishing boundaries in a research project 
 
This study of Croatia analyses the official government discourse.
16
 Official 
discourse can be defined as the discourse through which state action is legitimised, 
and thus it is crucial for understanding political and social relations within and 
beyond state boundaries. The analysis in this thesis is directly based on official 
policy discourse and centres on political leaders who have official authority in 
decision-making, and on those involved with executing these policies such as 
diplomats, military staff and the judiciary, as well as heads of international 
institutions. This framework allows us to study the constructions of identity within 
official discourse, to analyse the way in which intertextual links stabilise this 
discourse, and to examine how official discourse encounters criticism. The study 
only discusses oppositional discourses when they are explicitly addressed in 
responses by politicians. Therefore, the aim of this study is not to map the degree of 
stability of the official discourse within the larger sphere that would include the 
opposition and public opinion, but is concerned with the articulations of Croatian 
identity at the official level.  
 The question that can be raised is what benefit there is at studying the official 
discourse when poststructuralism cannot actually prove that it is enough for the 
wider society to accept certain political changes. It can be suggested to look at public 
opinion in order to see whether the government discourse has been accepted by the 
public and to what extent. The answer to the first question is that poststructuralism 
indeed cannot prove that the official discourse is enough to understand political 
changes in a certain country and that there are many other actors at play and a 
number of other features that are important for the social and political life of a given 
country. However, given the size and scope of a doctoral dissertation, it would be 
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impossible to include everything in a research piece at this level. Boundaries have to 
be drawn in every research endeavour and it is never possible to draw a line and 
claim that a topic has been completely analysed and that there is nothing left to 
study. Even if a study of the official discourse included aspects such as the 
opposition and public opinion there would still be unexamined features to the topic 
and material to yet be look at. Such a scenario would bring us back to the question of 
establishing parameters and whether what has been examined was enough for the 
question to be answered. It is reasonable to assume that a study would benefit from 
including other elements such as the discourse of the opposition or public opinion, 
but that would require a research project with a wider scope and perhaps more 
importantly a different research question that would require these elements to be 
incorporated in order for the question to be successfully answered. I argue that in the 
context of this thesis these additional elements are not necessary and that the 
question of Croatian national identity can be adequately answered by looking at the 
official discourse alone because the main research question concerns the articulation 
of Croatian national identity at that level. Including other elements into the analysis 
could be done in the future in order to broaden this study and discuss a number of 
questions that are related to the present study and so bring forth new insight.  
This brings me to the second point regarding public opinion and why it was 
not included in the analysis. Alongside the problem of space and scope of analysis, 
the role of public opinion in the Croatian context in the time of study is quite 
specific. This thesis looks at radical political changes that occurred with the change 
of leadership in January 2000 that had far-reaching and deep consequences, both for 
Croatia’s domestic and foreign policy. At this time the country still functioned under 
the remnants of the previous regime and was slowly getting used to the changes that 
occurred. The civil society was largely undeveloped at the time and had little, if any, 
influence on the political matters. Looking at the newspapers of the time and the way 
things were discussed reveals that political questions studied in this thesis were 
directly shaped by political actors. I argue that the topics under study represent a 
straightforward top-down development where political elites shape politics which 




Another observation that contributes to my position is the very nature of 
presidential and parliamentary elections of January 2000. As discussed in chapter 1, 
the case here was that the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) lost the elections, 
rather than the coalition of six parties won. This difference might seem obscure and 
irrelevant at first glance, but it does deserve a closer look. Chaos and increased loss 
of popularity of the HDZ, together with the rapid deterioration of Franjo Tuđman’s 
health and imminent death opened up the opportunity for the opposition to unite and 
defeat the HDZ in a joint effort. The six parties that formed the winning coalition 
were willing to forgo differences in order to form an alliance that would get them to 
power. The very fact that the coalition included six political parties allows us to 
assume that their political goals were not particularly sharpened and clear, and that 
victory over the HDZ was their primary goal. Events that soon followed testify to 
this conclusion, namely two parties leaving the coalition due to internal conflict and 
difficulty in finding common ground. As the analysis will demonstrate in the 
following chapters, much of the new political agenda was not well received; much of 
it was controversial and encountered protest from the public. As it will be discussed 
in greater detail in chapters four and five, these issues were directly imposed by the 
European Union and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
and as such present politics at the level of the elites, rather than something that is 
shaped at the level of the public and finds its way up through various ways of 
agenda-setting.    
To sum up, expanding a study beyond the official discourse would require a 
research project on a larger scale, as well as a different research question that would 
include a study of a wider social and political setting. Including public opinion in 
analysis is useful if we are to look at a wider stability of a particular discourse over a 
period of time, or it should be a case when public opinion plays an important role in 
political agenda setting. I have discussed the Croatian case and argued that it is 
reasonable and justifiable to focus on the official discourse in this thesis. Including 
other elements, such as public opinion, is both not necessary and not feasible in this 
instance given the focus of the inquiry and Croatian circumstances of the time. 
Having discussed this aspect of the study and the reasons behind omitting something 








Selection of texts, the subject, and the time of study  
 
The selection of texts used in discourse analysis should follow the same 
principle of keeping with the poststructuralist theory. Hansen suggests that the 
analyst needs to establish links between individual texts and a wider network of 
meaning in order to remain faithful to the link between language and the wider social 
sphere.
17
 Then a number of subjects ought to be identified, as well as a number of 
events one wishes to study in a given time period in order for boundaries of the 
research project to be set. Hansen advises that material should be chosen according 
to two sets of considerations. First, the majority of texts should be taken from the 
time under study. Second, the body of texts should include key texts that are 
frequently quoted and thus function as nodes within the intertextual web of a debate, 
as well as a larger body of general material that provides the basis for a more 
quantitative identification of the dominant discourses. A good discourse analysis 
requires knowledge of the case in question, which comes from reading a wide body 
of texts that cover a longer period of time. Knowing a language does not only mean 
being able to speak and read, but it also includes knowledge of the wider social 
setting as well as language codes. This type of knowledge enables the analyst to 
engage with a specific meaning in a given context and to go deeper into the material.  
According to Hansen, selected texts should follow three criteria: 1. they 
should be characterised by the clear articulation of identities and policies; 2. they are 
widely read and attended to; 3. they have the formal authority to define a political 
position.
18
 As will be shown, these criteria have different analytical and 
methodological strengths. Clear articulations make it possible to discursively analyse 
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the texts. Texts that are widely read help us determine which discourses are dominant 
based on the importance they are given, and formal authority is related to positions of 
power in a given context. Ideally, all of the criteria should be incorporated in an 
analysis but that is not always possible. It is because of that difficulty in securing 
ideal data that several types of texts should be included in the study in order to secure 
clear articulations of identity and policy, to be expressions of formal authority and to 
meet the criteria of the text being widely read. In this way all three will be covered 
although sometimes only two or even one will be explicit, but the discursive 
connections between them will allow us to establish these links and thus to fulfil the 
criteria. 
Poststructuralist discourse analysis gives epistemological and methodological 
priority to the study of primary texts. They include statements, speeches and 
interviews in the case where one studies the official government discourse. I refer to 
these sources as official statements in the analysis as they represent the official 
discourse that is being studied. The two terms are used interchangeably in the 
following chapters. In poststructuralist discourse analysis it is not usual to conduct 
interviews in a study of this kind. My argument against such practice is based on the 
problem of researcher’s involvement in producing their own data, since an interview 
is a direct form of interaction. Apart from this general principle there are two other 
reasons why I did not conduct interviews personally and chose to rely on different 
sources. Since the study examines the official government discourse that would 
require access to politicians and diplomats at the highest level. Access to them would 
be extremely difficult and would surpass the available connections and the time 
framework that I had at my disposition at the time.
19
 Also, several key figures have 
died since the events studied, which adds to the difficulty.  
Another reason against conducting interviews in this particular setting is that 
a significant amount of time passed between the events under study and my data 
collection that took place between July and October 2007. Talking about the events 
that took place 7 years before would require the interviewees to discuss the past and 
the result would be a retroactive description of events. Even if the interviewees told 
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the truth about their involvement in those past events and were happy to account for 
details in the political processes, the temporal distance would inevitably cause them 
to filter their account due to a new political circumstance, their career development, 
new political climate in the country or simply their memory of events could 
inadvertently have changed and thus provide data that is not completely accurate. It 
would be different if data collection took place at the time of occurrence of certain 
political events because in that context there would be no danger of retroactive 
description. However, a number of other problems could easily arise that would put 
the reliability of the data into question. For example, the interviewees could answer 
the questions with the intention to embellish past events, to justify their own 
involvement or of their colleagues. The interviewees could also respond in a way that 
they assume the interviewer wants to hear. Interaction between the interviewer and 
interviewees could also play and important role and we can assume that the rapport 
would also influence the outcome of the conversation as well as the atmosphere 
during the interview.
20
 For these reasons I argue that conducting interviews for this 
study would not have been helpful because the data would perhaps not fully satisfy 
the requirements that are needed to adequately examine the processes at the time of  
study.   
In order for the researcher to avoid these particular difficulties and 
uncertainties about the quality of data, poststructuralist scholars tend to rely on 
sources that were documented at the time when the political events in question 
occurred. The texts chosen for this study have been gathered from newspapers and 
the discourses analysed represent the official government discourses on cooperation 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the minority 
question, that address a deeper problem of Croatian national identity. There are 
several reasons for choosing newspapers as the source of data in this study. 
Newspapers were chosen primarily because they contained official statements at the 
time of events analysed in this thesis. These texts represent the views of state leaders 
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and diplomats and are taken from the time period of the study.
21
Another important 
reason is that they were the main source for the publication of official statements that 
was widely available to the public. The newspapers thus present public articulations 
of the politicians at the time. In this way they fulfil the above requirements of 
representing the official discourse that clearly articulates identities and policies, of 
being widely read and the speakers hold positions of authority. 
An objection that can be made at this point is that what was printed in the 
newspapers was not necessarily accurate and that we encounter interpretation on the 
side of the journalists. To adequately answer to this objection it is necessary to 
clarify that the study does not analyse editorials and articles that describe the events 
in question. The only data that is used are actual statements from politicians and 
other official figures. What particular journalists add to those statements is not taken 
into consideration at any level of analysis.
22
 
Another criticism of this approach concerns the quality of data since what is 
published is always reduced and we do not get the entire statement, even with long 
interviews. I agree with this objection and understand that indeed we are dealing with 
selected texts that have not been published in their entirety. For example, a journalist 
or an editor has to make a decision what to include in an article because they are 
restricted by space and the amount of text that can be included in their article. In this 
way we do not get the entire statement given at a press conference and must rely on 
what has been edited out of the whole statement. This does affect the quality and 
reliability of data and is a limitation that researchers encounter. In order to overcome 
this difficulty as much as possible I looked at a number of different newspapers and 
through triangulation of sources compared the statements that appeared in respective 
articles.
23
 This allowed me to identify relevant events and to double-check the quality 
of the statements. All of the events that I address in this thesis were covered by all of 
the newspapers that I consulted. This testifies that the events were indeed relevant 
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and that they deserved to be addressed and reported to the public. Looking at several 
different newspapers also helped me to find statements that were least edited and 
thus presented direct quotes by relevant speakers. Some of the newspapers included 
only a sentence or two of the direct quote and based the report on the discussion by 
the journalist. Some only summarised what was said, without including the actual 
text. Such sources were not very useful for the actual analysis of texts and do not 
feature in the thesis, although they were important for supporting the reliability of 
other sources that were included in the final analysis. Some newspapers tended to 
include longer quotes in order to present the official position.
24
 In this way I could 
compare a number of sources in order to check the reliability of official statements 
and could choose the quotes that had the highest amount of text included. 
Another objection that could be made concerns difficulties in conducting 
discourse analysis on written text that makes it difficult for nuances in the discourse 
to be captured and adequately analysed. This is a valid observation that calls into 
question the quality of interpretation and as such needs to be examined. I argue that it 
is the type of discourse analysis and the research question that requires one to focus 
on this element in varying degrees. If the research focus was on the micro level of 
language and critical discourse analysis was employed, then nuances in discourse 
would be of utmost importance. The rhythm of speech, pauses, the tone and all other 
aspects of speaking would be central in this type of study and thus would require the 
researcher to pay special attention to all the details that are not available in written 
data and are only available in live interviews.
25
 If the research project was looking at  
the meso level and was studying variations within a discourse then this aspect of 
speaking is not so relevant, unless the focus is on the way different actors speak in 
different contexts. This also depends on a research question.  
In this study the focus is on the level where discourses are not merely the 
technical aspect of language and what and how things are said, but the study of links 
between language and the wider social sphere and the way that the two are 
connected. For this purpose I argue that it is not necessary to look at the details of the 
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way actors speak, but rather at the content of their statements. Looking at the way 
certain discursive configurations work within a wider discursive sphere and how that 
is reflected as well as constituted in language is the focus of the study.  
However, another layer of interpretation is required in discourse analysis and 
that is where nuance plays an important role, albeit in a different way. The manner in 
which things are stated and discussed in interviews does allow the researcher to get a 
sense of how the interviewee feels about the topic; it becomes obvious what is a 
difficult subject, what should be avoided in the discussion or what the speaker wants 
to stress as important. A great deal of information is available in this way and it 
allows the researcher to go deeper into the material and to bring this information into 
the analysis. Written data does not provide this in the same way and the researcher 
has to use a different set of skills for understanding the material. As I argued 
previously, a wider range of knowledge is required for good analysis and it is not 
enough to speak the language to be able to produce a good piece of research. It is 
relevant that the researcher understands the subject of analysis more broadly, which 
includes history, politics, religion, social relations and culture, among other things. 
By being familiar with these elements, the researcher knows how to approach the 
material, which clues to look for in studied discourses and how to interpret them.
26
  
The intricacies with discourse analysis entail that what is not said sometimes 
has equal value as what is said. This is a very interesting feature that can produce 
relevant findings, but can be difficult to grasp if the researcher does not recognise the 
gaps and voids in a discourse. It is here that nuance is crucial and that the researcher 
must rely on subtleties of language to discern the meaning of what is being said. For 
example, there are several quotes that are used in the following chapters where the 
speaker does not explicitly name people he refers to but does so in a way that is more 
subtle and that relies on common knowledge of the audience. Thus we often 
encounter expressions such as ‘those people’, or simply ‘those’ when a speaker 
discusses a sensitive topic and wishes to stress his disapproval or even contempt for 
the people in question. Naturally, it is not possible to immediately assume that the 
speaker expresses disapproval or contempt simply for their choice of words. This 
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interpretation relies on the wider knowledge of the subject and the reading of a 
number of texts. In this way the researcher does not rely on one statement that is 
isolated from the rest of the material but works with a whole field of meaning and the 
complex relationships between discourses. My interpretation that a speaker expresses 
contempt for his political opponents is thus based on knowledge of the topic and 
being familiar with a number of texts that allow for this particular interpretation. 
Certain topics, motifs, expressions and images have been encountered in different 
contexts and from different speakers which makes it possible to establish a pattern of 
meaning. Repetition and placement of specific discursive constructions in speech 
allow us to recognise their specific meaning even when it is implicit or completely 
missing in certain instances. There have been examples of this in the analysis 
chapters when a topic is avoided to the extent that it is not mentioned although it is 
obvious from the wider context of the statement or interview that the topic is very 
much present. Awareness of the existence of these gaps is crucial to conducting good 
discourse analysis as it reveals the meaning of discourses on a deeper level. 
Therefore, I argue that it is possible to discern nuance in discourse even when 
working with written data if the researcher is capable of bringing together several 
levels of interpretation, which further relies on the researcher possessing enough 
knowledge about the case that will enable him to understand the material at a deeper 
level. I will return to this question later on when discussing the analysis section in 
order to clarify further the process as well as to point to the data itself.  
This last claim further poses the requirements for reliability of the results of 
the research project and for assessing the claims that the researcher makes. In order 
to assess whether something is a good piece of research there are always criteria that 
have to be met. However, given the nature of poststructuralist enquiry that rejects the 
very idea of proof within the social, the criteria are different for judging the quality 
and relevance of such work from those that are normally applied to mainstream 
social science.
27
 As discussed previously, this can present a problem because there 
are no strict guidelines for determining the reliability of work in a traditional sense, 
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but there are ways of establishing criteria that can help us make assessments in this 
area of study.
28
          
Reliability of analysis would ideally be comparable to other studies that 
would then support the claims made in this particular piece of research. As argued 
previously, the reliability of sources was established by the variety and number of 
sources used in the analysis and the reliability of interpretation on the whole is 
similarly linked to data and the way it was analysed. The problem in this particular 
study is that it was not possible to compare the results because there were no other 
studies of Croatia on a similar topic. This study covered a number of sources that 
addressed historical and political circumstances of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the 
Homeland War in order to provide a wider framework for analysis. Those studies 
occasionally touched upon the questions of Croatian national identity but did so 
without a deeper insight into the process of identity building or a closer study of the 
development of nationalist discourse over time.
29
This study in a way stands alone 
with its research focus for the time being and complements other work on Croatia 
already done. It is thus difficult to measure its accuracy by comparing it to other 
studies but on the other hand this piece of research is innovative and provides new 
insight about the subject.  
This research has relied on a number of studies on national identity and the 
self – other relationship specifically, and it is thus possible to compare its findings to 
those sources. In this way it is possible to check the reliability of the study and its 
results. Differences are obviously due to their own socio-political contexts but the 
insight the study provides follows the logic of explanation found in the works of 
Neumann, Waever, Hansen and other authors discussed previously, as well as some 
of their conclusions about identity building and self and other relationship.
 
The 
quality of this piece of research is thus assessed partly on its own, without direct 
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reference to similar studies, and partly based on studies conducted on different 
subjects. Its internal structure and cohesion of argument is crucial for assessing 
whether the final findings are credible and to what extent they offer a contribution to 
existing work on identity and the process of othering. 
 
 
Narrowing the focus of the study and selection of articles for analysis  
 
The situation in which Croatia found itself offers good material for analysis 
since it allowed for a wide range of discursive constructions that are not normally 
possible under other circumstances in more democratised societies. It is precisely 
these articulations that challenged the established discourses that are the main focus 
of this study. The analysis focuses on the discursive strategies employed by the 
political elites in their attempts to reconstruct the entire political sphere, and the way 
the relationship between signifiers and nodal points developed.
30
 Identity 
construction and policy discourses are identified through texts, both spoken and 
written. These texts revolve around common themes and are bound together by a 
smaller number of discourses.
31
 The way we identify particular discourses depends 
on the way we theorise all of our choices during the analysis that directly influence 
the selection of material and the discourses that emerge. Hansen suggests that it is 
useful to focus on several discourses in order to analyse challenges to the hegemonic 
discourse or because of the possibility to analyse it in a comparative perspective.
32
 
Such basic discourses, as I will refer to them from now on, are structuring discourses 
and are identified through readings of a number of texts. They provide an analytical 
lens through which a multitude of different representations and policies can be seen 
as systematically connected and that they identify the key points of structuring 
disagreement within a debate.
33
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In this study it is what has been identified as a ‘civilisational discourse’ that 
performs this function. As I have stated previously, discourses on cooperation and 
minority rights are analysed through the lens of a civilisational discourse of ‘West vs. 
East’. The civilisational aspect allows a study of both cases as separate but 
profoundly connected at the same time. Croatia’s developing Western identity and 
desire to completely disassociate itself with the Balkans and the Balkan practice are 
present in both case studies and lead to interesting findings. Studying the discourses 
of cooperation with the ICTY and minority rights question through the civilisational 
discourse takes the entire study to a wider level that grasps the level of text, the 
national level, as well as a civilisational one. In this way the study demonstrates the 
ability of discourse analysis as a method to engage with concrete policy questions 
whilst paying special attention to the context in order to examine how they interact 
and influence each other. 
The texts selected for the analysis are interviews with high ranking politicians 
and diplomats, excerpts from their press releases, public statements, speeches and 
their published written material. They have been gathered from several newspapers 
and weekly publications. The newspapers include Jutarnji List, Novi List, Slobodna 
Dalmacija and Vjesnik. The criteria of selection included the extent of their 
readerships, the geographic spread to cover the whole country
34
 and to represent a 
broad spectrum of editorial and ideological positions.
35
 The weekly publications 
include Globus, Nacional and Feral Tribune which at the time supported the new 
government and were highly critical of Tuđman and his legacy.  
Poststructuralist discourse analytical study does not have clearly defined 
requirements about the number of texts being analysed. This methodology is not 
quantitative and rejects the idea of proof being in the numbers. Depending on the 
type of work in question the analyst must decide on the number of text that will be 
included in the analysis and that will cover all the agreed upon requirements, rather 
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than relying on a fixed number of texts. The entire analysis has been conducted on 
140 texts. The chapter on the civilisational discourse and radical other is a result of 
an analysis of forty texts, while the chapters on ICTY and minority protection of fifty 
each. It should be noted that not all hundred and forty texts have been included in the 
final versions of analysis chapters. The main reason is the restriction of space and 
practicability. However, the chapters are results of the analysis of all hundred and 
forty texts, as well as other background reading of various literature, such as history 
book, editorials, and TV programmes. 
Texts that have been included in the chapters have been selected on the basis 
of their quality over other texts and in terms of their diversity in order to satisfy the 
requirements discussed earlier. For example, since all the texts have been gathered 
from widely read papers and represent the official discourse, these two important 
requirements have been met. Naturally, not all of these texts address the question in 
the same way. When analysing the civilisational discourse many texts did explicitly 
articulate the identity constructions and relationships between the self and the other. 
The reason for their inclusion in the analysis was their clear articulation of one of 
those features, their reference to other texts or expression of ideas that have later on 
been reproduced by other speakers.  
The texts chosen for analysis address important and often controversial 
issues. The topics were covered in all daily newspapers and appeared in the weekly 
publications as well. My choice of one source over others had to do with the quality 
of the published article, which primarily means the amount of original text included 
in the piece. The chosen text was compared to the version in other sources in order to 
establish the level of overlap between them and potential differences. This 
comparison served as a type of proof that the text was indeed faithful to the speaker’s 
position and their spoken words.  
 This study revolves around a single subject: the Croatian state. However, this 
single subject is further analysed along the temporal/historical perspective. Such a 
historical perspective and comparison with the contemporary subject and its identity 
gives the study a comparative perspective. The relationship between the self and the 




articulated as superior, inferior or equal but different. Croatia’s two principal others 
can be defined as the Balkans/Serbia which were constructed as inferior, and the 
West/European Union as superior to Croatia at the time of study. However, given the 
split between the past and present in Croatian identity (before and after the elections 
of 2000), another other can be added – Croatia’s own past. The complexity of the 
situation offers a fruitful study of the interplays between identity and Croatian 
politics at the moment when Croatia’s identity was intensely re-articulated along the 
Western European discourse.  
This study does not seek to compare the old Tuđmanist discourse and the 
post-election discourse. The Tuđmanist discourse is present in the analysis mainly 
through the new official discourse, or in other words, it appears as a representation 
of Tuđman’s discourse. The study is not interested in the accuracy of that 
representation, but rather with the role that Tuđman played in 2000 in the process of 
othering of Croatia’s recent past. Equally, the same principle applies to Serbia. 
Croatia’s construction of Serbia as a radical other was not something that resulted 
from their dialogue. The period of study contained no Serbian sources that would 
discuss the relations between the two countries. Serbia only started to speak at the 
Zagreb Summit. It can be argued that the Homeland War was perhaps the best 
example of the two countries ‘talking’ to each other, and that the self-other positions 
were cemented during that time. The analysis was conducted under that notion.
36
 
 The temporal perspective is equally important in the discourse analytical 
study. It is possible to focus on one particular moment, or to examine a case study 
through a longer period of time. Discourse analysis can be used to study how 
identities are implemented and put into practice in negotiations with international 
institutions, or on a local level.
37
 Studies of more than one moment range from 
comparison of a smaller number of important events. Hansen suggests that the 
moments in this type of a comparative study should not be too far apart as to risk 
making comparisons difficult or revealing little information. Comparison in itself is 
interesting, but it is the development of a discourse between two or more points in 
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time that is the focus of analysis in this case. In this sense, my study is not a 
historical one that focuses on Croatia’s negotiations with the European Union and the 
change of its relations with Serbia, but a study of Croatia’s changing identity in new 
political contexts.  
The period of time that this thesis investigates stretches over one year. I 
consider this period to be one ‘moment’ but it is further divided into several sub-
moments. The sub-moments are as follows: parliamentary and presidential elections 
in January 2000, changes related to presidential power in the Constitution and the 
debate on the nature of political systems, new regulations around minority rights, 
relations with The Hague Tribunal and the Declaration of Collaboration with the 
Tribunal, and the Zagreb Summit in November 2000. 
The decision to focus on the period of time that stretched over one year was 
made on the basis of importance that that particular time frame presented. In this 
immediate post-Tuđman period we witness radical political changes and a 
completely new direction that the new government took. Many reforms and changes 
were embarked upon in that year, and although most were not finished and required a 
longer time frame in order to be completed, they represent the intention and the new 
direction in the Croatian political life. It is of equal importance to note that the 
discourses that developed at that time essentially stayed the same in the following 
years. The reading of material between the period of 2000 and end of 2003 witnesses 
to that, as well as following of contemporary debates in Croatian politics.
38
 
The analysis is divided into three main parts. The first data analysis chapter 
investigates the civilisational discourse of ‘West/EU’ vs. ‘East/Balkans’ and the 
nature of the Serbian radical other. As I have noted, the civilisational discourse 
functions as a basic discourse in which the two case studies are discursively rooted. It 
works as a wider discursive context in which the identities of civilisation are 
constructed and are closely linked to the discourses on the national level. The 
civilisational discourse provides a framework within which discourses of 
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democratisation, progress and de-Balkanisation are further linked to policy decisions 
as well as of fine-tuning of Croatia’s changing identity. The radical other is in close 
relationship with the civilisational discourse because it provides a concrete subject 
(Serbia) that embodies the Balkan civilisation. The Serbian radical other is 
discursively constructed in the same way as ‘the Balkans’ and in the Croatian official 
discourse it is often explicitly stated that Serbia and the Balkans are essentially the 
same.
39
 A special focus in the analysis is paid to the way that the radical other 
changes in the official discourse during the process of cooperation with the ICTY 
and through debates on minority rights. 
 The second data analysis chapter investigates the discourses behind Croatia’s 
cooperation with the ICTY and looks into the process of Croatia’s change of identity. 
The third chapter studies the discourses on minority rights protection. Both case 
studies are discursively connected with the civilisational discourse and the radical 
other, and the analysis seeks to point connections between all three. The process of 
establishing and analysing a basic discourse and its relationship with the case studies 
will be elaborated in detail in the next section of this chapter.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, discourses organise knowledge in a 
systematic way and so define what can and cannot be said. All employed concepts 
and expressed ideas can only exist within discourse just as subjects do not exist 
outside discourse. They engage and contest each other by challenging policy, identity 
and the logic through which they are linked, and in doing so they often provide 
different readings of facts and events, especially as they develop over time. ‘Key 
events’ refer to situations where important facts manifest themselves on the political 
agenda and influence the official policy-identity constellation. Mapping debates 
around key events offers a methodological technique for tracing the stability of 
official discourse as they can be used to construct a timeline which in turn can be 
employed when empirical material is selected.
40
 According to Hansen, the analytical 
advantage of studying several events within the same temporal period is to generate a 
better understanding of the discourses across politically significant areas.
41
 This is 
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the main argument behind the use of two case studies in this thesis. Croatian identity 
is at the very core of both the ICTY and minority questions. Both cases demonstrate 
how Croatian identity as a Western and a democratic country has evolved and show 
its relationship with the civilisational discourse. The two studies address issues that 
might seem loosely connected at first glance; however, a detailed study reveals 
connections between the two that rest upon specific conceptions of what it means to 
be a Western European country. Furthermore, the reconstruction of the Serbian other 
is present in both cases, with different dimensions and roles.  
As argued previously, facts are never ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered, 
speaking for themselves. A poststructuralist study is engaged in discovering how 
facts are created and how they are related to the policy/identity nexus. It aims to 
show how discourses present events in order to support or destabilise official 
policy.
42
 In the Croatian case it is important to look closely into the construction of 
the nation and into the debate of whether a nation demands membership that depends 
on birth and lineage, or if it is a matter of openness towards new members who 
accept the political project in question.
43
 It is worth quoting Stuart Hall here, who 
links this question to discourse: ‘A national culture is a discourse - a way of 
constructing meanings which influences and organises both our actions and our 
conception of ourselves. […] National cultures construct identities by producing 
meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can identify, these are contained in the 




These issues do not necessarily have to fit with a set of external criteria 
deemed to be objective but rather the focus is on the way the state perceives itself to 
be and how that understanding correlates to the foreign policy issues of the country. 
In the context of my research it means looking into ways that Croatia projects its own 
vision of self onto the actors that it engages with in important political matters and 
how this influences the political events taking place and concretely, what kind of 
policies this relationship generates.  
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3.4 Data collection and analysis  
  
The purpose of this section is to address the entire process of the study, from 
data collection to data analysis. The last section will discuss the problem of 
reflexivity and my own role as a researcher and my relationship with the subject 
material. As discussed previously, the methodology used for the study is closely 
connected to poststructuralist theory and thus follows from its epistemology and 
ontology. The theory, outlined in the previous chapter, always guides the research 
and provides a framework. Therefore, data chosen for the study has not been forced 
to fit with the theoretical assumptions, but rather it is the case that theory made it 
more clear what kind of data had to be looked for in the first place.  
 Studying official government discourse requires an analysis of primary 
material. The data was collected at the Newspapers Archive at the National and 
University Library
45
 in Zagreb, Croatia between July and October 2007. I collected 
material about all aspects and problems of cooperation with the ICTY, such as war 
trials, negotiation problems, protests, discourses of the military personnel and of the 
opposition. The material on minority protection covered debates on citizenship and 
the Constitution, importance of sovereignty, the question of refugees and misplaced 
persons, and the position of Serbs as the biggest national minority in the country. I 
also collected material concerning the position of Croatia in the Balkans, relations 
with neighbouring countries, relations with Western European countries and its plans 
to become an EU member in the foreseeable future.  
  The first reading of the data was aimed at finding patterns in discourses on 
cooperation with the ICTY and the minority question, looking for the way things 
were constructed and within which particular contexts. I was also aiming to identify 
signifiers and nodal points that would structure my analysis. An additional awareness 
started to develop during this process: a distinctive emergence of the discourse of 
westernisation and de-Balkanisation. This discourse appeared early in the year 2000 
in relation to the plans for future EU membership and Croatia’s position and role in 
Europe. A parallel discourse about the Balkans was present and complemented the 
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discourse on westernisation. It became increasingly obvious that this civilisational 
discourse was constantly present in the discourses on cooperation and minorities and 
that it provided a rationale for certain government steps, as well as playing a central 
role in Croatian identity reconstruction.  
 Identifying the civilisational discourse was crucial for the second reading of 
the data. The reading identified central discourses surrounding cooperation with the 
ICTY and minority rights protection through the civilisational lens. Articulations of 
identity and policy thus assumed a wider meaning that ranged from the micro level 
of the text, to the macro level of the social context. At this point a framework for 
analysis started to appear. A group of discourses was identified around each topic 
and a web of meaning was traced. The third reading of data isolated specific texts for 
analysis. Subsequent work focused on the three sections of analysis separately, 
bringing them together at the last stage. Given the structure of the overall study it 
was possible to separate discourses of civilisation, cooperation and minorities and to 
analyse them separately. In this way certain repetitions of discourses they had in 
common were more pronounced and so affirmed in their importance.
46
 This feature is 
present in the final analysis of the study and certain discourses will appear in all three 
data analysis chapters. This repetition demonstrates the close link between them and 
the importance of intertextuality in discourse analysis. It also confirms the 
poststructuralist position that texts never exist in a vacuum but are always a part of 
the larger web of meaning and refer to other texts.   
 All analysis was conducted on the original texts in Croatian. When specific 
texts were chosen to be included in the chapters only then were they translated into 
English. Translations aimed to stay as close as possible to the original and to 
translate into English the meaning that went beyond grammar and syntax rules. In 
some occasions it was not possible to retain the meaning of the statement without 
including an explanation with more detail. Also, on several occasion it was 
impossible to translate certain concepts and a degree of improvisation and freedom in 
translation was required. Nevertheless, staying close to the original meaning was the 
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primary concern and all care was taken to bring all the texts of the final analysis to 
that level. 
 
   
Difficulties in accessing data 
 
At the planning stage of research design my intention was to also collect data 
from the Parliamentary archive in Zagreb
47
 and use transcripts of parliamentary 
debates to complement data gathered from newspapers. In that way triangulation 
would have been achieved in order to check for the quality and reliability of 
newspapers. Also, additional information about the topics would have been available, 
as well as more insight into the interaction between politicians and a more faithful 
record of debates, without editing that is always present in newspapers.  
The access to the archives seemed to be straightforward and open to the 
general public, as was stated on their website and repeated at the central office when 
I made the initial inquiry.
48
  However, it turned out to be quite difficult in reality. 
When I arrived at the archive building I was told that it was quite unusual to have 
people other than journalists ask for access. I had a letter from my supervisor, Dr. 
Aspinwall, that supported my claim to be a PhD student and that my request to 
access the archive was for academic purposes. I was told to call the main office and 
to ask about what exactly I needed to get into the archive. In that following 
conversation I was told that I needed to submit a list of exact dates of debates that I 
was interested in and that they were available online. I tried gathering the needed 
information but at that time there were no details about the debates on specific dates 
and I had to rely on guessing. During my next call to the archive main office I was 
told that it might take a few days or even weeks for them to process my request, 
which was then denied in a conversation with a different person. All of this took 
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place over a period of two weeks and it made me realise that accessing the archives 
would be a serious difficulty.  
I consulted with my supervisor, Dr. Annika Bergman at that point and 
discussed the situation. I was advised that I should look at the data already gathered 
in the newspapers archive and make a decision on what to do next: continue with 
trying to access the parliamentary archive or use what I had gathered. I spent several 
days going over the collected material and trying to assess whether I had enough to 
conduct analysis on them. Although I was concerned with having to change my plan 
I decided to use the newspapers as my source of analysis and to leave the 
parliamentary archive. I was confident that what I had would provide enough good 
material for my project.  
My experience in trying to access parliamentary archives demonstrates that 
although the information is meant to be readily available to the public it is 
questionable how easily accessible the information is as compared to other western 
countries a researcher may not face as many obstacles.  
 
 
Reflexivity in research 
 
When assessing a piece of research the question of relationship between the 
researcher and the topic is often raised. Mainstream social science pursues the ideal 
of objectivity where the researcher is detached from the topic and thus is capable of 
producing research without bias. Poststructuralist scholars reject that understanding 
and suggest that the researcher is always present in the study and that as a 
consequence objectivity is very difficult, if not impossible to achieve. 
This study is in many ways a personal story. I believe that is what makes it 
interesting and valuable to the academic circles, but it is necessary to clarify why that 
is the case and how such research can be credible. The question of epistemology is 
always central to any research project since it determines how we perceive the 




of a social construction of knowledge and of facts, this study inevitably must 
question its own position and how the role of the researcher has impacted the process 
of analysis as well as the final results. Phillips and Jørgensen warn that working with 
discourses close to oneself potentially makes it difficult to treat them as discourses, 
rather than a common-sense understanding within that particular context.
49
 I argue 
that it is exactly these common-sense understandings and local knowledge that have 
to be analysed, for their taken-for-granted quality and apparent ‘naturalness’. The 
analyst is thus a part of the process and what might appear as a problem to critics of 
poststructuralist discourse analysis is simply acknowledged by the analyst as an 
obvious situation, where every researcher regardless of their epistemological position 
or nationality is a part of their interpretation and understanding of data. This feature 
of familiarity and ‘naturalness’ of data is not only present in the analyst but in the 
very texts that are being analysed. For example, it is common to find in text that 
politicians refer to phenomena in a cryptic way.  ‘The region’, ‘those people’ and 
‘our neighbours’ might seem vague but the recipients of the discourse know exactly 
what and whom it is referred to. The meaning of the words is thus taken for granted 
on that level and it is the task of the analyst to shed light on the meaning of the 
concepts as well as the context in which they were articulated. Familiarity with the 
wider context and history, as well as knowledge of the language then becomes 
essential to the study.  
The following quote explains the role of the researcher in a clear way and the 
relationship they have to their subject in the process of researching it. 
 
Reflexivity requires an awareness of the researcher's contribution to the 
construction of meanings throughout the research process, and an 
acknowledgment of the impossibility of remaining 'outside of' one's subject 
matter while conducting research. Reflexivity then, urges us to explore the 
ways in which a researcher's involvement with a particular study 
influences, acts upon and informs such research.
50
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 Since it is not possible to remain on the outside and to impartially observe 
and analyse political phenomena, we must first decide whether that is an impediment 
to good research and how that personal element features in the study. The most 
obvious place to start is to look at the link between the case study and the researcher. 
When a specific country is the topic the researcher either comes from that country or 
is a foreigner. Given that poststructuralism rejects the idea of objectivity in research, 
both cases will demonstrate a degree of bias, although in different ways. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, most of available literature on Croatia and the 
Balkans comes from abroad, especially from the English speaking world. As a 
consequence it inevitably conveys the attitudes and understanding towards Croatia 
that are largely influenced by local circumstance and culture. As such it portrays a 
particular picture about the topic that equally reveals interesting things about the 
authors and where they were coming from in their assessment of the case study. 
Some of the authors were Croatian but were educated abroad (their postgraduate 
work at least) where they continued their academic career.
51
 We can assume with a 
degree of certainty that their work has been influenced by their academic 
environment and that their research focus and approach to studying Croatia differs 
from that of Croatian researchers.  
 My own position as a researcher in this case is similar to that of the Croats 
abroad. The topic of inquiry is my own country and as a consequence carries with it a 
certain amount of baggage. The events that took place in the 1990s and the period 
studied in this thesis directly influenced my life and greatly shaped my own attitudes 
towards my country, the Balkans and the rest of the world. The choice of the topic 
and the way I designed the research project were influenced by that as much as what 
I learned in the research design class. My personal views did greatly influence my 
choice of reading material in the initial stages of research and they placed me on the 
side of the new regime, with which I shared the same attitude towards the previous 
government and its actions.  
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However, the long process of data collection and analysis, as well as 
continuous reading of other kind of materials helped me see the Croatian story in a 
new light. A more critical stance towards the new government developed through 
this process, as well as towards the European Union and several other international  
organisations. A better understanding of political processes generally also developed 
and confirmed my understanding of the importance of domestic context and the 
interplay of different political spheres.  
 The growing awareness of the complexities of the Croatian case made me 
look more carefully into sources to be included in the thesis. I realised it was crucial 
to look at the case study from different angles and to be careful about the way I 
presented arguments, in terms of using certain language and tone. It is not possible to 
erase bias completely and the researcher is always embedded in the wider political 
and social discourse, but being aware of this issue and continually reflecting on the 
process of research and analysis makes it more likely for the researcher to produce 
work that is more than simply a manifesto of certain ideological propositions. 
This thesis, although written from a perspective of someone who is a part of 
the culture of the subject of the study, offers a critical stance towards the events that 
took place and contributes to the existing work on both Croatia and the Balkans. In 
terms of ‘foreign’ academic work it adds a local voice and a perspective of someone 
on the inside. In terms of contributing to Croatian research, it brings something new 
and daring to the field. During the period of my work on the thesis there was nothing 
written on this subject in Croatia. As discussed previously, a handful of Croatian 
authors working abroad had looked into the questions of the Homeland War and its 
aftermath, but these topics were curiously absent at home. Main concerns in the 
Croatian academic circles in the last ten years mainly revolved around questions of 
the field of political research, distinguishing it from other social science and setting 
its boundaries. What one would rightly see as the most important thing to study was 
simply not there. Discourse analysis places equal weight on what is not said to that 
what is said and this interesting situation in Croatia invites us to look more deeply 





Discussing my work with other researchers working on Croatia I am 
confident that my study would not have been possible had I pursued a postgraduate 
degree in Croatia. Despite claims to openness towards the international academic 
world Croatia is still a captive of its own insecurities in terms of where it belongs in 
the world, which is reflected in its academic achievements among other things. In 
March of 2009 a group of lecturers and PhD students gathered in Stirling for a one 
day conference on Croatia in the post – Tuđman period. The result was an exciting 
exchange of knowledge and findings on a variety of topics, from politics, social 
issues and media to pop culture. Another outcome was a proposal to put together a 
publication of our work as examples of Croatian academic working in diaspora. In 
October of 2010 a special edition of a Croatian political journal Politička misao was 
published and presented our work to the Croatian readers.
52
 It attracted a lot of 
attention and received much positive feedback. Initiatives such as this one will help 
establish closer contacts between Croatian researchers working at home and abroad 
and facilitate an exchange of views and experience. Addressing such sensitive topics 
that are still avoided at home and bringing a new perspective on things will benefit 
research and publications done locally and hopefully open the academic circle up to 
influences from abroad. Equally so, it might encourage them to start looking at 
domestic issues without fear of being deemed controversial or even hostile to our 
Country and its recent history.   
 Finally, it is important to reflect on the way that contemporary political 
discourse in Croatia is influenced by academic work. It is difficult to predict to what 
extent this study will impact the existing discourse in the long run, but we can 
assume with a degree of certainty that the very existence of academic work that seeks 
to understand these important questions at a deeper level and place them in a wider 
civilizational and political framework will allow for a development of thinking about 
Croatian identity. Engaging in debates about where Croatia belongs and how it 
should define itself in relation to the European Union and the Balkans by critically 
examining its past will help Croatia in defining and understanding its position in 
Europe and the rest of the world.  
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4 Trouble with the Balkans: an analysis of the 
radical other and the civilisational discourse 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will introduce several important topics that are closely 
connected to the question of Croatia’s changing political identity. It will set the scene 
for the discussion of co-operation with the ICTY and minority protection in relation 
to Croatia’s changing identity that forms two case studies, analysed in the following 
chapters. Questions of Croatian identity and the role of Serbia, as well as the problem 
of the Balkans as a geographical and civilisational space will be addressed in this 
chapter in order to provide a context for the study of Croatian identity with regards to 
ICTY and for the question of ethnic minorities.  
The chapter will first identify significant political events and connect them to 
the overall theme of Croatia’s progress westward and the changing nature of its 
political identity. The othering of Croatia’s past becomes central in the official 
discourse of the new government that seeks to completely change its political 
direction. The second part of the chapter will investigate a basic discourse that 
revolves around the concept of civilisation. This discourse is closely interwoven into 
all political action of the period studied, and will be looked at in detail in Croatia’s 
cooperation with the ICTY and its approach to regulating minority rights. The 
analysis of this basic discourse will be conducted by focusing on Croatia’s 
articulation of the ‘West’, its relationship with the Balkans and Serbia in particular. 
The concept of radical otherness will be addressed here in more detail and used to 
examine the nature of the Serbian other in the Croatian context. It will be argued that 
the civilisational discourse of the West/European Union versus the East/ the Balkans 
is the basis for Croatia’s understanding of its position in Europe.  
The nature of interpretive approaches requires a critical stance towards social 




stable in a given discursive field. The case of Croatia and the Balkans is examined in 
the light of Croatia’s democratic change and its connection to the questions of 
identity formation. The stress is on Croatia’s relations with the West, most 
significantly the European Union, and on the way these concepts are constructed in 
the official discourse. The second important feature is the relationship with Serbia – 
the radical other that represents the Balkans that Croatia is eager to leave behind.  
The tension between the established discourse of anti-Balkan and anti-Serbian 
sentiment and the need to reconcile with them in order to be accepted by the West 
will provide the basis of analysis in the remainder of this chapter and in the ones that 
follow.  
The link between the civilisational discourse and the two case studies is 
found at the level of Croatia’s changing identity. Croatia has never defined itself as a 
Balkan country, and the elections of 2000 offered an opportunity to reinforce this 
view with successful foreign policy decisions and by taking determined steps 
towards EU membership. Political elites faced the problem of how to justify their 
views and decisions to the people who were at that point still divided on the question 
of how much was negotiable in order to gain the desired membership of the 
European Union. The civilisational question existed primarily at the international 
level, while at the domestic level it was gradually translated into a question of the 
concept of ‘Balkan’ being equated with Tuđman’s stubbornness and narrow minded 
nationalism.  Nobody at home had to be convinced that Croatia was not Balkan but a 
‘proper’, Western European country. This discourse was embedded in the fabric of 
Croatian identity and was a widely shared belief among the population. Croatian 
identity as a western European country thus had to be made legitimate through 
acceptance of the western world, and specifically of the European Union. That was to 
be achieved by embracing Western European norms and putting them into practice. 
Reinterpreting concepts of democracy, responsibility and sovereignty and changing 
the attitudes towards minorities, as well as stressing the necessity of cooperating with 
the ICTY were some of the first things on the new agenda.  
The next section will introduce the political events at the beginning of the 




new government. It will also help the reader to better understand the political climate 
in the country in the time of study and to perceive the analysed topics as being 
directly connected to Croatia’s past and its problems with constructing and 
maintaining its political identity.  
 
 
4.2 Setting the scene: a new political agenda in the post-Tuđman era 
 
The beginning of the year 2000 witnessed a dramatic upheaval on the Croatian 
political scene. Franjo Tuđman’s death at the very end of the year 1999 had 
significant effects, both in terms of political action and a more general atmosphere in 
the country. It was more than a question of change of power and an opportunity to 
move in a different direction. For many Croatians the event was understood as an end 
of an era. The whole of the following year was characterised by the new 
government’s attempt to get away from the previous government’s direction as much 
as possible, to build a dramatically different image for themselves on the 
international plane as well as at home, and to energetically embark upon reform and 
to accommodate EU demands that would eventually lead Croatia towards the long 
desired membership.  
 The parliamentary elections held on 3rd January 2000 resulted in the defeat 
of the HDZ - Croatian Democratic Union
1
 to the coalition between the Social 
Democratic Party
2
 and the Croatian Social Liberal Party.
3
 The coalition won 71 out 
of 150 seats (46 %) while HDZ got 46 seats (30.46%). Together with a bloc of four 
other parties
4
 a comfortable majority of seats was won which secured the defeat of 
the HDZ. The leader of the SDP, Ivica Račan became head of government.
5
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 Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ) 
2
 Socijaldemokratska partija hrvatske (SDP) 
3
 Hrvatsko socijalno liberalna stranka (HSLS) 
4
 Hrvatska seljačka stranka (HSS) - Croatian Peasant Party, Istarski demokratski sabor (IDS) -  Istrian 
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5
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 The SDP-HSLS result was a triumph for the whole opposition and stood for 
an end of a dramatic era in Croatia’s politics. The HDZ was suffering from internal 
struggles between the conservative and liberal factions and was trying to reorganise. 
Reasons for the downfall of the HDZ in the elections were considered to be manifold 
but two stood out: the internal crisis into which the HDZ had fallen during Tuđman’s 
leadership and promises made by the SDP - HSLS concerning a radical improvement 
in economic as well as political matters. The anti - HDZ sentiment in the country was 
fuelled by the worsening of Croatia’s international standing and reputation, the 
economic crisis and the level of living conditions, by obvious abuse of power by the 
ruling party and their inflexible rule. The support that the winning coalition got was 
perceived as more of a response against the HDZ than the result of their own political 
plan. The result of the elections was immediately followed by comments that focused 
on the need for the HDZ to reform, following examples of European conservative 
parties and to abandon the path promoted by Tuđman and his followers.  
 The focus of the winning coalition’s programme was an improvement in 
cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, improvement of Croatia’s international status 
and resuscitation of the economy. ‘We are ready to be estimated by the European 
Union by what we do rather than on the grounds of what we declare’, was one of 
Prime Minister Račan’s early statements.
6
 The programme of the government was 
explicitly promoted as being in complete accordance with the requirements of the 
European Union. 
 The presidential elections took place shortly after the parliamentary elections. 
On 24
th
 January the results were in favour of Stjepan Mesić, an independent 
candidate and a well known figure on the Croatian political scene.
7
 Mesić got 41% of 
votes and was followed by Dražen Budiša of the HSLS/SDP with 27.7% and the 
HDZ candidate Mate Granić with 22.47%. A second round of elections took place on 
                                                                                                                                          
government’ instead in order to avoid confusion with the meaning of ‘prime minister’ as used in the 
UK. This option is also used in translation into English. 
6
 Ivica Račan, Vjesnik, 15
th
 February 2000, my translation 
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 February. Mesić won with 56% of the votes and became the second president of 
independent Croatia. The result of the election was completely unpredictable since 
Mesić announced his candidature relatively late and did not seem a serious contender 
during the presidential campaign. His independent status was perceived by many as a 
positive aspect due to the general loss of faith in political parties and mistrust in 
politicians and their incapability to bring about positive change in the country. Others 
however, regarded his position as weak and lacking in substance in relation to a 
definite programme and a more distinct political position. Mesić was aware of the 
attitudes and increasing media attention he was drawing and managed to sustain his 
image of someone who desires to be a ‘peoples’ president’, distancing himself from 
Tuđman and his nationalistic rhetoric.  
 Mesić’s victory was perceived by many as a definite blow to the old regime 
and the end of HDZ power in Croatia. His insistence on taking Croatia to Europe and 
promises of cooperating with the Government made a good impression on the 
international actors. Initial statements about immediate plans for action concerned 
changes to the Constitution and the need to decrease presidential power in favour of 
the Government. Mesić was open about his intent to cooperate from the start and 
supported the initiation for reform. In an interview given before the second round of 
elections, he discussed the constitutional changes and foreign policy direction. He 
described the presidential power during Tuđman as being wide ranging, which 
‘caused an inflation of extra-constitutional institutions’ where ‘all the power became 
centred in the president’s hands’. ‘President must be a co-creator of foreign policy 
and in our case I believe it is the president’s job to provide initiative aimed towards 




 The quote directly addresses a distinction between Tuđman’s understanding 
of the presidential role in a democratic state, and that of the leaders of the new 
regime that Mesić adheres to.  The old way supported centralised power and the  
existence of institutions outside the Constitution, while the new forces promote 
balance and responsibility of institutions towards one another, supported by a clear 
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division of duties. In the following section I will analyse the debate in more detail 
and lay the grounds for the broader setting which is crucial for the analysis of the 
civilisational discourse. Looking at the specifics of the Constitution debate and 
extracting signifiers on which it rests will offer a fruitful basis for placing these 
specific political matters within a broader discursive field, which in turn reflected the 
discursive constructions of signifiers found in the analysis of the ICTY and the 
minority question.  
   
 
4.3 First debates and political decisions: the Constitution and the 
question of government 
 
 The problems that the new Government and President decided to address 
immediately after the elections concerned the change within the Constitution 
regarding the presidential rule and the relationship with the Government. Two 
problems were put at the centre of the debate that were seen as having important 
consequences for the whole population of Croatia and that touched upon the very 
core of the identity of the Croatian state.  
 The first one was concerned with what should be done about the range of 
presidential power and the way it is defined in the Constitution, and what should be 
the domain of Government and what should be the domain of Parliament. The 
intention of changing the semi-presidential system into a parliamentary one was 
announced by the opposition during the parliamentary elections campaign. The plans 
for realisation commenced soon after the presidential elections took place. The 
opponents of the reform, on the one hand, expressed their fear that the parliamentary 
system would be slow in cases when rapid decision-making would be required and 
that Croatia could easily be destabilised. The supporters of the parliamentary option, 
on the other hand, blamed the semi-presidential system for the authoritarian style of 
Tuđman’s rule. They put their faith in institutional changes expecting a radical move 




One of the elements that featured in the pro-parliamentary system discourse 
was insistence that Croatia needed a leader that was not affiliated with a certain 
political party. The fear of the HDZ-Tuđman style of rule prompted many to press 
for a system that would not allow concentration of power in one person or a party. 
The semi presidential system was perceived to be an obstacle to any future political 
change if a parliament would undergo a process of shifting relationships between 
parties. Such a change would not effect the presidential term and would thus provide 
potential for tipping the balance in favour of one party. They claimed that a 
parliamentary system was better suited for countries in transition and especially those 
with pronounced regional and ethnic differences.
9
 Mesić openly declared support for 
the change of the system and diminishing presidential power, which is demonstrated 
in the following quote:  
 
I will accept all constitutional changes that happen in the future 
because I want Croatia to become a parliamentary democracy, to 
have the parliament as the highest organ of power and thus a 
guaranteed division of power. In such a system the president would 
not be merely a symbol of power but a balancing factor in the 
workings of the state apparatus. The president’s role ought to be to 




 What is apparent in this text is the stress on the need to separate power in the 
state institutions. Balance was the key concept in the discourse and was linked to 
Croatia’s aspirations to become fully democratic. The urgency with which the debate 
was put forward and the representation of the state apparatus as something that needs 
to be reformed suggests a certain amount of fear underlying the discourse. Unlike 
Tuđman, the new President supports the reasons for the diminishing of his authority 
for the sake of democratic principles. The following text shows that Mesić judged his  
predecessor in the light of not following such democratic principles: 
 
 President Tuđman did not understand democracy; he did not believe 
in democratic procedures, he did not understand that procedure is a 
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part of democracy. That is why he held on to his messianic role, 
believing that he knew what was best for the people, how institutions 
must work and that in that sense he was most competent to express his 
opinion on everything and to make all decisions. … I have had a very 
negative experience with the late President Tuđman. He harmed 
Croatia in the sense that his ruling style created a centre of power in 
his close surroundings. As his illness progressed more and more 
power was taken by an informal team of people that dragged Croatia 
away from Europe, the EU integration processes, European standards 
and criteria. Croatia was getting more and more isolated and those 
who did not care carried on looting it. Croatia simply did not function 




 The text positions Tuđman’s approach as diametrically opposite to the new 
government’s understanding of democracy. Mesić positions the two camps in the 
following way: Tuđman did not understand democracy and saw himself as having a 
messianic role in Croatia, as opposed to the new regime that supports the 
development of democratic institutions and procedures and sees them as being 
intrinsic to the very nature of democracy. Furthermore, Tuđman put himself at the 
centre of Croatia and substituted all democratic workings with his own personal 
opinion on all matters. Mesić then emphasises the negative outcome of such power 
arrangements. What followed was a drifting away from democratic Europe and being 
caught in isolation, which resulted in the country being exploited from the inside and 
subsequently weakened. Tuđman’s personification of Croatia with himself was thus 
in opposition to the institutional and legal aspects of the state, supported by the new 
power structures. This tension is further emphasised in the text when Mesić accuses a 
group of people who took over Tuđman’s role in an informal way and took 
advantage of the situation for personal gain. Throughout the text the stress is on the 
mutually exclusive personal and legal, individual and institutional. Mesić makes a 
direct, intrinsic link between the personal power of the President and the damage of 
the state. Law and institutions that work on democratic principles are put forward as 
factors of stability and progress.  
 However, a debate on the nature of political systems developed further 
among politicians and academics that looked to challenge this emerging discourse. 
The main argument of this position was that generally, the type of system is not 
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necessarily connected with the way power is exercised within a given state. From 
that it followed that the way HDZ acted was not in a direct way connected to the 
semi-presidential system. What this discourse suggested was that what happened in 
Croatia in the 1990s was not in any case an ‘ideal’ model of a semi-presidential 
system but rather, an anomaly. The government never exercised its power but chose 
to be a kind of a spokesperson for the President, thus losing its purpose and its 
legitimacy as an executive power. Thus, the deviations of Tuđman’s rule came out of 
a Croatian political practice, rather than the system being faulty in itself. The long 
period of communist rule and its centralised government shaped the political setting 
in Croatia to a high degree and the lack of civil society and the particular 
understanding of power made it possible for the semi-presidential system to be 
abused in an un-democratic way. According to this line of thinking we can conclude 
that it is the will of those in power and its acceptance of the citizens that determine 
the style of the rule, rather then the institutional structures. In other words, I argue 
that it is the discourses that operate within a given discursive field that set the 
boundaries of what is possible. The lack of civil society and the legacy of centralised 
one-party rule shaped the understanding of the Croatian public about what it means 
to be a democratic state and what the President’s role should be, which in turn 
allowed him to freely exercise power without restraint and without a true sense of 
accountability to the people. 
 
 
A question of sovereignty  
  
The second issue that was debated at this stage regarded the way of defining 
sovereignty and statehood of Croatia and was closely linked to the discourse on the 
presidential system. Those who favoured a change in the definition of the Croatian 
state talked about ‘eliminating the definition of Croatia as a nation state of all 






 In this case the debate was focused on two different understandings of 
a state, namely a ‘national’ versus ‘civil’ state. Politicians belonging to the winning 
coalition mostly supported the idea of changing the definition along the civil line 
argument.
13
 For example, Vesna Pusić of the HNS
14
 considered the proposal 
‘understandable and reasonable because most of the European countries had long ago 
abandoned the national definition of their states.’
15
 Pusić explained in her statement 
that the idea of a nation state was historically justifiable since back then there was a 
need to define a nation in the first place and the nation state model was supposed to 
hold it in place. Such an understanding of the need to change was in line with the 
idea that processes of globalisation have made such definitions redundant and that 
defining a state in national terms is in fact in opposition to the whole purpose of 
integration.  
 Others expressed similar understandings about the nature of progress 
regarding the definition of a state. A civil variant was always stressed as a more 
modern, democratic, European one. Mato Arlović of the SDP stated that ‘at the 
beginning of the 1990s when we were fighting for our independent and sovereign 
state it made sense to define Croatia as a national state of Croatian people. But after 
we have won the battle, such a formulation is no longer necessary.’
16
 Both texts 
based their arguments on historical grounds. This particular discourse supports the 
understanding that in the past the nation state was necessary given the different 
nature of the world. The first text is rather vague about the specific time period in 
question when it comes to the international level, while the second text identifies the 
1990s as being the crucial time for Croatia’s state building process. Both position the 
nation state as linked to the past and call it outdated, while the civil definition of a 
state is constructed as modern and desirable.  
Another feature that is important comes from the second text: ‘after we have 
won the battle, such a formulation is no longer necessary’. The battle is the 
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Homeland War, fought against Yugoslav forces and discursively constructed as a 
central feature of Croatian identity in the 1990s. Calling upon the Homeland War as 
a point in time when Croatia’s circumstances changed makes it possible to argue for 
the need to look at other European states for inspiration. The war is here constructed 
as both victorious and finished, which allows the possibility to break with the past 
and turn a new leaf. In the following chapter I will return to the question of the 
Homeland War and look at the way it had to be rearticulated and justified by difficult 
decisions if it were to stay as one of Croatia’s defining historical elements.  
 However, the question of changing the definition of Croatia perhaps needed a 
clearer debate given that the Constitution itself provided some interesting points. It 
stated: ‘In the Republic of Croatia ruling comes from the people and belongs to the 
people who are a community of free and equal citizens.’
17
 In this sense Croatia was 
defined in civil terms from its conception. All civil rights, freedoms and obligations 
were based on the understanding and defining of the citizen, and not on ethnic terms. 
The question of changing the definition of the Croatian state can thus be understood 
not as a question of legitimacy, but as a question of understanding one’s own 
position in the ‘modern, democratic West’ and developing its identity accordingly. 
Opponents of the change
18
 stressed the historical-symbolic nature of defining a state 
in a particular way but warned that because of Croatia’s recent history and particular 
political circumstances, the definition really does touch upon of all important 
questions regarding the constitution of the Croatian political community and as such 
it can provoke misunderstandings and even conflicts. Having made considerable 
progress in making Croatia a real democratic country makes it unnecessary to dwell 
on issues of mythic origins and ancient histories.
19
 In this way, a distinction was 
made between the Tuđmanist discourse on nationalism and the ‘true’ nature of 
Croatia, according to the written word of the Constitution.  
 The problem of reconciling the demands made by the EU and constrictions 
faced at home were soon articulated in the light of the sovereignty question. As I 
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argued previously, Tuđman’s rhetoric equated the independent Croatian state with 
not being a part of Yugoslavia or any other regional association. Membership in the 
European Union was at times seen as a positive option but often as a threat to 
Croatia’s independence and hard-earned sovereign status when conditions were 
imposed. The sovereignty question was used to legitimise the new Government’s 
decisions and in return provided space to navigate the risky waters. The need to make 
Croatia into a law-governed state was linked to the sovereignty argument and turned 
the previous rhetoric of independence upside-down. Foreign Minister Tonino Picula 
insisted that:  
 
It is in Croatia’s interest to be a law-governed state and that all 
criminal actions are punished at home, including war crimes. This 
ought to be for Croatia’s own credibility. Many say that 
cooperation with The Hague puts Croatia’s sovereignty in 
question. That is absurd because sovereignty is put into question 





 In this way the authority of the European Union and The Hague tribunal were 
positioned as unquestioned authority that has the right to grant or refute one’s right to 
be called sovereign. The legitimacy of the Government and a new direction in 
foreign policy making were thus secured without the humiliation of acting against 
one’s will. The reconstruction of the meaning of sovereignty will be addressed in 
greater detail in the context of cooperation with The Hague tribunal. The discourse 
on sovereignty is present in the minority protection issue as well, although to a lesser 
degree and is usually linked to the question of democratic practice of minority 
protection. 
 After having discussed several immediate concerns of the new government 
that direct us towards a deeper understanding of the changing Croatian identity and 
its relationship with political questions, I will now turn to the problem of political 
space and discuss its implications for the civilizational aspect of Croatian identity 
debate.  
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 4.4 The civilisational discourse and the radical other: what does ‘the 
Balkans’ really mean and where can it be found? 
 
Discursive constructions of ‘the Balkans’ 
  
Studying Croatian politics demands a thorough knowledge of the discursive 
space within which political action takes place. The question of the Balkans features 
prominently in the Croatian political discourse as one of the fundamental elements 
that shape Croatian social and political space. The question about the Balkans is 
present in explicit ways in the political discourse and is always a source of specific 
identity constructions from which political debates emerge. For that reason it is 
necessary at this point to examine ‘the Balkans’ as a concept around which the 
discourse on Croatian national identity is structured. An interesting question emerges 
when we look at the discursive construction of the Balkans by the Croatian political 
elites that reveals itself in the data: does anyone really know where the Balkans are 
and what they encompass?  It becomes evident in the analysis that the answer is 
negative. The Balkans is referred to as a concrete, geographical region but without 
clearly marked boundaries or definitions about that space. It is therefore possible to 
understand the Balkans as an imagined space. This assumption is supported by two 
contradictions that emerge in the Croatian discourse: the acceptance of the Balkans 
as a region and questioning of the legitimacy of the concept at the same time.  
 According to post-structuralist theory, mutual constituitiveness is the basis of 
discursive constructs. It is thus necessary to step away from the Croatian subject for a 
moment and look into the concept of ‘the Balkans’ as defined by non-Croatian 
sources that represent the Western conception of the term. The analysis will then 
question whether such a construction of the Balkans features in the Croatian political 
discourse, where variations emerge and what the consequences are.  
  In his essay, The Clash of Civilisations
21
, Huntington applies the idea to the 
Balkans as a good example of an area that is destined to face eternal conflicts due to 
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its mix of cultures and religions. The Balkans are thus not simply a geographical 
region but a civilisation that stands in opposition to the West. Within the Balkans 
there are variations and it is these internal differences that make the region dangerous 
and inherently unstable. In the same way the ‘ancient hatred thesis’ has been equally 
emphasised as a mechanism for explaining the Balkans. According to this thesis the 
basic idea is that ‘the Balkan peoples, irreconcilably divided by different religions 
and cultural affiliations, are forever fated to be at each other’s throats like cats and 
dogs’.
22
 What becomes apparent is that the notion of the Balkans carries an 
underlying sense of danger, threat, violence and instability. It features as a heart of 
darkness type space in the heart of Europe. The study of the Balkans thus ceases to 
be geographical but reveals itself to be a discourse of a civilisation. My analysis is 
embedded in this tradition and treats the Balkans as a primarily civilisational space. 
However, the geographical space and its alleged frontiers are central to the study 
despite the apparent contradiction. It will be argued that the debate concerning 
geographical frontiers only makes sense if these boundaries are looked at in the light 
of the discursive construction of the Balkans as being the opposite of the civilised 
West and the mystery of where these borders actually are. This approach is aligned 




 The Balkans are primarily characterised by their alleged place on the world 
map: between the East and the West of Europe. This geographical-civilisational 
position determines the identity of the Balkans
24
 and this ‘in-betweeness’ has become 
its central identity feature and is echoed in the Croatian national discourse that places 
Croatia in-between civilisations. Croatian national identity is often expressed in the 
negative: it is not Balkan, not like Serbia, not backward and uncivilised. These 
reference points at the same time explicitly show the discursive construction of the 
Balkans in the Croatian discourse, but also show the West as an identity at the 
opposite side of the spectrum and as being mutually exclusive. The Balkans are thus 
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discursively constructed as a negative of the West. The following quote effectively 
demonstrates that feature of the Western construction of the Balkans:  
 
But once again there arose the question that seemed so eternally 
asked and so perpetually appropriate here: just why? Just why is 
there this dire inevitability about the Balkans being so fractious and 
unsettled a corner of the world, an inevitability that always seemed 
to exist?  Just what was it that had marked out this particular 
peninsula, this particular gyre of mountains and plains, caves and 





The text addresses the reason for the apparent everlasting hostility and hatred 
in the Balkans. It discursively constructs the Balkans as being inherently unstable 
and violent, as suffering from an inevitability that has been present since the wake of 
time. This temporal - civilisational feature makes it impossible, or at least very 
difficult to challenge the notion of violence as a defining feature of the Balkans. The 
events of the 1990s were thus interpreted from this point of view in the Western  
media and the academia. ‘Historically, relations between Serbs, Croats and Muslims 
had been appalling for centuries. […] The place has always been considered a 
powder keg.
26
 This quote demonstrates the same principle of discursively 
representing the Balkans as a place where violence and hatred naturally occur. Just 
like the wild landscape that Todorova describes in her book, the Balkan people are 
constructed as having a natural tendency for violence which is beyond hope for 
change and as such is outside Western civilisation. The complexity of the 
relationships between the ex-Yugoslav countries and the conflicts between 1990 and 
1995 have too often been reduced to the ancient hatred concept and constructed as 
being too complicated for Westerners to understand.  
 This Western perception of the nature of the Balkans has been critically 
assessed in a volume by Bjelić and Savić, Balkan as a Metaphor.
27
 The essays 
address different aspects of the Balkan identity across case studies and examine the 
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relationship between Western constructions and their local variations. The authors 
challenge the dominant Western discourse on the Balkans and seek to identify its role 
in establishing the ‘truths’ about the region and the way that the Western 
constructions influenced political events within it. The authors point that ‘if Balkan 
peoples are frequently accused of being trapped in their own history, many of the 
outsiders dealing with the region have also shown an unwillingness to think beyond a 
symbolic, formulaic representation, to the point where the Balkans have become 
nothing but a metaphor for conflict, incivility and violence.’
28
 This willingness to 
engage with the discourse on the Balkans and offer a regional commentary is in itself 
an important achievement. The book presents valuable criticism of the uncritical 
acceptance and reproduction of the discourse on the Balkans that has become 
sedimented in the Western academia and the media. It is therefore a valuable 
contribution to the debate about the Balkans and raises important questions. 
However, the volume does not contain a Croatian perspective.  This study will 
attempt to answer the question of whether Croatia can critically engage with the 
Balkan discourse and offer an alternative. The implications that the volume raises 
concern the Croatian case and pose the following questions: can Croatia ever change 
the perceptions abroad? Can its identity as a Western European country be 
legitimated?   
 The following section will look more closely into the civilisational discourse 
between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ and the way it features in the Croatian articulation 
of its identity.  
 
  
The civilisational discourse and the radical other 
 
At this point it is necessary to examine the Croatian construction of the 
civilisational discourse between the West and the East. The Balkans are one of the 
central features of this discourse and exist at several levels. As argued in the theory 
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and methodology chapters, identity is a social category and revolves around the 
processes of ‘othering’. The self identifies against the other, which is a subject 
position that is its direct opposite and thus mutually exclusive. This study identifies 
the Balkans as Croatia’s radical other at a broader level, while Serbia functions as a 
local representation and embodiment of the Balkans. The civilisational discourse 
positions ‘the West’ against ‘the East’ where the Balkans belong to the East and hold 
a distinct identity from the West. This otherness of the Balkans is most apparent in 
the discourse on Croatia’s role in the region where it acts as an extension of the 
European Union and its democratising power, as well as in the constructions of 
Serbia as inferior to both the West and Croatia. 
An important question arises at this point: where do the Balkans actually 
start? By examining discourses on the Balkans we can conclude that the northern 
border of the Balkans is always pushed to the south. In the Western discourse Croatia 
is included in the Balkans and shares its traits. As discussed previously, the Balkans 
are represented as an actual space with a strong normative dimension to it. The ethics 
of the Balkans is purely negative: a powder keg waiting to blow up, without any 
possibility to change such an intrinsic property. In the Croatian discourse the 
geographical and civilisational notions also mix. Croatia does not consider itself to 
be Balkan but places the frontier along the actual borders with Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Living on the fringe of Western Europe has been accepted as part of 
Croatian identity and fortified by historic accounts of its belonging to Western 
European empires, rather than the Byzantium and subsequently the Ottoman Empire. 
In addition, the use of the Latin alphabet rather than Cyrillic, belonging to Roman 
Catholicism rather than Eastern Orthodox Christianity, adds to Croatia’s identity as a 
Western European rather than Eastern European civilisation.  
Being on the border between East and West in Europe has been constructed 
as a difficulty in the Croatian discourse and I argue that as long as there is real or 
perceived danger that comes from the Balkans that feature makes it impossible for 
Croatia to become fully Western. The shadow of conflict is always present in the 
discourse about the Balkans, whether real or hypothetical. The Balkans are 




peaceful and civilised. This feature will be analysed in more detail in the following 
two chapters and it will be argued that the discourse of insecurity and violence makes 
Croatian identity as a Western country questionable.  
At this stage the official discourse is trying to place Croatia in another 
geographical setting in order to fortify its non-Balkan identity. The following quote 
demonstrates this point. In an official visit to Germany in April 2000, the Head of 
Government Ivica Račan discussed with Joschka Fischer, German Head of 
Diplomacy, the importance for Croatia to be seen as Europe’s partner who could in 
time become a vehicle for integration. He stated: ‘It is expected from us to do 
Europe’s work in a way, in our relations with the neighbours. Croatia’s geographical 
position is important: between Central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkans.’
29
 
Račan places Croatia in a non-defined space: between three distinct regions. It can be 
argued that this strategy opts for a vague definition of regional identity rather than a  
simple anti-Balkan statement in order to make the claim more credible. The 
statement also shows a difficulty in stating Croatia’s identity in the positive. 
Remaining in-between several geographical spaces allows space for navigation and 
redefinition, but at the same time demonstrates the instability of the discourse and its 
internal tensions. 
The following statement by the President, made during a visit to Hungary for 
the Summit of the Visegrad countries adds to the argued instability of the discourse 
by placing Croatia in a specific region:  
 
Central Europe is a fact, and a united Europe is our goal. We can 
reach it only if we acknowledge this fact. Here we have present 
EU member states that can help us outside the EU to reach our 
goals, through cooperation and solidarity. (...) It is on us to make 
the central-European space stable, prosperous and integrated 
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The President speaks of Central Europe as a place where Croatia also 
belongs. This construction is problematic, however, because it does not follow a 
historical account of Croatia’s identity and it is not present elsewhere in the 
discourse. Just like the previous text, this statement points to a non-defined situation 
where Croatia is struggling to find its space and to belong to a group of countries 
other than the Balkans. The attempt of defining Croatia as a Central European 
country did not succeed and it did not reappear in the official discourse again. 
The following text, a statement from one of the President’s foreign policy 
advisors, offers an interesting discourse that separates the Balkan region and 
civilisation and argues that Croatia can be a part of one but not the other. It starts 
with an appraisal of rapid democratic change after the elections and introduces the 
idea of a Balkan Croatia in the regional sense: 
 
These internal changes are reflected in our foreign policy, in 
Croatia’s relations with the world and with the neighbouring 
countries and countries of the region. For a time the term 
‘Balkans’ was something that had to be avoided at all cost. But 
I do not see a problem with it now. We are in the Balkans and 
should not be trying to escape this geographical space. What 
has to be escaped is the primitivism and understanding of the 
Balkans and ‘balkanisation’ in that sense. We are where we 
are, nothing to be ashamed of since there have been great 
civilisational achievements here.
31
    
 
This text presents a challenging representation of Croatia. It argues that there 
is nothing negative about being from the Balkans as long as it is defined as a 
geographical region. The speaker does stress that the region and the civilisation must 
be separated and explicitly states that what he has in mind is not Balkans in the 
civilisational sense. He identifies the latter as primitive. This articulation that 
separates the region and the civilisation shows potential for a complex, layered 
Balkan identity that is not just defined by violence and conflict, but by culture and 
progress. The speaker hints at the recent past when being in the Balkans had to be 
avoided at all costs and calls for a change in attitude in the new political era. 
However, this approach did not prove to be a success and the speaker’s suggestion 
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that being Balkan is not a bad thing in itself provoked strong reactions both from the 
readers and politicians and demonstrated the difficulty of divorcing the Balkan 
region from a negative civilisational construct. Such suggestions did not appear again 
within the official discourse and, as will be demonstrated in the next section and 
chapters, the notion of Croatia as Balkan was strongly refuted throughout the year.  
Moreover, the Balkans do not stop at the regional level. The Croatian national 
discourse goes deeper into its identity and makes even more specific claims about its 
radical other. Serbia is identified as such and discursively constructed as the local 
extension of the Balkan civilisation. Again, Serbia and Yugoslavia are used 
interchangeably in the Croatian discourse and represent the Balkans. This is most 
apparent in texts addressing relations with Yugoslavia, where Serbia is frequently 
used in its place. The following text addresses the issue of regional integration and 
the role of the European Union and demonstrates the importance of that relationship 
in the context of Croatian identity discourse:  
 
Since we started our journey towards the EU we have never been 
further from any kind of Balkan association and the very act of 
joining the EU will free us from all phobias about being involved in 




The speaker articulates the West against the East divide in terms of the EU 
against ‘some sort of Balkan community’. She positions EU membership as 
something that belongs to the future while the Balkans are the thing of the past. A 
Balkan community that Pusić alludes to is Yugoslavia. Being part of the EU excludes 
the possibilities of falling into another type of Balkan or Yugoslav union.
33
 Dangers 
of being associated with Yugoslavia in any way are thus prevented by being 
embraced by the European Union and in that way fully achieving the desired 
Western European identity. The EU thus becomes not just a solution to the Croatian 
problem but a way of reinforcing Croatia’s non-Balkan identity and a sure way of 
preventing any future associations with Serbia/Yugoslavia. 
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 A similar point was made by the Minister of European Integration, Ivan 
Jakovčić in an interview to the Nacional:  
Nacional: HDZ has not positively greeted a single thing that has been 
done by the new regime.  
 
IJ: It is true that the opposition has had strong reactions so far. (…) I 
do resent the fact that they all continue to pursue anti-European 
politics and what that effectively means is keeping Croatia in the 
Balkans with the Milošević regime. Those gentlemen that have been 
against every Government’s move are actually working on keeping 
Croatia beside Milošević. Tuđman and him were political twins but 
the new government has no intention to carry on with that politics. 
That is in the past. This government wants to include Croatia in the 




The Minister accuses the opposition on the whole as being anti-European, 
and thus Balkan. The two are constructed as mutually exclusive so not favouring the 
government’s path to EU membership is relegated to the inferior level of the 
Balkans. He makes an even stronger claim when the Balkans are linked to Milošević 
and his regime. In this way the opposition is equated with being Balkan, which 
means violent, undemocratic and backward. This point will again be addressed in the 
following chapters where all action that challenges the official discourse is 
discursively constructed in the same way. Furthermore, the temporal element is 
introduced here and the Balkans are placed in ‘the past’ where Tuđman and 
Milošević are political twins.   
Again, the EU is positioned as Croatia’s future and mutually exclusive to the 
Balkan option. Despite being an obvious attempt at undermining the claims made by 
the opposition by simplifying discursive constructions of what is politically desirable 
and viable, the text offers an insight into the way the new official discourse 
articulated the nature of Croatia’s identity. It explicitly positions the West (European 
Union) against the East (Balkans-Serbia-Milošević) and reproduces the discourses of 
cooperation with the West/EU and non-cooperation with the East/Balkans. The 
nature of Serbia is not addressed here in great depth since at this stage it still featured 
as an external element to Croatia and the embodiment of the Balkan civilisation that 
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Croatia disassociates from. The problem of Serbia as an internal element of Croatian 
identity appears within the minority rights protection discourse and will be analysed 
later on in depth. However, the importance of acknowledging Serbia as a Radical 
Other at this point is great since it is present in the official discourse as a continuous, 
underlying force that shapes political debates. It is only later that the Radical Other is 
subject to change and challenges the established ‘truths’.  
 
 
Reproducing the Western discourse on the Balkans 
 
 By this point it becomes apparent from the analysis that Croatia sees itself as 
being trapped in-between the Balkans and Western Europe, and constantly 
reproduces the oppositions between the two in order to secure the stability of its 
identity. The analysed texts demonstrate the emotiveness of the feeling towards the 
Balkans. It is not simply a political question, but there is something profoundly 
personal about it that manifests itself in the discourse. ‘Leaving’ the Balkans behind 
is presented as fundamental to the very existence of the Croatian state that goes 
beyond the political implications of such a development. The relationships between 
Croatia and the Balkans, and Croatia and the European Union are conceived and 
reproduced with reference to the binary oppositions ‘the West’ against ‘the East’. As 
I have argued earlier, the West has discursively constructed the Balkans in a 
particular way: inherently violent, backward and hostile to progress. The analysis of 
the Croatian political discourse demonstrates that in the post-election period in the 
year 2000 there was no challenging of the Western discourse on the Balkans, but that 
Croatia participated in the reproduction of the ‘West’ against ‘East’ antagonism 
following the European discourse. Croatia looked to the West as an ideal of 
democracy, justice and freedom and was willing to cooperate in order to be able to 
join the European family. This is evident in the discourses on the Constitution and 
the nature of the Croatian state, as well as in the discourses of justice and 
responsibility, analysed in the following chapters. However, at the same time it was 




Croatia occasionally challenges the Western construction of the Balkans but 
only to a certain extent. It separates itself from the Balkans on cultural and historical 
grounds, but it does not question the very foundation of the meaning of the Balkans 
put forward by the West. It is here that we can find the cracks in the official 
discourse regarding the West-Balkans duality. If Croatia defines itself as not Balkan 
and desires to separate itself from it at all cost, it is at this very point that Croatia 
reproduces the discourse of antagonism that reinforces its Balkan identity.
35
 Croatia 
is thus locked in a paradox and cannot fully attain its Western identity that stresses 
cooperation. This situation demonstrates the difficulty of changing embedded 
discourses and the reality of boundaries within a discursive field. In order to illustrate 
this point further the following section will demonstrate this tension in the official 
discourse by examining the nature of cooperation by European standards and what 
Croatia perceives its role to be in the Balkan region.  
 
 
4.5 Turning over a new leaf: spreading democracy in the region 
 
An important element of the debate with the West became an idea that Croatia 
should work as a factor of stabilisation in the region. The changes on the political 
scene were distinctively radical in comparison to previous periods and seemed 
promising in the long run. The recognition of Croatia’s success was evident in the 
hopes and encouragement that its case can serve as an example and a model for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia to follow, each in their own right.  
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tonino Picula stated:  
There are big expectations from us but our primary task is to 
democratise ourselves. Until we do that and arrive to a position of an 
EU candidate our democratic spill-over into our neighbourhood will 
be quite limited, despite the expectations from the world. But we are 
not running away from our obligation of democratising others. 
Depending on the success we have in Croatia we can expect to 
influence our neighbours. I do not know how successful Croatia will 
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be in building these bridges but in any case we do have great 




His view of Croatia as playing a part of the bridge between the Balkans and 
the West is based on the discourse of progress. Croatia has to democratise itself first 
in order to be able to export democracy to its neighbourhood. This text shows that 
the EU is reproduced in discourse as superior and democratic, while the 
neighbourhood – the Balkans, as inferior. Croatia positions itself as being in-between 
the two, involved in the processes of profound change.  The identity that it desires is 
in the future and EU membership will make it real. It is thus possible to question the 
articulation of the radical other of the neighbourhood as legitimate. If Croatia is not 
yet fully Western can it claim to be radically different from its ‘true’ Balkan 
neighbours? However, the texts analysed do not offer a satisfactory answer but all 
insist in treating the relationship between the poles of the civilisational spectrum as 
solid and mutually exclusive.  
Another discourse that emerges at this point is that of ethics. Foreign Minister 
Picula stresses that Croatia has a duty to democratise others and not run away from 
that responsibility. This normative element implies that the discursive construction of 
non-cooperation as being central to the Balkans can be questioned. Acknowledging 
the ethical implications of cooperating with the radical other takes Croatia further 
away from the Balkans and its reproduction of the Balkan civilisational discourse 
established by the West. The co-existence of the non-cooperation discourse with the 
discourse of Western co-operation in the Croatian context is nevertheless evident in 
the following section of the same text and suggests an ambiguity of identity 
relationships. The question of power is raised and coupled with the discourse on 
ethics and responsibility.  
 
When I say this I do not mean that Croatia should be a regional power 
as envisaged by President Tuđman. That was grotesque. We want to 
be a real democratic country that supports development and co-
operation in the region but without being hostages to that region. We 
do not want that our chances of joining of the EU is limited, or God 
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forbid, conditioned by the pace of democratic transition and 
development of our neighbours. We have been told that all accession 
to the EU will be made on highly individual bases. However, we 
cannot escape our geographical position and obligations we have 
because we will not be able to develop all our democratic potential if 





Acknowledging its position as a small state that is only learning how to be 
truly democratic was coupled with an understanding of the importance of that 
position given the nature of the geo-political setting. Leading the way and 
contributing to bringing democracy into the Balkans was compatible with the 
political elites’ vision of Croatia as being Western enough to be able to aspire to  
become ‘truly’ Western in the foreseeable future. Being recognised as a ‘partner’ 
rather than a ‘case’ or simply a ‘problem’ is thus a boost of encouragement and a 
sign of Croatia’s developing new identity being embraced by the actors deemed 
highly important. The speaker positions himself against Tuđman’s vision of what a 
regional power meant. In this way Croatia’s role is that of being an extension of the 
European Union and Western democratic values, rather than an actor that acts for its 
own sake independently of the broader political context. 
However, despite the good will and encouraging messages of being willing to 
help Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia (after it frees itself from Milošević) to move 
towards democracy, and the expressed desire for Croatia to be a generator of positive 
changes in the region generally, Croatian politicians early on expressed their views 
on the boundaries they would not be willing to cross. When asked whether the 
international community put Croatia in the same group of Balkan countries again, the 
Foreign Minister Picula replied: 
Before the Stability Pact we were operating within a regional system 
approach. The emphasis now is on individual efforts and progress, 
including the acceptance of European standards and of moving 
towards the EU and NATO memberships. (…) Just compare the 
efforts of the last three months and how we have changed the status 
of our country in comparison with the one it had before, because of 
the belligerent and somewhat autistic politics they pursued. I think 
we have a reason to be satisfied. We have confirmed that we are 
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being increasingly perceived as partners with special obligations in 
this region. However, as Head of Government Račan has said, we 
will not be sharing the same regional destiny. We have institutionally 




Not sharing the same regional destiny with Serbia and other Balkan states is 
thus a matter of not only noticeable development and democratisation, but a 
reinforcement of Croatia’s identity as a non-Balkan country. Being ‘in the fast lane’ 
and getting to the desired goal was more then just a question of progress: it was a 
question of getting there before the Balkan states do, and getting to the West early 
enough to feel safe and assured of its identity and position. Therefore, helping Serbia 
is acceptable and justifiable as long as there are clear borders between the two. The 
discourse of antagonism and non-cooperation that is inherent in the Balkans is visible 
yet again and demands to be considered from this point of view. In the official 
Croatian discourse the nature of co-operation and goodwill towards neighbouring 
Balkan countries can therefore only exist within the wider framework of the 
European Union initiative and protection. Anything else would be deemed dangerous 
and detrimental to Croatian progress.  
 Another statement by the Foreign Minister concerns the nature of cooperation 
in the Balkans and the difficulty of working within that context:  
 
Political changes in Croatia thus caused excitement in Europe: 
people showed at elections the desire for positive change. Europe 
wants us to be their partner who will help resolve the regional 
problem. I want to stress that we are not being pushed into bad 
political options; they just want us to contribute in clearing things 
up in this area. We must serve as an example to our eastern 
neighbours that it is possible to change the government through 
proper pre-election campaign and by forming certain coalitions. 
The international community really needs a move forward in 
terms of the status quo that exists in Bosnia and Kosovo, and 
especially in Yugoslavia. We are aware of the hopes that they are 
putting into Croatia. This is a chance for the whole new 
generation that is coming into power now and it would be a 
disaster to waste it.
39
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The ‘bad political options’ concern a Balkan union of a kind; something to be 
avoided at all costs. An example to the neighbours is acceptable as long as Croatia 
has full European support and works as its agent. Being compared to 
Yugoslavia/Serbia becomes a question of Croatia’s Balkan identity – something that 
is considered the least desirable option for the future. If Croatia is to be like Serbia 
then it has not developed and democratised, it has not moved away from the Balkans. 
However, in order to reinforce its Western identity there was a request by the EU to 
increase engagement in European attempts to cooperate with the Balkans. Accepting 
its geographical position but with a strong temporal and ethical distance from 
Yugoslavia was thus understood as the only possible way forward to Europe. The 
following text demonstrates this in an explicit way: 
 
We have always claimed that we support regional cooperation but 
that every country should approach the EU membership on an 
individual basis. There is no doubt about it - we are for good 
neighbourly relations, which includes our realisation that Croatia 
connects the Mediterranean, Central Europe and the South-East. On 
the 3
rd
 January elections were held that signalled the 
democratisation of our country. However, Croatia has not been 
accompanied by the democratisation of the region. It does play the 
part in the EU’s ambitions to transform Europe’s South-East. That is 
an important message but we are not expected to be prisoners of the 
region. It is important to us to be seen as a possible future candidate 




The statement explicitly juxtaposes ‘the region’ – the Balkans and the 
European Union. The Balkans have not followed Croatia into the processes of 
democratisation and that in itself is a danger because being influenced by the Balkan 
neighbours would keep Croatia a ‘prisoner’ in this region where it does not truly 
belong. The future of EU membership and the past of the Balkan prison stand in 
stark contrast in the discourse on Croatian identity and its political options.  
The following text is looking at the way that Serbia was perceived and 
positioned in the official discourse in terms of the Croatian civilising role. It links the 
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Croatian obligation to transform the region to a more personal level of Croatian 
identity. 
 
As a Croatian citizen and a politician I have always been very hurt 
and offended when Europe would compare Croatia to Serbia, and 
for that I blame former authorities. We are making all of this 
effort in order to move away from such a perception. The greatest 
achievement of our foreign politics is that we have shed the image 
of being related to Serbia. Now Croatia is being perceived as an 
active factor in the transformation of not only Serbia, but the 
whole region, and by meeting standards that Europe expects here. 
We are now creating democracy although that might seem a bit 




 Being compared to Serbia is considered to be offensive and demeaning. 
Again, the language is highly emotional and demonstrates the importance of being 
recognised as different from Serbia and the Balkans. Croatian achievements are thus 
measured in the distance between Croatia and its identity as a Western European 
country and the radical other. The speaker explicitly elaborates that this relationship 
has to maintain that space between the two if Croatia is to be able to act in the region. 
The distance is what allows the transformative power of the EU to fully work in 
Croatia and only from that position to reach down to Serbia and other Balkan 
countries. In this way the discourses of cooperation and non-cooperation are 
reconciled and allow Croatia to reproduce the Western discourse of Balkan 
antagonism with the Western discourse on democratic standards of cooperation 
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4.6 The Zagreb Summit and its implications 
 
 The Zagreb Summit that took place in November 2000 was interpreted as a 
sign of EU recognition and of further encouragement for Croatia to carry on its work 
in order to become a complete democratic state governed by law. The alternative to 
the EU, in the words of President Mesić is:  
 
(…) Balkanisation in a political and civilisational sense. We do 
not want an isolated Croatia that can be abused and robbed from 
the inside. Still, there are people that will demonstrate against 
the Summit by using transparent proclamations that hide their 
true intentions. Those who do that are directly working against 





 Mesić calls upon the civilisational discourse of Balkans vs. Europe and warns 
of the danger of choosing the wrong group. However, the concept of ‘Balkanisation’ 
does not stand for Serbia in this case but refers to those who do not support 
democratic changes, who want to protest against Serbia’s appearance at the 
Summit
43
; in short, those who are working against the modern, democratised Croatia 
that is willing to enter into a dialogue with Serbia, by keeping to the old, dishonest, 
and backward ways characteristic of the Balkans. In this way ‘Balkanisation’ and 
being from the Balkans are not simply geographical/civilisational concepts, but 
directly anti-Croatian and subversive. As I have argued previously, it is Croatia’s 
past and the previous regime that was also Balkan, and as a consequence dangerous 
for contemporary policymaking. Holding on to the old ways and greeting Serbia with 
rage and hostility is equally un-civilised and Balkan, as Serbia itself. It was the fall of 
Milošević that made it possible for Serbia to attend the Summit and marked the 
initial stage of distinguishing between his regime and the Serbian people. It is 
something that featured in the early post-Tuđmanist discourse, analysed in more 
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 This was the first time that the leaders of Croatia and Serbia would meet at an international summit. 
The forthcoming event attracted a lot of attention from the public whose opinion on whether Serbia 




detail in the previous chapter. In this context acceptance of Serbia at the Summit 
hosted by Croatia signifies a Western attitude of agreement and tolerance that 
Croatia has accepted. Serbia that is not represented by Milošević thus has an 
opportunity to change into a less radical other. As I will discuss later in the chapter, it 
is this particular construction of Serbia by the Croats that makes it acceptable, and 
later necessary, to recognise the Serbian minority and to consider them equal, as is 
written in the Constitution.  
 The Summit marked a new phase between the EU and Croatia. The most 
important element was a promise from the EU that all future candidates that come 
from the Western Balkans shall be evaluated on an individual basis. Croatia will 
consequently not have to wait for other countries in the region to join the EU in a 
group, but will do so on the basis of its individual progress. The President clarified 
the matter in clear terms: 
 
The EU is very much interested in the regional aspect of joining 
the EU but the way that was understood in Croatia had a strong 
emotional component. It was often interpreted as ‘returning to 
the Balkans’. Eventually, this fear was understood in Brussels 




 The fear of being grouped together with the ‘real Balkans’ thus generates a 
fear of being taken back to the trap of the East, the foster home, under the Serbian 
hegemony. The presence of Serbia at the Summit was enough to cause suspicion 
among many and to start speculations about a Balkan union being prepared. The 
otherness of Serbia is continuously invoked through concepts of ‘Balkanisation’, 
isolation, inability for democratic change and fear of stagnation. Becoming Western 
excludes any presence of Serbia/Yugoslavia/the Balkans in Croatia’s future. 
Institutional ties with the European Union secure this division between the ‘real 
Balkans’ and Croatia and are seen as the only option. Everything else leads back to 
the past.  
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 The adoption of the Stabilisation and Association Process hence represented a 
new chapter in the relations between the EU and Croatia as well as between Croatia 
and its Eastern neighbours. The threat of a regional development towards EU 
membership was removed and although Yugoslavia participated at the Summit it was 
received with a positive assessment. In the speech given in front of the Summit 
participants who belonged to the Central European Initiative, Ivica Račan stated that 
‘The participation of the Yugoslav Republic has given a new dimension to the 
relations of the countries in this region, ending the period of instability and crisis.’
45
 
By rejecting the politics of Milošević Serbia is starting the process of 
democratisation and as such it has the potential to be Croatia’s partner in the region, 
rather than a threat. 
The text of the final Declaration of the Zagreb Summit opens with naming the 
participants: heads of state or government of EU member states and Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Foreign Minister of Slovenia,  and stating that the meeting 




The text positions that period of time as being open to democratic changes 
and thus allowing ‘the region’ to progress ‘towards’ Europe. It is interesting that the 
text of the Declaration is not specific in naming the geo-political space, but refers to 
it as the ‘region’ in a vague manner. In doing so, it corresponds to the official 
Croatian discourse and its insistence on avoiding naming this space in order to 
circumvent a possible ideological identification that accompanies it. ‘The region’ 
thus remains un-named but nevertheless real on the political map of Europe. The text 
invokes the ‘victory of democracy’ in Croatia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia that opens 
‘the way for regional reconciliation and cooperation’ where the recent ‘historic 
changes enable all the countries in the region to establish new relations, beneficial to 
all of them, for the stability in the region and peace and stability on the European 
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 This passage demonstrates well the poststructuralist emphasis on the 
implicit and what is not said. ‘The region’ continues to feature in the Declaration 
discourse and its function is to placate difficult circumstances in which ex-Yugoslav 
countries were born. Avoiding the term Balkans makes it possible to talk around the 
actual events and relationships. The war not only took place in the Balkans but was 
constructed as ‘Balkan’, which carried very strong connotations, as argued 
previously. This makes any discussion about peace, cooperation and good 
neighbourly relations in the Balkan context impossible. The two are mutually 
exclusive and belong to different civilisational spaces. Omitting to name the space 
Balkans and resorting to the more neutral ‘region’ seems to fit the purpose of the 
summit where all the countries are brought together to discuss the options for their 
future. However, despite not being explicitly named, the Balkans are present like a 
dark shadow. The recent changes are deemed ‘historic’ because they allow for the 
possibility of cooperation, stability and peace between former enemies.  
 It is important to stress that the text of the Declaration matches the official 
Croatian discourse on the matter of naming the political space. ‘The Region’, rather 
than ‘the Balkans’ manages to downplay the connotations associated with the 
Balkans and to soften the recent historical events. Neutralising the political space 
thus points to the difficulty of placing Croatia and other countries on a map of 
Europe. It is possible to raise a question at this point and wonder whether the 
European Union has enough weight to challenge different political discourses and to 
incorporate them into its community.  
The Summit was understood as a positive result of national efforts and 
progress that received approval and recognition from the EU. Its coming closer could 
thus obliterate the difficult Balkan subject, until it is finally dispersed and forgotten 
when EU membership is obtained. This positioning of the Balkans as being 
diametrically opposite to Europe/West is implicitly present in the European 
discourse. Avoiding naming the Balkans as such points to the problematic nature of 
the political space in question and fluctuating identities of Croatia and other 
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neighbouring countries. By not being fully Western European and rejecting the 
Balkans, Croatia is left hanging in-between its past and its future.  
 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
 
 This chapter has analysed what has been identified as a ‘civilisational 
discourse’ that positions the West against the Balkans. After the elections at the 
beginning of the year 2000 a new direction that would take the country into EU 
membership was promised. The discourse of an idealised West embodied in the 
European Union emerged and was promoted as the only option for a modern Croatia. 
The alternative was staying in the Balkans together with Serbia.  
 This positioning of West against the Balkan East found its way into a wide 
array of policy discourses, from the debate on the definition of the state, the question 
of cooperation with the neighbouring countries to the achievements with the EU, 
such as the Zagreb Summit. Discourses of progress and democratisation were central 
to the debates and were positioned against the general Balkan backwardness of non-
cooperation and its inherent violence. Serbia emerged as the radical other in the 
official discourse that occupied a position of the local Balkan subject. Its 
geographical position of bordering with Croatia was perceived not just as a security 
threat but as a civilisational menace. Its proximity to Croatia required a change in 
approach and careful deliberation on the nature of cooperation that was permissible 
with the Balkan subject that would satisfy European Union requirements but at the 
same time not compromise Croatia’s desire for cutting off ties with the Balkans and 
Serbia. 
 The following two chapters address the questions of cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the problems 
regarding minority rights protection. Both case studies are rooted in the civilisational 
discourse analysed here and the analysis seeks to show how Croatia’s changing 




areas. Notions of what it means to be ‘Western’ and ‘democratic’ drive the debates 
forward and offer an opportunity to discover the importance of the domestic context 
in the study of politics. The civilisational discourse and the radical other addressed in 
this thesis are not just tools for the study of political events but elements the study of 
which contributes to the theoretical foundations of this work. The process of othering 
and the role of the radical other are especially important in this study of a changing 























5. The case of cooperating with the ICTY 
5.1. Introduction 
 
 In the introduction of the thesis I outlined a history of Croatia in the period of 
the 1990s with the aim of setting the context of the war and the post-war periods, and 
the political action Croatia was involved in during that turbulent decade. The events 
of that time heavily influenced the later phase of Croatia’s political development and 
discourses from the Tuđman era were far from extinct. The section on the Tuđmanist 
nationalist discourse thus serves the purpose of a basis of comparison between old 
and new, the nationalist and democratic faces of Croatia. It is this shift in Croatia’s 
national and political identity that I examine further in this chapter, with a detailed 
examination of the problem of cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY).  This complex relationship between identity and 
policy is at the heart of a poststructuralist analysis of a case study and rests on the 
conceptual apparatus outlined in the theory and methodology chapters.  
 This chapter is structured around the question of cooperation between Croatia 
and ICTY. The civilisational discourse, discussed in the previous chapter brings into 
the debate concepts such as sovereignty and Western European identity. Both are 
deeply intertwined and have undergone a radical conceptual shift in the new political 
discourse surrounding Croatia’s position in Europe. The questions of sovereignty and 
Croatian Western identity are also present in the area of minority rights, which will 
be analysed in the following chapter and looked at from a different angle. 
 The focus of my investigation in this chapter is the official discourse of the 
Croatian political elites and so provides the greater part of my data. However, I will 
also engage at some points with the oppositional discourses, mainly those consisting 
of the Tuđman legacy. The purpose of this juxtaposition is to show how they used 
the same concepts and strategies, but with different policy options in mind and with 




 As argued previously, sovereignty was an important part of the Tuđmanist 
discourse where it functioned as a nodal point around which his nationalist discourse 
was woven. In his discourse, sovereignty was constructed as Croatia’s goal, the 
reason beyond a long struggle against different foreign rulers. It was a ‘centuries old 
dream’, finally achieved with the establishment of the independent Croatian state in 
1990. In the new, post-Tuđman discourse the question of sovereignty was thus 
historically embedded and had to be addressed when approaching any important 
policy decision. The fear of losing Croatia’s sovereignty was still strong in the early 
post-Tuđmanist period of 2000 and thus featured heavily in certain policy choices 
and decisions. The question of cooperating with the ICTY as well as the question of 
minority rights protection was both immediately examined in the light of the problem 
of sovereignty. The change of the political landscape and venturing into the new, 
unmapped territory of closer engagement with the European Union and ICTY 
required a new understanding of democracy, and as a consequence, a new 
understanding of the concept of sovereignty itself.  
This concept provides the first step of my analysis and demonstrates how 
discursive strategies were employed in the context of cooperation with The Hague 
tribunal and moved the sovereignty debate away from the discourse of danger and 
fear of its loss towards the question of legitimacy and Western European norms. The 
second step of the analysis focuses on the relationship between the Croatian subject 
and the other.  
 Cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for ex Yugoslavia was a 
hot topic in the year 2000. The new Government was determined to increase 
cooperation with The Hague in order to start moving in the direction of EU 
membership. Tuđman’s policy of non-cooperation was abandoned in the name of 
development, Westernising the country and trying to minimise all ties with the 
Balkans. One of the problems facing the political actors was justifying this move to 
the people and saving the face of the Homeland War. The War played a great role in 
the shaping of Croatian identity during the entire period of the 1990s and was one of 
the key nodal points in the Croatian political discourse. It was defined as a just war 




of Serbian aggression and desire for territorial expansion. One of the major problems 
of collaborating with the Tribunal was the case of General Blaškić during which 
Croatia was confronted with accusations of being involved in an act of aggression in 
the sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. This case thus threatened to turn Croatia 
from ‘victim’ to ‘aggressor’. The difficulty that it presented was important on several 
levels: it had the potential to destabilise the existing national identity in terms of 
being a ‘victim’ of the ‘Balkan conflict’, and it made it difficult to justify further 
cooperation with the Tribunal that was obviously not following the divide between a 
‘Croatian victim’ and the ‘Serbian aggressor’. It is something that I will examine in 
more detail in the following sections of the chapter.  
 
 
5.2 Rearticulating sovereignty  
  





  Examining the question of cooperation between Croatia and the ICTY is 
rooted in the discourse of where Croatia belongs, as I have argued previously. The 
debate about the necessity to fulfil the European Union’s criteria of accession was 
focused primarily on the ICTY at the beginning of the new Government and 
presidential mandate, while the questions of regulating minority rights, institutional 
reforms and a number of other issues took a back seat at the time.  
 The main question that surrounded the ICTY debate was whether Croatia 
would eventually join the ‘European club’ if it played by the rules. Opinions were 
divided over the nature of cooperation itself, although the general consensus among 
the politicians was that Croatia was definitely (Western) European and thus 
essentially eligible to become an EU member. However, despite the agreement about 
the country’s identity there was little agreement on how to get there. On the one 
hand, the Croatian Democratic Union - HDZ, now in opposition, strongly advocated 
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caution in dealing with the tribunal, for the sake of not diminishing Croatia’s power 
of jurisdiction. The coalition, on the other hand, held a strong view that the only way 
forward was to closely cooperate. The civilisational discourse featured heavily in 
their argument and the options were presented as following: Croatia can either join 
the West or return to the Balkans. Two interesting things are apparent here: Croatia 
exists somewhere in-between and is neither Western nor Balkan, as mentioned 
earlier. The second is a transcendental claim that  links the signifiers ‘the Western 
civilisation’ and ‘democracy’ and puts forward the idea that only as a part of the 
Western civilisation, embodied in the European Union, can Croatia achieve its 
desired identity as a truly democratic state.  
 The analysis is thus conducted at two levels: examining the shift between the 
‘non-Balkan’ and ‘almost Western’ identities, and on the analysis of discursive 
strategies employed by the political actors in directing Croatia towards the West. The 
discourse of the Western world as being the main carrier of true democracy mirrors 
contemporary attitudes in that very same world. Croatian political discourse takes a 
further step and equates the European Union with the West and sees it as 
representing Western values and norms. The new regime excluded Western countries 
that are not EU members from its discourse, although Switzerland and Norway are 
both considered equally democratic by the EU. This articulation of ‘EU is the 
embodiment of the Western civilisation’ can thus justify the regime’s insistence that 
the only legitimate way forward was towards the West/EU and explain the absence 
of arguments that would support the possibility of further democratisation outside the 
EU context.  
 The Balkans have not been considered Croatia’s ‘true’ home, but rather a 
kind of foster home, where Croatia was put against the will of the people, according 
to the wishes of the Communists after the Second World War. The analysis will 
demonstrate that this negating of the discourse on the Balkan region that includes 
Croatia was a contradiction within the Croatian discourse since the Balkans are 
constantly treated as a direct threat to Croatian Western identity. This suggests that 
the Balkans are not just in the neighbourhood, but have a significant role to play in 




constructed point to instability in the official discourse and the non-settled nature of 
the identity of the contested region. As it was argued in chapter two, the subject 
needs the other in order to be and to construct its identity, and the relationship 
between Croatia and the Balkans demonstrates well this complex relationship. 
Questioning of the borders of the Balkan region and accepting that Croatia was 
closely related to that space demonstrates the tension in the process of othering, as 
well as the constructed nature of Croatia’s Western identity.  
In the official discourse it was Yugoslavia that was mostly Balkan, but 
Croatia, like Slovenia, never truly belonged there. The question about the nature of 
‘the Balkans’ and Croatia’s political decision about trying war criminals poses itself 
as directly connected to the possibilities that arise out of particular understandings of 
Croatian identity. Whether Croatia is ‘Balkan’ or ‘Western’ influences certain 
choices and justifies specific steps. The problem of cooperation with the ICTY is not 
merely a question of judiciary, as the quote above suggests, but a complex area of 
decision-making that directly affects Croatia’s developing identity as a Western 
European country. The civilisational discourse carries the debates surrounding the 
cooperation with the ICTY and provides the basis for Croatia’s understanding of 
events and of possible courses of action. I will now turn to the events that were 
crucial for the development of the cooperation discourse in the year 2000. 
 In August 1999 the chairwoman of the Tribunal, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 
reported Croatia to the UN Security Council for its refusal to work with the Tribunal 
on the cases related to the military operations Storm and Flash undertaken in 1995, 
and for refusal to extradite Mladen Naletilić Tuta, a Croat from Bosnia under 
suspicion of war crimes. The Tribunal asked for measures to ensure further 
cooperation. The Spokesperson for the ICTY Prosecutor
2
, Paul Ripley, stated: ‘The 
fact that this report exists makes things difficult for international organisations and 
the international community to make any promises to Croatia regarding EU 
membership. Nothing will change until the problem of cooperating is resolved. We 
are stuck in the status quo.’
3
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Membership of the European Union was again put forward by the new 
regime as the main principle and goal of Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. The 
articulation of national interest that included joining the EU that was developed by 
the previous regime was accepted and further developed by the new government. The 
main difference lay in stressing the importance of Croatia joining the European 
Union as a deserving member that bases its aspirations on actual policy adjustment, 
rather than on rhetoric. The Head of Government, Ivica Račan said during his visit to 
Lisbon, at the time of the Portuguese presidency: ‘We invite the EU not to judge us 
according to what we are saying but according to what we are going to be doing in 
the next few months. In doing so we are hoping to receive the EU’s support.’
4
 The 
statement openly positions the new regime against the previous one on the basis of 
‘words against deeds’. Račan expresses his hope that the EU will acknowledge 
Croatia’s efforts in choosing the European way, supported by his Government.   
 The year 2000 in Croatia started with a wave of optimism after picking up the 
pace and improving relations with the Tribunal in the first few months of the year. 
Foreign affairs minister, Tonino Picula commented on the relations between Croatia 
and The Hague:  
  
The new Minister of Judiciary must send the right signals to the 
Tribunal as soon as possible. The relations between Croatia and The 
Hague must not be the most difficult part in the development of our 
new international politics. There are constitutional laws about the 
cooperation with the tribunal that Croatia has adopted, but was not 
adhered to in any way by the Ministry of Judiciary in the past. It is 





 Turning against the previous regime and labelling them as ‘those’ who did 
not work in the true interest of the people and the state but for their own benefit, 
marked a clear shift in the official discourse and the setting up of the dichotomy 
between the Croatian present and its past – a temporal other. The previous regime, 
the often non-identified ‘those’ featured in the new official discourse as a bridge 
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between the new, Western-oriented Croatia and the Balkans, epitomised by 
Serbia/Yugoslavia.
6
 The old regime was acknowledged as ‘Croatian’ but it contained 
many features that were not democratic, and thus not Western. The situation 
demanded a new interpretation of ‘Croatia as a Western European country’, a 
concept that did not depend upon the old Tuđmanist definitions. Rearticulating the 
meanings of the signifiers ‘sovereignty’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘state interest’ was thus at 
the heart of the new approaches to the de-Balkanising and de-Tuđmanising of 
Croatia. Therefore, the question of Croatia’s state interest was addressed in a new 
way that stressed cooperation and respect for international norms as a way of 
supporting the claims about the nature of Croatia’s Westernised goals.  
The temporal element of othering that is here present is quite different from 
the radical other found in the way that the Balkans and Serbia were discursively 
constructed. Addressing its own past and trying to move in a different direction 
presents Croatia with difficult ethical dilemmas. Its identity comes into question 
because it is becoming increasingly obvious and important that its present needs to 
be divorced from its past. Identity thus becomes weakened since it loses a significant 
level of support for the discourse in the population. In order for the past to be 
successfully replaced the subject requires a very strong vision of its own future, with 
clear normative implications.  
Similar arguments concerning temporal othering of the subject itself were  
made by Thomas Diez and Ole Waever.
7
 Both make the claim that for Europe 
temporal othering is self reflexive, in which its own past is presented as a threat, 
rather than another group. ‘Europe’s  other, the enemy image, is today not to a very 
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large extent ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘the Russians’ or anything similar – rather 
Europe’s other is Europe’s own past which should not be allowed to become its 
future’.
8
 This principle can easily apply to the Croatian case as well in terms of the 
process of othering of the previous regime and some of its actions. However, it is 
important to note that while many European states have to a large extent come to 
terms with their role in the conflicts of the past, during the early 2000 Croatia still 
did not address its role in the war. Its identity was constructed as that of a ‘victim’ 
while Serbia was constructed as ‘the aggressor’. Its own role in the conflict was, at 
this point, not questioned and thus the temporal othering of its own identity was not 
yet complete. I will come back to this point later on in the analysis when the ‘victim’ 
- ‘aggressor’ identities become contested and redefined.  
An extract from an interview with Stjepan Mesić conducted during his 
presidential campaign demonstrates the distancing and othering of the previous 
regime and President Tuđman, as well as the openness towards Western institutions 
and a desire to include Croatia in all aspects of international co-operation.  
 
Q: How do you envisage Croatia’s journey into the integrated Europe? 
What is your message to the Euro sceptics in Croatia? 
SM: Our citizens had been frightened by those who used to steal from 
Croatia. They were frightened of the enemies on the outside, of 
Europe and of the USA by that measure that Clinton and Madeline 
Albright were called enemies of Croatia. These things are nonsense 
and border on a caricature. Europe is going towards further 
integration, which cannot be stopped. That is to our luck and 
advantage. Croatia has to find its place in this design but first we must 
reach specific standards. (…) The world is changing; there is no more 
conflict between East and West, things are getting more complex. 
Croatia has to participate in these processes in the world, and it has to 





 Mesić stresses the importance of being a Western European, democratic 
country and invokes the civilisational discourse of ‘The West’ versus ‘the East’. 
Although there is no more Cold War hostility between East and West there is an 
                                                 
8
 Waever (1998), op. cit. p. 90 
9




acknowledgement that certain divisions still exist and that Croatia must earn its place 
to be a part of the Western world. Participating in Western European initiatives and 
the spread of democratic values in the region is its goal and part of its emerging 
Western identity. Furthermore, Europe is progressing with integration. This concept 
of integration aroused much suspicion among the previous Government for its 
possible threat to Croatia’s newly gained sovereign status in the international 
community. For Mesić the prospect of integration is not only inevitable but desirable 
and strongly encouraged. Croatia has to find its place in the increasingly integrating 
Europe in order to fully participate in the events of world politics. Democratic 
processes that Europe promotes are thus vital for Croatia’s own development and in 
order to further redefine the idea of progress the two discourses become inseparable. 
Another interesting feature that the quote demonstrates is the division 
between the ‘thieves’ of the previous regime and the present. The opening of the 
statement at first glance may seem unrelated to the question asked by the journalist. 
The President brings up the fear of the international community that was present 
during the 1990s, as a consequence of the HDZ discursive constructions of ‘friends’ 
and ‘enemies’. Such a discourse is juxtaposed upon the construction of the 
West/Europe as a positive force in the world, a view the he supports. Invoking the 
previous regime in order to stress the profound difference with the present reveals the 
discursive strategies of separating Croatia from the figure of the late president 
Tuđman, as well as giving meaning to the elections as a sign of radical change. Both 
discursive strategies supplement the central claim that Croatia belongs in the West, 
but that it has to work to be accepted there at the same time. Separating Tuđman and 
the HDZ from the Croatian state as well as ‘the people’ developed further with the 
question of the criminalisation of the Homeland War and will be analysed in more 
depth later on in the chapter.  
The strategy of infusing the 2000 elections with a meaning of radical change 
features throughout the analysis as one of the links between ‘the Croatian people’ 
and Western civilisation, and the new regime functioning as the bridge between the 




 A third feature that can be extracted from the passage is the manner in which the 
question of sovereignty is addressed. Sovereignty is here not explicitly invoked but it is 
present as an underlying principle of the international order: it is a question of sovereign 
states collaborating and developing together.  Croatia as a sovereign state has to work with 
other states and international actors and participate in the democratic processes. I will now 
turn to a more elaborate analysis of the connection between the discourse of 
democratisation and the sovereignty signifier. 
 The problem of reconciling the demands made by the EU and the political 
conditions faced at home were soon articulated in light of the question about 
Croatia’s sovereignty. Tuđman’s rhetoric equated the independent Croatian state 
with not being a part of Yugoslavia or any other regional association. Membership of 
the European Union was at times seen as a positive option but often as a threat to 
Croatia’s independence and its hard-earned sovereign status every time conditions 
were imposed by the international community.
10
 The question of sovereignty and its 
reinterpretation was discursively used to legitimise the new Government’s decisions 
in terms of fulfilling its obligations, and in return provided space to navigate the 
risky waters of justifying their actions to the bewildered public. The stress on the 
need to turn Croatia into a law-governed state was linked to the civilisational 
discourse, and in particular with participation in international institutions and respect 
for signed agreements, and thus turned the previous rhetoric of independence upside-
down.  
The following text demonstrates the relationships established between 
different aspects of ‘The West’, and how the subject position of Croatia as a Western 
entity and a sovereign actor was constructed through the interaction with 
international institutions and states, and equally, how its emergence as such laid the 
foundations for deeper cooperation and identification with the Western world. The 
statement came from Ivica Račan, after a meeting with Carla Del Ponte about the 
progress made by Croatia and the achieved consensus with the ICTY: 
Croatia accepts and respects all of its international obligations, which 
include cooperating with ICTY. The new regime wants to show that 
Croatia has become an increasingly law governed state, much more 
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than before. That is why we will try all crimes committed in Croatia 
or by Croatian citizens. The collaboration with the tribunal will be 
increased with the new available documentation. I am convinced that 
we will contribute to bringing criminals to justice, regardless whether 
in Croatia or The Hague. To repeat, we will prosecute criminals – not 




The argument developed in this text unfolds along the lines of establishing 
links between ‘the West’ and the ‘new pro-European regime’ subject positions. The 
West is constructed around the concepts of international cooperation - respecting 
obligations - support of justice - the rule of law - trying of war criminals.  Each of 
these elements is also linked to a Croatia that positions itself as taking part in the 
process of democratisation with the aim of transforming its identity into ‘The West’ 
in the future. The role of the pro-Western political elites is emphasised as promoting 
Western democratic norms and in that way opening the road to the possibility of 
transformation. Croatia’s identity started to develop in opposition to the previous 
regime, constructed as un-democratic, not respecting international obligations and 
agreements, and not supporting justice. Croatia’s identity as a law-governed state 
depended heavily upon cooperating with the ICTY. Being capable of trying criminals 
at home as well as allowing their trials to take place abroad was constructed as 
demonstrating its maturity and capability to belong together with other Western 
European countries.   
The discursive articulation of ‘justice’ further emphasises the link between 
the West and Croatia, and establishes a boundary between the two and the previous 
regime. The increasing cooperation with the tribunal and the rule of law are here 
articulated as necessary for the creation of justice, which were lacking in the 
previous period. Pointing to the ‘criminals’ that must be sent to trial is the following 
step in the articulation of the pro-Western position, and will be addressed in more 
detail in the next section of the chapter. But it is the naming of the criminals that is 
revealing of the discursive strategies at play, and the construction of Croatia’s 
identity as being separate from the ‘criminals’ and willing to try them at home and in 
The Hague. The process of othering in this case involves not just distancing itself 
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from the Balkans, but from the undesirable features of itself, which is the Croatian 
past, a point I addressed in the previous section. This feature will become more 
apparent in the context of the criminalisation of the Homeland War, and it will be 
explored in that context later on.  
 The main question that was on everyone’s minds was whether cooperating 
with The Hague tribunal would erode Croatia’s sovereignty. The matter was at first 
discussed on its own, without explicit links to the Homeland War. The Constitution 
did not foresee such a situation, and the experts’ opinions were divided. A judge 
from the Zagreb County Court, Damir Kos, argued that the answer depends on 
whether the ICTY is considered as another country’s court or not.
12
 However, given 
that Croatia supported the founding of the Tribunal in the first place and 
subsequently passed the Constitutional Law that allowed the Tribunal to try Croatian 
citizens, it can be argued that by doing this Croatia has given up a part of its 
sovereignty already. It is possible to make that argument if we follow a strict 
definition of sovereignty as ‘supreme authority within a territory’.
13
 In this case, 
international law and agreements are highly problematic and in direct conflict with 
the concept of sovereignty. Supreme authority would thus be compromised and could 
not accommodate certain aspects of international cooperation, such as the ICTY. 
Despite having supported the founding of the tribunal, President Tuđman was very 
cautious with his actual involvement and always warned against the dangers of 
losing Croatia’s sovereignty.   
 The new regime embarked upon a different route towards closer cooperation 
with the ICTY. Their discourse on democratisation that stressed cooperation and 
transparency employed a discursive strategy that supported the discourse with a 
different conception of sovereignty. In their view, a country could not be sovereign 
solely by stating such a fact and receiving a formal recognition from other political 
actors, but by fully complying with international democratic standards and respecting 
democratic norms. The new regime’s redefinition of sovereignty was rooted in the 
civilisational discourse by looking for the support and recognition of the Western 
world, especially the European Union countries. This leads us to conclude that the 
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subject position of Croatia as being ‘Western European’ can only exist if it is 
recognised as such by the EU and other Western countries. The reconstruction of the 
Croatian identity thus directly depends on the setting within which it functions: an 
achievable progress towards EU membership characterises the reality of the subject 
as being potentially Western, while holding on to the old discourse of sovereignty 
makes the claims about the Western subject meaningless and contradictory. The 
following analysis demonstrates the strategies at play and the future opportunities for 
the development of both the civilisational discourse and the discourse on 
democratisation and justice. 
 The former President of the Constitutional Court, Jadranko Crnić, supported 
the belief that the ICTY working in Croatia would not erode Croatia’s sovereignty.  
  
Croatia as a sovereign state agrees to have an international 
institution perform judiciary duties within its territory. The future 
brings more co-operation and less boundaries. There is no 





 In this case it is the consent to allow an international court to deal with 
domestic issues that is interpreted as a case of free decision making. The question of 
sovereignty is thus directed at a different issue: only a truly sovereign state can make 
such decisions. Sharing of the judicial responsibility with the international 
community reinforces sovereignty rather than takes it away. Croatia’s identity as a 
sovereign state is not eroded but highlighted and grounded in the legitimacy that the 
international community provides.  
This important signifier went through radical change in the process. The 
Tuđmanist discourse positioned sovereignty at the very centre of Croatia’s statehood 
and its national identity. The discourse became relatively sedimented during the 
period of the 1990s and was difficult to challenge by the new government. It is 
important to note that although the concept of sovereignty was not completely 
rearticulated the change in its meaning was strong enough to open the door for the 
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new government to pursue political action deemed to be controversial. I also argue 
that although they incessantly pushed for the new meaning of sovereignty, there were 
other factors that contributed to the success of their course of action. Again, the 
importance of the civilisational discourse and the desire to differentiate from Serbia 
and the Balkans added more impetus to big changes taking place.  
  However, the official discourse was engaging with a very strong opposition. 
Both political parties and different organisations put forward strong arguments 
against the possibility of engaging with the ICTY. A section of an interview with 
Branko Borković, who was a War Commander of Vukovar Forces in 1991, and in 
2000 was the President of Association of Croatian Defenders of The Homeland War, 
demonstrates that tension:  
  
Look at what is happening. Armed representatives of foreign powers are 
controlling all movement of civilians in Gospić and nearby villages. Is that 
not an example of disrespecting a country’s sovereignty? But the 
Government says that it is because of the Constitutional Law that binds us to 
cooperate with The Hague, and that the HDZ is to blame for everything. 
(…) It is matter of principle that foreign investigators are conducting an 




Borković stresses that the people conducting the inquiry in Croatia are armed 
foreigners who stand in opposition to unarmed civilians and control their daily 
movements. The image invokes force as the central feature of the power relation here 
present and it discursively constructs the boundary between the Croatian people and 
the representatives of the foreign institution, based on the notion of justice. The 
foreign investigators are constructed as being unjust and not having the right to 
conduct the inquiry on Croatian soil, while the unarmed civilians assume a subject 
position of victims of foreign injustice. His argument closely follows the Tuđmanist 
discourse on justice and freedom from foreign oppression. Just like Tuđman, 
Borković links the concept of injustice and endangered sovereignty. As long as there 
are foreigners exercising power within Croatian territory their actions diminish its 
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sovereignty and additionally are inherently unjust. This particular discursive 
construction forms a mirror image to the one analysed previously, that links the 
concept of justice to the ‘shared’ notion of sovereignty and welcomes the foreign 
political actors who have the power to legitimise Croatia’s claims to sovereignty as 
well as its identity constructions as a Western European country.  
 The question of sovereignty is thus linked to the civilisational discourse in 
terms of the necessity to be legitimised by the West under particular terms, but also 
to the relationship between Croatia’s past and its present and different discursive 
constructions of the concept of sovereignty. The analysis of sovereignty and the way 
it features in the new political discourse opposed to Tuđmanism makes it possible to 
look deeper into the relationship between Croatia and its other, in terms of Croatia’s 
present and past. It is to this feature that I shall now turn. 
 
  
5.3. Whose war was it in the first place?  
  
 The civilisational discourse outlined and analysed in the previous chapter 
stressed the importance between the Croatian subject which is constructed as on the 
way to becoming Western, and the Eastern, Balkan other. The way political decisions 
were presented was that Croatia had to comply with the EU conditions among other 
reasons, because of its identity as a Western, democratic country.
16
 Non compliance 
would have meant staying at the Balkan level of close-minded nationalism and 
pursuit of archaic interpretations of sovereignty and state interest. Continuous 
emphasis that non-cooperating meant returning to the Balkans makes it possible to 
link the Croatian past and the Balkan region. Both are Croatia’s others, albeit one is a 
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temporal dimension of the Croatian subject, and the second one is a regional and 
civilizational other.  
The following text introduces the tension between the two groups in Croatia, 
‘those’ who are working against Croatia are ‘pushing it back to the Balkans’, and 
people who are working for the benefit of the country:  
  
Some individuals and groups have illusions that they can manipulate 
the interests of this people and that to the detriment of the Homeland 
War certain things can be hidden that a democratic and law governed 
state must not hide. By doing this they are not defending the 
Homeland War but are causing damage and I believe that the majority 




 The damage implied refers in this context to the previous regime’s 
unwillingness to fully cooperate with the ICTY. A more critical assessment of those  
events was automatically interpreted to mean disloyalty to the state and to the people. 
The new regime’s rearticulation of loyalty and patriotism stressed the need to know 
and acknowledge the truth about the past, the need to bring out to the open 
everything that could potentially harm the country in order to purge it from the ill-
doers. The damage is not only isolation from the international community that 
Croatia suffered in the past, as well as a ‘return’ to the Balkans, but also hiding of the 
truth that in itself degrades the honour of the fight for liberation. The following 
section, belonging to the same text, demonstrates this point: 
   
I do not believe that in the democratic Croatia can be tolerated those 
who would want to sacrifice our national interests and to allow 
individuals and groups to get away with not being punished for what 
they have done, or for what they are suspected of having done. It is 
finally time that those individuals and groups show their 
responsibility towards the institutions of their country and to show 
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 The question of national interests was addressed through the lens of the 
polarising democratic forces on one side, and on the other side the less-progressive, 
backward actors who insist on keeping the integrity of the war intact through silence 
and hiding of the truth. This kind of attitude is defined as being the opposite of the 
true democratic spirit which generates respect towards one’s country’s institutions. A 
part of it is respect towards the lawfully elected Government and the other follows 
from the Government’s decision to engage with international institutions.  
 Tuđman and his followers only nominally supported democratic practices and 
institutions. Signing agreements and abandoning them was a standard practice at the 
time. The new construction of a truly democratic Croatia linked such acts to selfish, 
self-interested ‘those’ who exploited the times of crisis for their own benefit. Such 
behaviour is labelled as being ‘Balkan’ and not what Croatia must be.  
President Mesić repeatedly stressed the connection between following the old 
way of thinking and being pushed back to the Balkans. Refusal to cooperate 
immediately takes Croatia back to the Balkans, not only because the hopes of joining 
the EU would thus end, but because the robbing of one’s people and state is deemed 
to be synonymous with the Balkan way. 
 
 Attacking international institutions takes Croatia back into isolation 
because a conflict with the Tribunal would mean a conflict with the 
international community and the UN. Those who speculate in this way 
want an isolated Croatia once again, and want to see in power those 
who would be robbing it once again. This refers to all who say to the 
Croatian public that the world is against us and especially the Hague 




 Statements of this kind imply that ‘The Balkan phase’ included not only the 
fifty years in the Yugoslav federation, but also Tuđman’s years in office, although 
that was rarely openly stated. It is useful to note at this point that poststructuralist 
principles do not dismiss meaning conveyed in an implicit way, but rather stress the 
importance of being sensitive to such articulations. What this reluctance to directly 
mention Tuđman suggests is the difficulty of turning against him to such a great 
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degree. The practice of clearly stating things but not naming any names makes 
criticism of the previous regime and his leadership easier and more acceptable.  
It thus becomes obvious that despite the determination to pursue a new 
direction in Croatian politics, the importance of Tuđman was not easy to leave 
behind. It also becomes apparent that his role and image among the people had an 
important effect and that the political elites had to be extremely careful how they 
addressed this issue when speaking publicly and when appearing in the media. 
Nevertheless, linking the Tuđman years with the Balkan other can be studied not just 
as a usual rhetoric against the previous regime, the new against the old, but as a 
specific discursive strategy that is based on the reconstruction of the Croatian 
identity and the rearticulation of the controversial political space. The hegemonising 
project depended equally on the external support and legitimation and equally on the 
internal change of the subject position ‘Croatian’. The establishment of the 
boundaries between the self that is the Croatian subject, and the other became not 
just a question of external other (Balkans and Serbia), but of moving its own past 
within the domain of the other.  
 The unnamed ‘those’ who worked against Croatia and who are still dragging 
it back to the Balkans are an important element that has direct links with specific 
policies of non-cooperation with the ICTY as well as not complying with the 
minority regulation. They form the oppositional discourse that rests on Tuđman’s 
ideas and uses the same language. Because of this apparent similarity it is not 
difficult to identify them as pro-Tuđmanist and anti-EU forces. They are centred 
around the idea that international institutions are a negative interference with 
Croatia’s affairs and stand in contrast with concepts of sovereignty and justice, by 
encroaching onto Croatian territory and questioning the morality of the Homeland 
War. Mesić discursively links the international institutions and community with 
Croatia being free of internal enemies (those robbing their own people). Therefore, 
being against the international community can only take Croatia to isolation and a 
lack of justice. The President repeats the word ‘conflict’ and places it between the 
international community and Croatia’s past. The s subject of the past, whose identity 




cooperation and is further linked to having negative intentions for the country. The 
boundary between discourses of ‘past-conflict-suspicion-isolation’ and ‘present-
cooperation-trust-belonging to the Western world’ is here firmly established as 
existing between the Tuđman regime and the new government.  
 The boundary between the present Croatian identity and the other of the past 
made it possible to discursively structure choices about cooperating with the ICTY. 
The alternative was presented as isolation and digression in both political and 
civilisational terms. Splitting up of the Croatian identity between the democratic, 
Western present and nationalistic, anti-Western past made it possible to address the 
Homeland War in a new light and to offer an alternative interpretation of justice and 
truth, based on Western democratic norms.  
  
 
5.4. Defending the Homeland War and the problem of its criminalisation 
  
 After demarcating the new, pro-European forces and their opposition who 
trailed in the Tuđmanist discourse on Croatian policy orientation, I now turn to the 
next set of oppositional relationships, between the ‘legitimate defenders’ of the 
Homeland War and the ‘war criminals’. In the new official discourse the war 
criminals are constructed as having put shame on the war that is a defining feature of 
contemporary Croatia and its identity. The old Tuđmanist discourse put forward a 
very clear-cut division between the Croatian people – the victims, and the Serb 
aggressors that is now challenged and reconstructed. The following analysis will 
focus on these subject positions and their reconstruction. 
 Throughout the 1990s, this particular discursive construction of the victim-
aggressor relationship was not challenged until the start of the cooperation with the 
ICTY in1995.
20
 The very nature of the tribunal proved to be difficult on several 
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levels: that of challenging Croatia’s sovereignty, and of challenging the victim-
aggressor identity construction of Croatia and Serbia. There was insufficient 
cooperation until the year 2000 when the new regime announced the beginning of a 
different era in which Croatia would fully cooperate with the Tribunal, in accordance 
with its identification with Western European values and norms. 
 The message they were aiming to convey was that Croatian cooperation 
signified a changed, democratised and civilised entity, willing to reformulate its 
understanding of sovereignty, responsibility and ‘Europeanness’. The discursive 
construction of national interest did not stand apart from the overall discursive 
change because the two were mutually constitutive and developed within the given 
discursive framework. Traditional understanding of national interest focuses mainly 
on the questions of security and material capabilities. These elements did not 
disappear in the new government’s discourse but were altered in accordance with the 
new interpretation of Croatian identity. A Western country was expected to pursue 
security and economic prosperity but within a given framework of democratic norms 
and values. The question of security for Croatia ceased to focus solely on the 
possible invasion by the Serbs, and started to include a variety of concerns. Among 
them was the notion that returning to the Balkans was not necessarily a physical 
threat to peace, but nevertheless a threat of civilisational degradation. Being accepted 
fully as a member of the Western world would not just provide protection in military 
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 The criminalisation of the Homeland War presented an enormous obstacle for 
the new regime. It was considered one of the foundations of the modern Croatian 
state and a cornerstone of Croatian national identity. Its discursive construction 
depended heavily on the subject positions of Croats as victims and Serbs as 
aggressors in the Tuđmanist discourse, and needed particular constructions of 
signifiers ‘sovereignty’ and ‘justice’ to further legitimise its status. The question of 
military security was closely related to the war and questioning its nature seemed to 
question the very essence of the Croatian state and the identity of its citizens. The 
main point of contestation was the understanding that the ICTY investigations into 
war crimes committed by Croats would criminalise the Homeland War in general 
and military operations Flash and Storm in particular. 
 The following analysis looks into the way the question of criminalisation was 
addressed in relation to the civilisational discourse of Western cooperation and 
justice, and the way the Croatian identity underwent further reconstructions in terms 
of divisions between the war criminals and real defenders of the war.  
 The question of the validity of the ICTY was constantly addressed and 
legitimised by the necessity to cooperate with the Hague and by insistence on the 
European nature of cooperation with international institutions. The following text, an 
extract from an interview with the Foreign Minister, demonstrates the relationship 
between ICTY, European norms on cooperation and the notion of justice:  
  
The Hague tribunal has been established with the good intentions of 
serving as a starting point of a possible global system that would try 
war criminals. (…) We have ratified the Constitutional Law on the 
Cooperation with The Hague Tribunal and are obliged to respect it. But 
also it is a sign that Croatia is ready to look at the Homeland War and to 
protect its true values from malign occurrences. Because of the very 
protection of the freedom that people have fought for, because of the 
victims, the wounded and all the damage to our country, our legislature 
had to react with more efficiency towards all criminal actions that 
endangered the meaning of the Homeland War. The ICTY is our chance 
now to redefine our attitude regarding criminal activities in the war. I 
also believe that the ICTY has jurisdiction over the Flash and Storm 
military operations.
22
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 The Minister positively assessed the existence of the ICTY as a possible 
starting point for a global standard of justice. Croatia has to respect the tribunal and 
cooperate not only because it is legally bound to do it, but also to show it has the 
democratic maturity to voluntarily accept the standards of international justice. The 
discourse on Western civilisation is present in the articulation of the Homeland War 
as something that has to be freed from criminal activity by correct legislature and 
efforts. The protection of freedom is here not only a matter of liberation from Serbian 
aggression, but also liberation from internal corruption, criminal actions and 
dishonesty. Therefore, the freedom must be protected from the outside with the help 
of the ICTY, and from the inside through Croatia’s own efforts.  
The chain of corruption-criminal actions-dishonesty can be clearly related 
back to the discourse on Balkan civilisation and to the HDZ era of the 1990s. The 
Minister’s criticism of the previous legislature is in line with the process of othering 
of Croatia’s past, analysed in the previous section, in that it employs the strategy of 
Western identity building upon the notion of inherent compatibility between 
democracy and freedom and the Western world, as opposed to the inherent 
incompatibility between the Balkans and democracy and freedom. Tuđman’s 
discourse on freedom and democratic values becomes very much questionable since 
it overlooked the true values of the Homeland War and failed to keep it intact for the 
sake of those who suffered in the war and had made great sacrifices. The role of the 
ICTY then becomes a good in itself because it promotes international norms of 
justice, but also it is constructed as necessary to Croatia because it can help it purge 
the Homeland War of negative connotations. Because of its apparent dual necessity 
and positive influence in the world and in Croatia, the official discourse could further 
link the developing Western identity of Croatia to the concept of Western 
civilisation, through the willingness to cooperate, to embrace their values and also by 
rejecting the past as undemocratic.  
 The first increasingly difficult stumbling block in the cooperation process 
was the case of General Tihomir Blaškić. On the 3
rd
 March 2000, General Blaškić 




crimes committed in about 20 villages in Bosnia.
23
 One of the features of the verdict 
that made it resonate within the international community was that Blaškić was the 
first officer of such a high rank tried and convicted by an international court since the 
Nuremberg Trials. He was convicted for individual responsibility and responsibility 
entailed by the chain of command for crimes against civilians.
24
 The judges stressed 
that although it was not proven that General Blaškić had committed a single crime 
personally, he was still guilty for not having sanctioned a single offender under his 
command. Also, the general’s involvement with local politicians in Bosnia was taken 
into consideration and as a consequence his responsibility was not only viewed in 
military terms. The conflict in central Bosnia where Blaškić was in charge was thus 
proclaimed an international conflict because Croatia had the command over military 
and political actors among the Bosnian Croats. The court possessed proof that 
Croatia wanted to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina with Yugoslavia: evidence of a 
meeting in Karađorđevo between Tuđman and Milošević in March 1991.
25
 This was 
perhaps the most crucial feature of the trial for Croatia. For years the Tuđman regime 
officially denied any involvement in the Bosnian conflict, what made it possible to 
maintain the discursive construction of Croatia as ‘victim’ and Serbia as ‘aggressor’.  
 The judges justified their strict verdict by stressing that Blaškić ordered a 
number of attacks in Bosnia, and that he did not prevent or subsequently punish 
individuals who committed crimes under his command. Judge Claud Jorda stated:  
 
The crimes that you committed are very serious. These war 
operations were undertaken without any regard for international 




Blaškić was convicted for crimes against humanity, breaching of laws and 
customs of war, and breaching of the Geneva Conventions. Although it was clear that 
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the General was not the only one responsible for the events and despite awareness of 
the further need for prosecuting the responsible individuals, the case was a turning 
point for Croatia. The Blaškić trial provoked very strong reactions at home due to the 
element of Croatia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1992, 
Croatia recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state but nevertheless got 
involved in the armed conflict on its territory, albeit in secret.
27
 The case against the 
General thus stated that the purpose of Croatia’s involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was ethnic cleansing of central Bosnia. The General Blaškić case finally brought the 
issue of Croatia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina out in the open. 
This step, however difficult, made it possible for the new regime to address the 
problem and to clear Croatia’s name in the international community by taking 
responsibility for its involvement in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and by 
continuing its cooperation with the Tribunal.  
 President Mesić gave a statement immediately after the verdict: 
  
 This issue is about the requirements needed for the Croatian Army to 
cross the border. It can only happen if the Commander in Chief brings 
such a decision, and if the Parliament brings such a decision. And that 
was never done by our Parliament. At that time I was the Head of 
Parliament and I never signed a document regarding the involvement in 
Bosnia. If somebody employed the Croatian Army outside the Croatian 
borders they were acting against our Constitution. It is a question of 





 The President clearly rejected his own involvement in the affair at the time. He 
does not explicitly name who gave the orders for the army to cross the border, but it could 
only mean that the orders were given by Tuđman, who was the commander in chief of the 
armed forces. This distinction polarises those in command - Tuđman and his supporters 
who did not respect the Constitution, from himself and the current Government that do. By 
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not naming the party that acted against the law, but by clearly indicating about what their 
identity might be, the audience is invited to draw their own conclusions about the nature of 
Croatia’s involvement and the motives behind the actions. The polarisation between the 
two is further emphasised by the President’s insistence that the matter concerned 
individuals rather than the entire country. ‘Those’ who gave orders did so in secret from 
the people and acted against the Constitution. The new regime represents itself as being 
law abiding in this context and distances itself from Tuđman by openly addressing the 
difficult issue and by being willing to point the blame at those who were responsible. 
Invoking the discourse on respect for law and international institutions falls into the link 
between signifiers on the Western civilisation (cooperation-democracy-justice), and thus 
further legitimises the emerging Western identity of Croatia.  
 However, the Tuđmanist discourse was actively advocated by several oppositional 
parties and charities that supported the veterans of the war. The following text is an 
example of their arguments in relation to the verdict to General Blaškić: 
  
The verdict clearly demonstrates that the ICTY is not interested in 
justice but revenge towards the Croatian people who stood up to the 
international community and their wishes at the beginning of the war. 
I am saying this because of what has been happening recently: not 
even humanitarian aid can get into Chechnya, Pinochet has been sent 
free, but Blaškić got 45 years in prison. There is no justice here. On 
the other hand, the verdict is a prime example of the unclean 
conscience of the international community that quietly observed 
Serbia’s aggression onto Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and even 
helped the Serbs at the start. I am afraid that this verdict will divide 
the Croatian people onto those who are rejoicing, and those who are 
shocked and angry like us. What is even more dangerous is that 
operations Flash and Storm are now under the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY because that will be used as an instrument of political 




 The oppositional discourse presented here is again constructed around the 
antagonistic relationship between the international community and Croatia. The 
international community is accused of injustice and revenge, while the Croatian people are 
applauded for having stood up to the unjust community. The statement has a heavy 
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normative element to it and argues for the necessity to look at other events in the world 
(Chechnya, Pinochet case) in comparison to which the case of Blaškić seems less grave 
and inappropriately dealt with. The speaker accuses the international community of having 
an unclean conscience for allowing Serbia to invade Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
the first place and thus reinforces the discursive construction of ‘Croatia-victim’ and 
‘Serbia–aggressor’. This relationship is further emphasised by addressing the potential 
division among the Croats between those who support the international community and 
hence rejoice at this misfortune, and those who will feel anger and side with the 
opposition. The oppositional discourse in this way directly challenges the new 
Government’s attempts to establish their identity as civilised, democratic and Western 
European by trying to fill the signifier ‘justice’ with  contrasting claims, and thus claiming 
it as part of their articulation.  
 Similar logic of argumentation is found in the statement by Vladimir Šeks of HDZ 
who claims that: ‘The Hague tribunal has become exclusively and primarily an instrument 
for accomplishing political goals and altering historical facts.’’30 He directly accuses the 
government of using the tribunal for its own purposes of obtaining political power and of 
undermining the years of Tuđman being in office by unjustly accusing the late President. 
The debate on General Blaškić continued along the pro-Tuđman and anti-Tuđman 
discourse. For example, the leader of a party from the governing coalition stated: 
 
General Blaškić has come out of this as an innocent victim, a pawn in a 
game whose strings were pulled by the culprits residing elsewhere. It was 
known who was pulling the strings and that the Croatian Army 




The text invokes the construction of the General as a victim as opposed to 
those who gave orders and are the true perpetrators. The speaker juxtaposes the 
Croatian Army that acts according to military principles and those who were in 
command but did not respect those principles. Again, the question of truth and justice 
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is posed and the text suggests that the division between the past and the new regime 
is real and grounded in truth.  
  The case of General Blaškić further implied that the war was not entirely 
just. Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina was undertaken with the aim of 
conquering territory. Given that the Homeland War was one of the major features of 
the creation of Croatian identity, this situation proved to be highly problematic. The 
evidence of Croatia’s involvement made it difficult, if not impossible to keep the 
reputation of the war intact in the face of accusations. The Deputy of the Head of 
Government, Goran Granić, addressed the problem of accepting responsibility for the 
war crimes committed by Croats:  
 
However, no matter how disappointed we are with the sentence given to 
General Blaškić, we must not be silent over our horror for the crimes 
committed in Ahmići. I am ashamed because that crime was committed 
by Croats. I do not believe that any crimes committed against civilians 




 It is here that the division between the people and war criminals starts. The 
Croatian people who were the true defenders of their country are here clearly separated 
from the crimes and those individuals who committed them. This statement that divided 
the Croatian people from war criminals further deepened the discourse on the nature of 
Croatia. It was ‘the people’ who fought for freedom under the rule of international law and 
regulations who could claim to be truly Croatian, and who represent the values of the 
Croatian people. One of those values is being horrified by the brutality of war and 
sympathising with the victims. This particular discursive shift is present in the minority 
protection discourse as well and will be analysed further in the following chapter. Special 
attention will be paid to the role of the Serbian national minority and the way its identity 
was reconstructed in the minority protection discourse.   
Breaking with the Croatian self-presentation as ‘victim’ and extending the category 
to the Bosnians who also suffered in the war marks an important point where the Croatian 
identity splits even further. It lets go of the ‘war criminals’ who are represented as brutal 
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and blood thirsty, and articulates itself as sympathising and civilised. The crimes could not 
have been committed in the name of the Croatian people and the Croatian state because 
those people and the state are civilised and understand the ethical implications of the 
discourse. Publicly expressing the horror over the crimes in Bosnian villages thus helped 
glue the community together; it helped distinguish those who fought for freedom, and 
those who murdered and destroyed towns for their own reasons. ‘Those’ who led Croatia 
into isolation and kept it in the Balkans were the same as ‘those’ who gave orders to the 
army to cross into Bosnia. The thickening of the divide between Croatia and its own other 
thus got even more complex as it involved the temporal as well as an ethical element of 
differentiation.  
 The implications for poststructuralist theory become evident here as well. The 
process of othering has assumed a completely new level and demands from us to raise 
questions about the very nature of the subject under examination. In this case, the subject’s 
identity was forced to be fundamentally reconstructed. The formerly unified Croatian 
identity was divided between two groups, one that holds a positive identity (‘the people’, 
‘defenders’) and the other that holds a negative identity (‘war criminals’, ‘aggressors’). 
The group with the negative identity then crosses the boundary and becomes the other. In 
this way the subject is constantly redefining itself and reconstructing its identity against a 
number of features that at different points in time were a part of its own identity. This 
development confirms the importance that the temporal other plays in identity construction 
discussed previously with reference to the work of T. Diez and O. Waever.
33
 Their 
discussion of temporal othering in the case of Europe has a very strong normative element 
to it. The same is the case here, where distancing from the past is done on the grounds of 
ethics. Just like Europe after the Second World War, Croatia had to acknowledge its 
responsibility in the conflict and make sure that history does not repeat itself.  
Looking within, the subject separates from the negative aspects of its own self and 
looks for ways to make the new identity legitimate in the eyes of the international 
community, but at the same time seeks to remain recognisable. The process of othering 
thus becomes an increasingly internal, reflexive process. Another element of this 
development can be perceived in the nature of othering. As discussed in chapter two, 
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othering has been traditionally studied as a relationship between the self and an other 
which is a radical other. This thesis seeks to challenge that approach and in doing so 
demonstrates various types of other as a result of this complex process. The internal other 
is evidently not a radical other but has developed from a different logic of differentiation. 
Similarly, the changing representations of Serbia – the radical other, lead to a less radical 
identity that at times comes very close to the identity of the subject, which is in this case  
articulated as ‘victim of the war’. This particular feature will be analysed in depth in the 
following chapter in the context of minority protection. Both non-radical others, Croatia’s 
past and Serbian victims demonstrate that it is necessary to pay close attention to the 
concept and the way the process of othering works in different settings. This point is 
further elaborated in the following analysis of text.    
An interview with General Martin Špegelj, who was Croatia’s first Minister of 
Defence, demonstrates the divisions in the Croatian identity discourses. The interview was 
conducted after the sentence to Blaškić was issued and wanted to clarify the circumstances 
in which war crimes happened in 1991. I extract the following sections: 
 
Q: Was it possible that crimes against civilians in 1991 happened by 
accident? 
MŠ: Everything had a reason, there were no coincidences. It was not 
possible that after Operation Storm hundreds of villages were burned 
down and that those in command did not see it happen. There must have 
been an approval, at least a silent one. Why were 183 houses demolished 
in Bjelovar in 1991 although they were far away from the battle lines? A 
part of political leaders of that time were behind that and are responsible 
for those crimes: for landmines, for arson, and for murders. They are 
responsible for genocide. (…) All those people who committed crimes, 
organised them or made them possible by the nature of their responsibility 
of being in command we must put on trial and we must clearly say to 
them: this is not Croatia, these are not the real defenders, but people who 
are deeply immoral and even criminals. This is the only solution, we have 
no other choice. This shame must be washed off so the enormous effort 




 On the one hand, General Blaškić blamed the chaos caused by poor organisation 
of defence in 1991 as a cause of murders of civilians, as well as the recruiting of 
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criminals among Croatian émigrés that were allowed to loot and kill for their own 
purposes, but under a mask of national interest. On the other hand, General Špegelj 
started to organise defence in 1990 and had a plan of having a professional army with a 
clear system of command and strict discipline. He did not expect to also deal with 
volunteers, especially those with a criminal file:  
 
The other reason that made possible crimes against civilians was the 
arrival of people with criminal files. At the beginning of the war many 
came, started over-emphasising their love of Croatia and carrying 
photos of Ante Pavelić around.
35
 Local boys prone to criminal activities 
were also recruited and from this milieu were created groups that 
carried on executions. They went into action during night time, for their 
own benefits, and during daytime they hid in basements. If everything 
is done in the name of a nation, in the name of defending Croatia, why 
would anyone ask why some Serb was killed at the moment when the 




 One of the central features that becomes apparent in this interview extract is 
the nature of the subject position of a ‘victim’. Traditionally, the old Tuđmanist 
discourse only allowed the possibility of Croats to be the victims of the war. An 
alternative view that nominates Serbs as victims as well resurfaced with the new 
regime’s rearticulation of the relationship between Croatia and the Balkans, and by 
allowing for the possibility of reconstructing Croatia’s identity, especially its subject 
position of ‘victim’. Serbs could be victims in cases when those who committed 
crimes against them were not acting in the name of the Croatian state and its people. 
The statement shows the hierarchy of concepts that influenced subsequent decisions: 
the liberation of the Croatian state could justify anything, since it was done in the 
name of freedom.  However, separating the legitimate defenders from suspicious 
characters with criminal files made it possible to open up the ‘victim’ category and 
include non-Croatian nationals. Civilians are finally equated in their suffering and 
granted the status of ‘victim’ regardless of their ethnicity. General Špegelj stated: 
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It is important to find out the truth. These are the steps of clearing our 
conscience that is needed for the survival of Croatia. Only in this way 
Croatia can become prosperous and it would be very dangerous if we 
neglected this fact. The true danger lies at this moment in sweeping 




By acknowledging the importance of separating these two groups, and further 
redefining its identity, Croatia makes it possible to prosper and develop its 
democratic standards: to pursue its goal of joining the EU with a clear conscience. 
Not doing that was seen as more dangerous than mass protests aimed against the 
ICTY and the government.   
The problematic feature of the ICTY trying Croats as well as Serbs induced a 
highly charged debate on the possibility of criminalisation of the Homeland War. In 
April of 2000, the Parliament produced a Declaration on Cooperation with the ICTY.
38
 
The debate on the Declaration was difficult given the controversy that surrounded it. The 
consensus was only reached after the main opposition party, the HDZ walked out of the 
Parliament and refused to vote. The Government’s proposal for the Declaration had to 
exclude the part on the protection of the value of the Homeland War, due to the parties’ 
request. The value was considered to be unquestionable. The Deputy of the Head of 
Government, Goran Granić, tried to convince the participants that ‘the Declaration will 
not only mean a crucial step forward in co-operating with ICTY, but it will be a 
civilisational step as well, in terms of Croatia’s responsibility for what happened on its 
territory.’
39
 Granić thus rejected the possibility that accepting the Declaration would lead 
to criminalisation of the Homeland War and stated that the status of the War is not 
questionable for the government in any way.  
 The HDZ did not accept Granić’s arguments and accused the government of 
allowing the possibility through the Declaration to endanger the value and nature of the 
Homeland War, and accused the Tribunal for working against Croatia under the 
influence of power players. The old rhetoric of Croatia that supported the discourse on 
Croatia as the victim of the war, and the new regime’s discourses on responsibility, 
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democracy and justice clashed again with regard to the question of what constitutes 
civilised behaviour of a European country. The following interview with  the President 
of the Association of Croatian Veterans challenges the division along the lines of war 
criminals versus legitimate defenders category, as well as the civilised versus backward 
mindset of foreign policy making:  
 
Q: Until recently those in power used to say that in a war of defence it 
is not possible to commit crimes. But now The Hague is full of Croats 
and the Homeland war is increasingly talked about as a crime.  
 
BB: That is a big problem. Reading the papers one would get an 
impression that we who defended our country are being forgotten, 
just like all of those cities: Vukovar, Pakrac, Petrinja and Gospić, and 
it seems like we have forgotten the pride over Flash and Storm. For 
five years almost half a million Croats wore the uniform. Are all of us 
now criminals? The people should wake up and say ‘Enough’.  
 
(…) All defenders groups are now in unison and support the 
protection of the Homeland War and of the Croatian soldiers, but also 
want to protect the county. Accepting the Declaration does not only 
mean doubting the war to have been necessary, but also a degradation 





The speaker identifies the veterans with towns and villages that suffered much 
damage in the conflict. The names of the towns are well known to all Croats and invoke 
powerful images of suffering, struggle, and destruction of lives and property. His 
question whether all those people who fought in the war should be equated with 
criminals demonstrates the complexity of identification between the Homeland War, 
Croatia and its people. This understanding of justice does not question the nature of 
Croatia’s involvement in the war but focuses only on the grief of the Croatian people. 
Although such claims and positions can surely be understandable and not taken lightly, 
the discursive construction reveals the fundamentally Tuđmanist articulation of truth 
about the Homeland War, and the exclusion of other ethnic groups from the subject 
position of ‘victim’.  
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Another element worth examining in this text is the construction of boundaries  
between the veteran groups and the Government’s Declaration. Taking a stand against 
the Declaration meant not only uniting under the same banner of ‘defenders of Croatia’ 
but also an attempt to save the Government and the Parliament from committing a 
mistake through the Declaration and compromising their positions. Standing up for the 
war was constructed as standing up for the country and the Croatian people.   
 In response to the strong oppositional discourse that challenged the government’s 
attempt to further intensify collaboration with The Hague, President Mesić openly 
addressed the accusations that collaboration signified the criminalisation of the war.  
 
In a cheap way some are attempting to accuse the ICTY for 
criminalising the Homeland War. But that is not correct; it is not true 
that insistence on the responsibility in the line of duty criminalises 
operations Flash and Storm. This responsibility cannot be stretched 
that far. Anything that would be attempted against collaborating with 
The Hague would mean working against the interests of Croatia.
41
   
 
His interpretation is done in the light of strengthening Croatia’s national interest 
constructed as belonging to Western European institutions. The discourse strengthens the 
articulations of extreme positions of the Balkans versus the EU/West. The question of 
criminalisation of the Homeland War was crucial for any further steps that could be 
taken in relation to the ICTY.  
Head of Government, Ivica Račan stood up in the defence of collaboration by 
employing similar discursive strategies to those used by the president:  
 
 Although I stated clearly that the documents concern only what 
happened in Bosnia, some people managed to involve the Homeland 
War in this story, as well as operations Storm and Flash. They have not 
done anyone a favour. Calming the situation at home will help both 
Croatia and those who are to be tried at The Hague. Things can be 
cleared only through co-operation and dialogue, and not by asking for 
more conflict between our country and the ICTY, which is advocated 
by certain marginal political groups.
42  
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Again, the ‘marginal political groups’ threaten to engage Croatia in conflict 
rather than cooperation by twisting the truth about Croatia’s cooperating with the 
Tribunal. Involving the Homeland War and operations Storm and Flash in the wider 
debate about legitimate military action would make it possible to accuse the opponents 
of betraying the country and its people. The official government discourse once again 
acted along the division between ‘those’ who work against the country (and in this case 
who are trying to promote the fabricated link between Croatia’s involvement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the legitimate military operation), and those who want to tell the truth 
about what happened. Dialogue and cooperation are stressed as a ‘civilised’ way, rather 
than the uncivilised, Balkan desire to cause conflict and discord. ‘We will defend our 
interests through dialogue. Croatian independence, the Homeland War, operations Flash 
and Storm must be defended by clear separation between our national defence and 
crimes committed by individuals’, Račan insisted.
43
 He criticised the previous 
government for failing to do the same:  
 
These crimes should not have been hidden behind our honourable 
fight for freedom and the mistakes made there only harmed our 
country. This Government will not repeat these mistakes. Croatia 
will not allow that those who committed crimes freely walk 
around because that would disgrace what we call the Homeland 
War. Taking action will be the best defence of Croatian 
independence. Everything else is against Croatia; it is a conflict 




The honour of the legitimate fight for freedom and Croatian independence are 
invoked against the individually committed war crimes that bring disgrace to all Croatian 
people. The ‘normal life’, so often invoked in the new discourse, was surely not the 
Balkan life, but something that was to be found in the democratic structures of the 
Western, civilised Croatian state. The relationship between the backward Balkans and 
the progressive West was further emphasised in the relationship between Serbia and 
Croatia.  
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Zdravko Tomac, a prominent member of the Social Democratic Party, 
commented at a party meeting:  
 
On the one hand, we are being criticised for betraying our national 
interests, for creating a banana republic, and that we accept 
unconditional dictation of the international community. Others say 
that we do not want real changes in Croatia and that we are taking 
the country back into isolation because we are not accepting 
unconditional cooperation with The Hague. We have to reject all of 
these pressures. The Homeland war must be defended against 
equalising it with the Great-Serbian aggression
45
 and those who are 
directly responsible for war crimes should be tried both at The 




Two important points emerge here: the Homeland War must not be identified 
with the Greater-Serbian aggression, and war criminals should be tried in Croatia as well 
as in The Hague. Trying the war criminals at home shows the willingness to contribute 
to the seeing of justice, which then adds to the clearing of the Homeland War’s 
reputation as a just and honourable war, unlike the Greater-Serbian aggression, which 
was purely a desire to conquer foreign territory. Cooperating with the ICTY and trying 
one’s own nationals thus further separates the Western mindset from that of the Balkans, 
which is tied to rhetoric of history, land and national bonds, and does not accept civic 
duties and responsibilities, embodied in international institutions. The same view was 
expressed by President Mesić:  
 
It is about time that people in this country understand: we do not 
have many democratic traditions but we want European standards 
and we must fight for them! We will not allow that the street 
resolves what should be resolved by the institutions of this state! 
Those who are now defending the dignity of the Homeland war 
must understand that they should defend the institutions of this 
country as well. Those who fought for Croatia also fought for the 
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Linking of the state institutions to the dignity of the war thus reinforced the links 
between the legitimate and the non-legitimate in Croatia. Those who legitimately fought 
in the war for the benefit of people and the state now must respect the legitimate 
institutions of that same state. The question of legitimacy is reinforced by Western 
democratic traditions, which Croatia must yet acquire. The future (democracy, respect 
for institutions) is juxtaposed to the past one again and it ties to itself the question of who 
Croatia is and where it naturally belongs.  
 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
  
This chapter addressed the links between the civilisation discourse that 
juxtaposes the Balkans and the West in the case of cooperation with the ICTY. The 
cooperation between Croatia and the Tribunal was centred around several debates: 
the question of sovereignty, the problem of the criminalisation of the Homeland War 
and the military operations Flash and Storm, and the nature of legitimate democratic 
institutions of the Croatian state. This case study also addressed the othering of 
Croatia’s past and re-examining the legacy of Tuđman and his impact on Croatian 
identity formation. The question of criminalisation of the Homeland War was a 
venue where old and new discursive constructions of Croatian identity clashed most 
violently and struggled to fill the signifiers such as democracy, progress and justice 
with new meaning. The argument put forward is that the discursive change and the 
challenge posed to the old hegemonic discourse were successful because of their link 
with the civilizational discourse and the opposition between the West and the East. 
Linking Tuđman and the Balkans in terms of the civilizational radical other and the 
temporal other of Croatia’s own past was a crucial step in the reconstruction of 
important signifiers, as well as Croatia’s identity. 
  The sovereignty question demanded a reinterpretation of the meaning of the 
concept and the way it related to the Croatian situation. The new sovereign Croatia 




contract the boundaries between itself and the rest of the international community. 
Sovereignty ceased to mean supreme authority within a territory in a traditional sense 
of political authority. It became a way of being recognised in the community of 
democratic states. Sovereignty turned from a question of authority into agency 
included in recognition of authority. Only under those conditions Croatia would be 
recognised as a ‘proper’ state, a truly modern sovereign state, if it is willing to 
renounce its control in the name of community, and the recognition it provides.  
 The criminalisation of the war brought into the spotlight the problem of 
Croatia’s involvement in an international conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1992. The issue could have been detrimental to the future relations between Croatia 
and the ICTY, given the fundamental role the war played in the creation of Croatian 
identity in the 1990s. The official discourse divided the Croatian Self into the 
legitimate defenders in the war from war criminals who fought for their own benefit 
and prize. Distancing the Croatian people from the ‘war criminals’ made it possible 
to separate the legitimate military action from the non-legitimate.  
 Rejecting the old Tuđmanist discourse was a way of reinventing the new 
identity for Croatia. Identifying itself with Western European democratic practices 
and traditions was a way of ending the previous identification of Croatia with the 
person of Tuđman. Accepting other ethnic groups as equal citizens was a part of that 
process, as well as abandoning old definitions of statehood and democracy. The new 
regime’s articulations of what it means to be a truly democratic Western state 
reconciled old ideas and new circumstances. Defining Croatia as not being a part of 
the Balkans was a crucial element that made it possible to seek an alternative. 
 The following chapter will explore the question of protecting minority rights 
in the light of the same civilizational discourse and the Croatia’s desire to adapt to 
Western European standards, and in doing so to cement its developing identity as a 










This chapter addresses the question of minority rights and the way certain 
discursive constructions of the nation, the state and justice, as well as the 
civilizational discourse influenced the construction of Croatian identity in this period 
of time. In the first section, I will introduce the minority rights question in the 
context of Yugoslavia and the way the problem of minorities was addressed until the 
1990s. I will then proceed to analyse the development of the minority discourse and 
its relationship to Croatian identity. Despite Croatia’s independence and its attempts 
to embark upon democratisation processes, the question of minorities was still 
heavily influenced by old definitions and understandings, shaped by communist 
discourses on majority-minority relations and the conception of justice. These 
discursive constructions were subsequently modified in the Tuđmanist discourse and 
tied to the new constructions of signifiers ‘democracy’, ‘the people’, ‘nation state’ 
and ‘Western Europe’. As discussed previously, the Homeland War was fought 
against Serbian forces and thus increased the difficulty of addressing minority rights 
protection, given that the most numerous national minority in Croatia after the war in 
1995 was still the Serbs.
1
  
 In my analysis, I will focus on this particular element in the minority rights 
discourse and demonstrate how the rearticulation of the very concept of national 
minority took place. The civilisational discourse will again be the starting point of 
my analysis and will remain present throughout as an underlying force behind the 
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political discourse. Croatia’s reconstructions of its identity as being Western 
European are challenged by the reality of the social and political needs of its national 
minorities. In this way, the Serbian other becomes an internal element rather than an 
outside feature of the Balkan civilisation, which is the case in the ICTY case study. 
The analysis will look into the ways that the Serbian radical other changed in the 
process of Croatia’s redefining of the above mentioned signifiers, in the light of 
European influence and demands in this area.  
Inclusion of national minorities, especially the Serbs, and their acceptance as 
equal citizens of Croatia marked a radical change in the discourse of Croatian 
statehood and its Western identity. My analysis will also focus on the way minorities 
were discursively rearticulated on the basis of the debates about the Croatian 
Constitution, and on the problem of the returning Serbian population. The analysis of 
data follows three interlinked discourses on the question of minorities: the official 
government discourse, the oppositional discourse that follows the Tuđmanist 
construction of the Serbs as potentially dangerous for the Croatian state, and the 
discourse of the minority representatives. As the analysis progresses, the focus is 
placed on the tension between the official government discourse and the opposition. 
As elaborated previously, the question of Croatian identity as a key marker of a move 
towards a specifically ‘Western European’ country will form the backbone of this 
study and present the macro level of analysis that connects the various political 
questions arising at the period of study and the question of Croatia’s changing 
political identity.  
Addressing the minority rights question was not of primary importance 
during the first year of the coalition being in power. Relations with the ICTY and 
events in Serbia, primarily the fall of Milošević in October 2000, dominated the 
agenda. The question of minorities was largely neglected and mentioned mostly in a 
legislative sense, by preparing a bill about minority rights and the way the question 
was tied to the change in the Constitution, from defining Croatia as a nation state to a 
civil state. The discourse on the minority issue gradually developed from a general 
discussion on the nature and status of minorities in Croatia, the Constitution and the 




property and their status in the country. The Government and the Parliament 
struggled to find a balance between following European directions on 
democratisation processes and legitimising their decisions to the public. Breaking 
with the Tuđmanist tradition that constructed the idea of national interest around the 
thousand year’s dream of statehood and sovereignty was challenging in the 
circumstances. Cooperating with the ICTY, as analysed in the previous chapter, 
asked for a fundamental shift in the way the Croatian state and its sovereignty were 
defined. The case on minority rights developed along similar lines where ideas about 
the nature of the state had to be addressed and redefined.  
The structure of this chapter follows the developments in the year 2000 in a 
chronological way in order to map out the links between dominant discourses and to 
offer a clear analysis of the events that took place. This case study differs from the 
previous one in terms of the importance it was given at the time, but nevertheless 
demonstrates the relevance of both the civilisational debate and the events 
surrounding the ICTY for its own development and the close links between them.  
 The texts analysed in this section are representative of the main points of 
dispute around the question of minorities between those in power and the opposition. 
The nature of the conflict was used to legitimise certain claims as well as 
reproducing the relationship between Croatia and the Serbian other, in accordance 
with the old Tuđmanist rhetoric and the Western European discourse respectively.   
The following section sets the context for the question of ethnic minorities in 
Yugoslavia that consequently served as the basis of understanding and defining 
minorities in the Croatian context. It is this particular construction and relationship 
between minority and majority that developed into a stumbling block between the 









6.2 Minority rights in the Yugoslav context and the new political setting 
 
As discussed previously, the question of nationality in Yugoslavia was very 
sensitive and something that was seen as potentially dangerous.  The Yugoslav 
project was, among others, an attempt to overcome divisions according to national 
groups and thus rejected the idea of existing majorities and minorities on the 
Yugoslav territory. The Yugoslav Federation consisted of five nations (Croats, Serbs, 
Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians) and two ‘nationalities’ (Albanians in 
Kosovo and people of Vojvodina – both autonomous regions within the Serbian 
Socialist Republic). All were equal citizens of Yugoslavia, shared equal rights and 
protection and there was no perceived need to recognise a group’s rights additionally. 
A member of one ‘nation’ had the same rights regardless of the place of residence, 
whether it was their own Republic or elsewhere. Serbs in Croatia were thus not 
treated as a minority but had the status of a ‘constitutive nation’ of Yugoslavia and 
were in that respect equal to Croats. The same principle applied to the whole 
federation. 
Until the end of the war in 1995 when Croatia reclaimed its land and 
established its power over the entire territory, there was not much room for 
discussing the relevance of minorities in the Croatian state. Tuđman’s idea of what 
Croatia should be like after it recovered from the war did not seriously acknowledge 
minorities. Despite their mention in the Constitution there was no real attempt to 
include minority groups with ‘authentic’ Croatian nationals in the political life of the 
country. Minorities were seen as a threat to the wholeness of the state, especially 
because the most numerous group were Serbs – an element that was impossible to 
strip of all connotations from the recent past. In this way, minorities assumed the role 
of an other and were discursively constructed as being different from Croatian 
nationals and as a consequence a potential threat to the society and the state. The fact 
the Serbs formed the biggest minority group only aggravated the situation since the 
discourse in their particular case constructed a radical other that was linked to the 




After the elections of 2000, more serious and determined attempts were made 
in establishing relations with the EU and the status of Croatia in the international 
community changed dramatically. The new government agreed to implement laws 
that would secure rights for minorities and hinted at a genuine change of attitudes 
towards the problem. In a meeting with the representatives of the Serbian National 
Community in Croatia, President Mesić stated:  
 
Croatia has decided on the democratic system in which all citizens 
must be equal before the law and there cannot be a selective 
approach. No Croatian citizen should feel threatened but all must 




The signifier ‘democracy’ is placed at the centre of relations between the state 
and its citizens. As a democratic country, it is obliged to respect the law and to offer 
all rights and protection to all citizens, regardless of their nationality. In this way, the 
legal discourse is linked to the question of nationality and articulated as being 
inseparable from democracy. I will look at this element of the changing discourse on 
minorities in more detail in the next section of the chapter in order to provide an 
account of several steps undertaken by the elites that subsequently resulted in a 
changed definition of a nation state, more adept to accommodating a multi-ethnic 
community.  
President Mesić and Milorad Pupovac from the Serbian National Council
3
 
agreed that ‘minorities in both countries have to be bridges of cooperation, and not 
spaces of conflict.’
4
 The new discourse stresses cooperation as the key ingredient to 
peaceful coexistence. As argued in the previous chapter, cooperation was stressed as 
one of the defining features of the West in the new government discourse. 
Cooperation between different national groups is thus necessary in light of the 
emerging Western identity, both among the Croats and the Serbs, in order to further 
reinforce the change in identity and to legitimise the claims put forth by both sides.  
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The problem of conflict that Mesić and Pupovac seek to abandon has to 
become a question of the past. Both the construction of the Homeland War as a fight 
of Croatian people against the Serbian hegemon, and the Tuđmanist discourse on the 
radical other of Serbia were drawn into this new discourse and demanded a shift of 
perspective. Cooperation and respect for law are put forward as foundations for a 
working democracy, and prioritised above the historical perspective that glorified 
struggle against the enemy and holding on to the notion of an ethnically pure state. 
An increase in respect of human rights in general and for ethnic minorities in 
particular was one of the conditions for membership demanded by the European 
Union, defined in the Copenhagen Criteria of Accession. The return of Serb refugees 
from eastern Slavonia was pressed as a priority for the Croatian government and 
rapid improvement in actual measures implemented was required. However, there 
were no steps actually taken at that point in order to solve the refugee crisis. 
Nevertheless, I argue that acknowledging the importance of recognising the Serb 
minority as part of Croatian society and granting them rights was a significant 
departure from Tuđman’s discourse of irreconcilable nationalism that supported an 
ethnically homogenous nation state. The significance of this shift will be analysed in 
more detail in the following sections of the chapter and the implications for concrete 
political steps will be highlighted.  
The problem of minorities and regulation of their rights in the new, 
democratic Croatia is something that is closely connected with the question of the 
nature of the Croatian state and with its identity. As I argued previously, the way the 
majority-minority problem was dealt with in Yugoslavia had remained a resilient 
example in practice despite the efforts to move to a Western model that recognises 
minorities within states. The Serb minority, being the most numerous in Croatia and 
in a controversial position due to previous conflicts in the region, was in the 
spotlight. As a result all the laws and regulations were discussed in the political arena 
with an understanding that it was primarily the Serbian minority Croatia was dealing 
with, and consequently had to be extremely careful not to grant them too much or too 
little ground for fear of another political crisis. At first, these concerns were not 




But, over time, the question of Serbs started to be discussed more openly and in 
explicit terms.  
After the elections the country witnessed a rapid change to de-ethnicise its 
politics and to move closer to the desired model of most Western democracies. In the 
year 2000, the minorities had altogether five representatives in the Parliament. At the 
same time, the Institute for Minority Representation was proposed to be abolished on 
the grounds of its poor organisation and structure, a move that was interpreted by the 
minorities as the last blow of the old HDZ politics of exclusion of minorities from 
the political and public sphere.  
Milorad Pupovac, the President of the Serbian National Council made a 
comment in regards to this problem:  
 
The specific Croatian context demands the recognition of minorities, 
their identities and their institutions and an end of politics that claims 
us all simply citizens of Croatia. In the new liberal democratic politics 
on minorities the basis of citizenship is expanded with mechanisms of 
protection and promotions of minorities. (…) Thus, Croatia must 
recognise its minorities not only as a private matter of individuals. 
The new minority politics must begin with the participation of ethnic 
minorities in the public sphere at the national and especially local, 
regional levels where minority rights are actually exercised. The 
situation at the moment is very bad, in judiciary, firms, in 
representative bodies and at the executive. For example, many 
minority representatives have been expelled from the courts and in 
many local and regional councils minorities are not represented at all, 




The text addresses a very practical matter that concerns not just the 
participation of minorities in the public sphere, but their actual visibility. The speaker 
stresses the importance of the Croatian context: the knowledge about the roots of 
such a specific understanding of the position of minorities is explicit. The old 
Yugoslav principle of putting the subject position of ‘Yugoslav citizen’ above any 
national identity is now being challenged by invoking a new, liberal, democratic 
politics of the West that Croatia is aiming to embrace. Pupovac calls for the inclusion 
of minorities into all aspects of public life as a way to promote and strengthen new 
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democratic values. Linking the discourse on liberal democracy and the need to 
acknowledge the rights of minorities is done in a way that positions the civil concept 
of citizenship against the recent interpretations of majority-minority relationships. 
This discursive strategy stands in contrast to the official Government discourse that 
aimed to reconstruct the meaning of ‘state’ and to move from the definition of 
‘nation state’ to ‘civil state’ by stressing the connection between the recognition of 
minorities and the civil state that operates according to Western democratic 
principles.  
In the speech made by Pupovac we can note an attempt of filling the signified 
‘democracy’ with new content by calling upon Western democratic norms and 
practices but also that his discursive construction missed a significant point; that the 
particularities of the Croatian context cannot be taken into account and enhanced by 
attempting to link it to a version of democracy that supports minority protection by 
challenging the civil model of a state and its construction of citizenship.  
It is interesting to note that a democratic model that assumes recognition and 
protection of minorities is taken for granted to be valid in all Western European 
states. France in never mentioned in the official and minority discourses as an 
example of a civil state that addresses the minority-majority relationship in a 
different way. This exclusion demonstrates the selective nature of identification with 
‘the West’ and its practices. The same was evident in the analysis of the civilisational 
discourse and cooperation with the ICTY, where particular (or rather abstract) 
constructions of the European Union and ‘the West’ were promoted. The EU is 
constructed as an entity that exists regardless of its particular member states and their 
particularities.  
The minority discourse in this case is trying to challenge the hegemonic 
discourse about the majority-minority relationship that has become sedimented and 
difficult to challenge. The contradictions in the discourse, evident in the above text, 
demonstrate the difficulty of this attempt and the complexity of the problem. 
Pupovac calls for the recognition of minorities and allowing them to participate in 
public life. This appeal refers to the end of the Yugoslav model, as well as the 




The following example offers another interpretation of the meaning of 
minority rights, by discursively linking the Italian minority and Croatian majority in 
the common values of democracy and freedom. Furio Radin, the representative of the 
Italian minority in the Croatian Parliament stated: 
 
Our former Minister of Education used to tell me she respected me 
for the way I was defending the rights of the Italian minority, just 
as she used to defend the rights of Croats. I told her that in a way I 
was also defending the rights of Croats, because by defending and 
protecting minorities I was protecting common values. It is 
something that in Istria we understand well. In Istria most citizens 
believe that minority rights are also their rights – the rights that 
belong to that region. But people from the Croatian Community in 
Istria do not understand that and are trying to impose the view that 
minorities have privileges. Minorities, including the Italians, must 
have additional rights in order to equally and as a community 





What is immediately apparent in this text is the discursive linking between 
the Italian minority and Croatian majority. Radin compares his position to the one 
that discursively separates two national communities and points to the difference in 
understanding of the broader meaning of the two. The former Minister of Education, 
who was not named, echoed the Tuđmanist discourse that separated national 
minorities from Croatian nationals in the discursive construction of the Croatian 
state. The signifier ‘state’ carried the meaning of a nation state and was further linked 
to the signifier ‘democracy’. The link between the two was constructed as being 
natural and on those grounds excluded national minorities from equally taking part in 
belonging to Croatia.  The Croatian Community in Istria participates in this discourse 
in their understanding that minority rights in reality mean additional privileges. This 
particular element was a strong point of  contestation in Croatia at the time and 
divided the supporters of minority protection norms, and those against.  
Radin points to this discourse and challenges it by first positioning the Italian 
minority as being equal to the Croatian majority at the level of the state. He equates 
the protection of minority rights to the protection of Croatian nationals’ rights and 
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discursively constructs them as being common values on a more general level. For 
Radin that is Istria – a region in Croatia with the highest number of Italian minority 
population of 7%.
7
 Istria has been known for a peaceful coexistence between the 
Croats and Italians since the end of the WWII and during the 1990s witnessed an 
increased settlement of Albanian, Serbian and Bosnian populations. In Radin’s 
discourse multiculturalism and inclusion feature as central tenets of the discourse and 
are linked to the Western democratic values of minority protection and tolerance. It 
is because of this understanding that Radin claims to be protecting common values of 
all Croats.  
His claim that most of the people in Istria hold this belief reveals an 
interesting construction of their identity. Italians and most Croats in Istria are aware 
of their national identity but that awareness makes them inclusive and open to others, 
rather than exclusive. Supporting minority protection thus means supporting the 
rights of all citizens in Istria and in Croatia. The foreign other is thus not a radical 
other and the process of identity construction in this case revolves around similarities 
rather than differences. Istrian people, both Italians and Croats, by acknowledging 
this fact are capable of living in peace and harmony. Their identities as 
Croats/Italians – Istrians - Croatian citizens, demonstrate a complexity and layering 
that is compatible with poststructuralist claims about national identity construction. 
Their discourse accommodates differences rather than uses them as a basis for 
conflict and animosity and allows for flexibility in interpretation of the democratic 
norms promoted by the West and the new Government of the Croatian state. In this 
way the Italian minority in Istria that supports the institutions of the Croatia state and 
the Croatian national majority serves as an example for the rest of the country to 
follow in order to develop democratically and to more fully develop the country’s 
Western European identity.  
The case of the Italian minority in Croatia could have served as a positive 
model for other minorities to follow and to embrace their discourse on rights and 
equality. However, the position of the Italian minority was particular because of 
bilateral relations between Italy and Yugoslavia after WWII. The Italian minority 
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had no political power but had their cultural heritage protected. In the Northern 
Adriatic region (especially in Rijeka and Kvarner) and Istria they had Italian schools, 
newspapers, community centres and theatre productions. In this way, the Italians 
were an exception in the Yugoslav context and during the fifty year period enjoyed a 
status similar to that national minorities had in Western European countries. Their 
engagement in the political debates at this point revealed a sophisticated discourse on 
minority rights and responsibilities, as well as a deep distinction between themselves 
and other minority groups.  
A comparison between Pupovac and Radin demonstrates this difference in 
the way they phrase their understanding on the Croatian situation and solutions to the 
problem. While Radin offers a coherent stance on the minority question and the way 
the majority and minorities relate to one another, Pupovac expresses a rather 
confused position and no answer to the problem. This can be interpreted as a sign of 
an early stage of development of the Serbian minority discourse and a reflection of 
the challenging situation they were in. As it will be apparent in the next section of the 
analysis, the focus of the minority debate will be increasingly placed on Serbia, while 
the Italian minority will take a back seat. The analysis will demonstrate how the 
discourse on minorities as a threat was related to the Serbs and how at that point 
different discursive constructions of the identity of the Serbs developed, as well as 
discourses on the nature of the Croatian state, progress and justice. The process of 
othering will be at the centre of the analysis and will be linked to the previous case 
study, as well as to the civilisational discourse in order to reveal the 
interconnectedness of the discourses.  
The way the debate on minorities was developing in the year 2000 revealed 
interesting and complex links between the concepts of nationalism and that of the 
state. The traditional understanding of the necessity to identify and equate the two 
was slowly changing and a new discourse emerged that separated the idea of one 
homogenous nation from that of a state. The notion of a citizen was more important 
in that discourse than national homogeneousness and the example of Istria 
demonstrated the possibility of overcoming differences through embracing and 




section, I will further examine how the concept of minority protection featured in the 
discourse on the Balkans and the way the minority protection norm was constructed 
in that context. The relationship between Croatia and the Balkans will then be 
examined in light of the meaning of minority protection for Croatia and a conclusion 
will be drawn on the links between them.   
 
 
6.3 Minority rights and the fear of the Balkans: a crisis of identity 
 
As argued in chapter four, an important element in the debate with the West 
became an idea that Croatia should work as a factor of stabilisation in the region. The 
changes on the political scene were distinctively radical in comparison to the 
previous period and seemed promising in the long run. Discussing the civilisational 
discourse in this particular context of national minorities will reveal an additional 
layer of meaning to the complex relationship between Croatia and its neighbours and 
allow for a deeper understanding of attitudes and discourses surrounding the 
question.  
The recognition of Croatia’s success was evident in the hopes and 
encouragement that its case can serve as an example and a model for Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia to follow, each in their own right, and the notion of Croatia 
as a bridge that stands between the West and the Balkans was a popular one and 
often invoked in the Government’s discourse. However, despite the desire to be the 
generator of positive changes in the region and a role model for its eastern 
neighbours, Croatian politicians expressed their opinions early on about the need to 
keep certain boundaries between themselves and Yugoslavia. The Foreign Minister 
stated:  
 
Political changes in Croatia thus caused excitement in Europe:  
people showed at elections the desire for positive change. 
Europe wants us to be their partner who will help resolve the 




into bad political options; they just want us to contribute in 
clearing things up in this area. We must serve as an example to 
our eastern neighbours that it is possible to change the 





The ‘bad political options’ concern a Balkan union of a kind; something to be 
avoided at all costs. An example to the neighbours is acceptable as long as Croatia 
has full European support and works as its agent. Being compared to 
Yugoslavia/Serbia becomes a question of Croatia’s Balkan identity – something that 
is considered the least desirable option for the future. If Croatia is to be like Serbia 
then it has not developed and democratised, it has not moved away from the Balkans. 
Accepting its geographical position but with a strong temporal and ethical distance 
from Yugoslavia was thus understood as the only possible way forward to Europe. 
Another statement from the Foreign Minister further clarifies this point: 
 
We have always claimed that we support regional cooperation but 
that every country should approach the EU membership on an 
individual basis. There is no doubt about it - we are for good 
neighbourly relations, which includes our understanding that Croatia 
connects the Mediterranean, Central Europe and the South-East. On 
the 3
rd
 January elections were held that signalled the democratisation 
of our country. However, Croatia has not been accompanied by the 
democratisation of the region. It does play the part in the EU’s 
ambitions to transform Europe’s South-East. That is an important 
message but we are not expected to be prisoners of the region. It is 





The statement explicitly juxtaposes ‘the region’ - the Balkans and the EU. 
The Balkans have not followed Croatia into the processes of democratisation and that 
in itself is a danger: being influenced by the Balkan neighbours would keep Croatia a 
‘prisoner’ in this region where it does not truly belong. The future EU membership 
and the past of the Balkan prison stand in stark contrast in the discourse on Croatian 
identity and its political options. This division features heavily in the discourse on 
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minority rights. The number of the Serbian minority posed a problem for Croatia 
given the nature of its own identity construction that excludes the Balkans. The 
Serbian minority is discursively constructed as an extension of Yugoslavia/Serbia 
and thus stands for the Balkans in the midst of a ‘democratising’, ‘Western’ and 
‘progressive’ Croatia. Therefore, grating them rights is at the same time a European 
requirement and a sign of Croatian democratic practice and its identity, as well as a 
perceived danger of being under the Balkan influence and imprisonment in that 
foster home of a region. Thus, relations with Yugoslavia/Serbia are closely 
intertwined with the minority question and must be looked at with equal scrutiny. 
The minority question does not stand alone as a domestic issue, but is a part of the 
grander discourse of Croatia as a Balkan or a European country.  
Events in Serbia that followed the fall of Milošević and its changing political 
landscape were of major impact for Croatia and some of its policy decisions. 
Redefining its relationship with Serbia was not just a foreign policy matter but 
something that played a role in the minority rights discourse as well. The role of the 
Homeland War and the question of responsibility are also present in the discourse 
through Croatia that defines itself at first as being a victim in the war, and later as 
also being responsible for war crimes, as well as through Serbia which is 
continuously articulated as the aggressor.  
As I have argued previously, the Serbs were constructed as the radical other, 
the aggressor, the Balkan element in the otherwise Western Croatia. In this context 
the Serbian minority finds itself in a difficult and a complex situation because their 
identity is perceived to affect Croatia in more than just political ways. This feature 
supports the arguments made by scholars who look into the processes of identity 
construction as interaction between the self (or the subject of analysis), the radical 
other and a range of less radical otherness.
10
 Positioning Croatia within this web of 
relations makes it possible to examine the process of Western identity construction as 
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a complex interplay of different subject positions. The existence of this ‘aspirational 
identity’, which is in this case the European Union, provides a pull towards specific 
articulations of democratic life in the West and offers a context within which 
Croatia’s identity constructions of its others can be justified. The process of identity 
construction is in this way not simply established around the dichotomous 
relationship between Croatia and the EU, or Croatia and Serbia. A wide range of 
identities and relations are present here and form a complex web of meaning.  
As will be argued later on, the possibility of change for the radical other 
offers an alternative to traditional readings of the self and other relationship that is 
locked in a standstill and difficult to change. I argue that there is a direct link 
between a change in an established, sedimented discourse and a discursive 
reconstruction of the radical other. In this case it is the discourse on minorities as 
being dangerous and undesirable, and the identity of the Serbian minority that 
supports this thesis. I shall return to this point later on in the analysis of ‘victim’ and 
‘aggressor’ subject positions and the way it relates to the previous case study. 
The existence of a particular discourse in Istria of the Italian minority adds 
another layer to this relational system. The Istrian population offers a Western 
element to Croatia and makes it easier to identify itself as already Western European. 
The Italians in Istria are thus not a radical other, but an other closer to the Croatian 
subject and to its aspirational identity of Western Europe. However, the existence of 
Serbs in Croatia challenges Croatia’s identity as a ‘Western European country’ in 
two ways. Serbs are not Western European people but belong to the Balkan 
civilisation, and their identification with the Serbian aggressor makes it impossible to 
include them within the Croatian state as equal to the rest of the population. The 
Serbs thus remain in the position of the radical other and occupy a marginal space 
within the discursive structures on Croatia. The shifting of the radical other to a 
lesser degree of otherness took place in the period 2000-2001 and that change forms 
the following sections of my analysis.          
The complexity of the situation in the post-2000 election period Croatia made 
it difficult to answer the EU demands without re-defining the relationship with 




communication. It was Serbia as the most radical other: the hegemon of Yugoslavia, 
the aggressor, the backward Balkan civilisation. The question of establishing 
relations with Serbia was thus not only political in a strict sense, but civilisational as 
well. An interview with Croatia’s Minister for European Integration, Ivan Jakovčić, 
demonstrates this point:  
 
It is very simple: it cannot be in anyone’s interest for Croatia to stay 
in the same group as countries that are not capable of democratic 
steps. Just because Croatia has opted for democratic cooperation on 
the Southeast of Europe it does not mean that it has chosen its 





The official discourse stressed a strict division between Croatia’s 
geographical location that is the Balkans, and where it truly belongs: in Western 
Europe and the European Union. Cooperating with neighbours is thus a sign of its 
European willingness to spread democracy and encourage peace and stability, but at 
the same time a very clear distinction between itself and the Balkan others is needed 
in order to enforce its Western European identity. Serbia is articulated as not being 
capable of democratic change and its identity as a backward, uncivilised entity is a 
threat for democratic and civilised Croatia. This text is an excellent example of the 




The following section looks at the Croatian Constitution and the way the state 
was discursively reconstructed as civil versus national. This debate is further linked 
to the meaning of minorities in that context and the way the concept of citizenship 
played a crucial role in further discursive changes.  
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 6.4 The Constitution and rearticulation of the meaning of the state 
 
The question of citizenship continued to feature in the official discourse on 
national minorities and offers another fruitful venue for studying the development of 
Croatia’s Westernisation. The previous chapter on cooperation with the ICTY 
engaged with a debate about Croatia’s Constitution with regard to the nature of 
sovereignty in a modern European state. The following analysis looks at the 
Constitution and the way nationality and citizenship were rearticulated in the new 
official discourse. It is at this point that the question of Serbs in Croatia becomes 
more explicit and is tied to Serbia as an external and internal threat.  
One of the problems that had to be addressed regarding the change of the 
Constitution was the change in the concepts of statehood and sovereignty of Croatia.  
The debate was placed within the broader question of Croatian democratisation and 
was linked to a debate about the duties of the President. A desire to make changes 
that will move the new Croatia as far away as possible from Tuđman’s idea on how 
to organise a state opened up a complex discussion about the very nature of the 
Croatian state and its people, including the role of the President. Tuđman declared 
himself to be ‘the President of all Croatian people’ and stressed national identity as 
key to the essence of the state and overall unity of its people. As I have elaborated 
previously, during his presidential campaign Mesić stressed the need for Croatia to 
change the role of the president and promised to offer a different model – a president 
that is primarily a citizen of his country, rather than a ‘father of the nation’.
13
 This 
move is significant for the study of minority rights because it shows a willingness to 
move away from the definition of Croatia as a nation state for all Croatian people 
towards a definition of a state that would include all its citizens, rather than 
nationals. This change in the official discourse thus allows for the greater inclusion 
of national minorities and possibilities for further democratic changes.  
The initial dilemma at this point was a distinction between a discourse of a 
‘nation state’ and a ‘civil state’. A majority of politicians belonging to the winning 
coalition were supportive of the definition of Croatia in terms of a civil state, rather 
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that keeping the old concept of a nation state.
14
 Vesna Pusić of HNS stated that the 
request is:  
(…) Understandable and justifiable given that the majority of 
European states have abandoned the national definition of their 
states. It was something that was dominant in the 19
th
 century while 
the idea of a ‘nation’ was still questionable and thus needed a 
defined framework. In the modern day of globalisation such a 
definition has become redundant and even stands in stark contrast 




Pusić positions the two discourses on the nature of the state as being mutually 
exclusive. The concept of a nation state belongs to the past and is incompatible with 
the modern era and processes that go on in the world, like globalisation and 
European integration. The signifier ‘state’ in the new Croatian context underwent a 
radical reconstruction and was linked to specific definitions of statehood and 
democracy promoted in most Western European countries. She defines Croatia as 
belonging to the Western society that supports the civil character of the state through 
its links with the European Union. Participating in the processes of integration thus 
positions Croatia within the wider democratic framework and conditions its 
democratic legitimacy by the success of the implementation of the civil state 
discourse.   
A different argument but with a similar conclusion was put forward by Mato 
Arlović of SDP who said:  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, when Croatia was fighting for its 
independence and sovereignty it made sense to define it as a nation 
state in the Constitution. But after the battle was won there was no 




Both texts define the concept of a nation state as something outdated and 
unnecessary. The nation state makes sense at a time of crisis where boundaries and 
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definitions of statehood are not set and when identity formation revolves around a 
negative differentiation between the political subject and the other. Croatia’s 
independence and sovereignty had first to be established and then defended between 
1991 and 1995. At the time of peace, however, it was deemed necessary to abandon 
such conceptualisations that were understood as contrary to the concept of 
integration and progress.  
A ‘nation state’ thus changes from being acceptable and necessary to 
outdated and unacceptable for modern standards and definitions of statehood. The 
change of discourse on the nature of the Croatian state is closely connected to the 
problem of the Serbian radical other. A nation state excluded all possibility to 
address the problem of its Serbian population as potentially equal to Croats. Moving 
away from the construction of Croatia as a state for all Croatian people towards a 
more inclusive entity based on civil values of citizenship makes it possible to 
redefine the subject position of the Serbian minority in particular and of all other 
minorities generally. Identifying Croatia as a civil state allows the Serbian radical 
other to become more acceptable to Croatia, given its lack of threat to the wholeness 
of the nation. It slowly transforms into an acceptable other that shares Croatian civil 
identity and participates in the Westernisation of the country.  
The Constitution debate was carried out along the lines of the necessity to 
change the status of Croatia as a ‘nation state’ into a civil state, or whether it was 
enough to add to the Constitution a definition of Croatia as a ‘civil state’. 
Interestingly enough, the existing Constitution had a clearly stated definition, a 
variation from the US Constitution, that ‘in the Republic of Croatia the power comes 
from its people and belongs to its people as a community of all free and equal 
citizens.’
17
 This implies that from its beginning Croatia has been defined as a civil 
state in which all rights, freedoms and obligations have been defined on the basis of 
it being a civil state, rather than being based on nationality, gender, religion or 
ethnicity. The dilemma that emerged in the post-election context on how to define 
Croatia, therefore had more to do with the recent historical circumstance of 
Tuđman’s practice and his insistence on the definition of Croatia as a nation state, 
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than to its definition at the Constitutional level.  This question was not explicitly 
raised during the debate, which can be interpreted as the new Government’s 
determination to move away as far from Tuđman's legacy as possible, and trying to 
eradicate traces of his political practice. The Constitution says: 
 
(…) the Republic of Croatia is established as a nation state for 
Croatian people and a state for all other national minorities: 
Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, 
Austrians, Ukrainians and others that are Croatian citizens. 
They are guaranteed equality with all citizens of Croatian 
nationality and granted national rights according to democratic 
norms of the free world.
18
   
 
At the time of writing of the Constitution the most numerous ethnic minority 
were the Serbs and in the year 2000 that was still the case despite a dramatic 
decrease in the Serbian population during the war years.
19
 Inclusion of other ethnic 
minorities in the text can be interpreted as an attempt to decrease the importance of 
the most numerous group on Croatian territory given the big difference in their 
numbers. It is also important to notice that Slovenians and Bosniaks
20
 were not 
included in the text despite their numbers in Croatia
21
, which contributes to such an 
understanding of the text, and supports the thesis that exclusion of non-Croatian 
national communities worked as one of the main mechanisms of national identity 
construction. Including most national minorities in the Constitution but omitting two 
significant groups has to be taken into account when looking at the very nature of the 
text.  
The question of defining Croatia along national or civic lines is thus more 
than a question about terminology and appropriate conceptualisation, but a question 
about constitutive elements of that political and social community. This brings back 
the fundamental myth of ‘a centuries long dream’ for establishing a sovereign nation 
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state that Tuđman used in his rhetoric and which legitimised much of political action 
during the 1990s.  The following section analyses the far-reaching effects of the 
change within the nation state discourse and the way it was discursively linked to the 
question of victims of the Homeland War.  
 
 
6.5 Occupying a new subject position: a difficult journey from 
victimisation to responsibility 
 
Discursive changes that occurred within the debates on the redefinition of 
Croatia at the level of the Constitution further influenced the question of the Serbian 
minority and their status in society. Abandoning the Tuđmanist nationalist discourse 
as a result of democratic forces promoting a new agenda opened up the possibility of 
a reconstruction of the subject position of the Serbian minority and their ‘role’ in the 
Homeland War, as well as in the contemporary Croatian context.  
Events that followed the increased cooperation with the ICTY demonstrated a 
radically different conception of the Croatian identity, now based on increased 
identification with Western European values and responsibility towards Western 
European institutions. The change within the subject position of ‘Croatia-victim’ into 
an actor ready to assume responsibility and a more critical stance towards its recent 
past found its way into the debates on minority rights. The very act of acknowledging 
Croatia’s responsibility in committing war crimes against Serbian civilians living in 
Croatia between 1990 and 1995 made it possible to reconstruct the discourse on the 
nature of the Serbian minority on the whole, and their status as part of Croatia’s 
radical other.  The discursive links between the Serbs in Yugoslavia and those living 
in Croatia were unambiguous and seemed rather resilient during the 1990s. The 
Serbian radical other functioned as an external threat to Croatian security and an 





The following text demonstrates the tension between the old discourse and 
the new ideas. It is an extract from an interview with Andrija Hebrang, one of the 
prominent HDZ members, that revolved around questions of sovereignty, relations 
with Serbia and problems regarding Serbs in Croatia. The following extract 
represents the focus of the HDZ discourse of the time: 
 
Q: What should the future leadership of the party be like? 
AH: Those individuals must be recognisable through their 
democratic, pro-European and global ideas but with the condition 
that they stress the dignity of the Croatian people and state 
sovereignty. (…) The HDZ has remained the only party that in this 
moment is defending the reputation of our country, and that has 
been united by their opposition to the criminalisation of the 
Homeland War.  
(…) 
Q: You claim that there were no organised crimes during the war 
and that you had no information about committed crimes. But we 
now know that your superior at the time, Head of Government 
Franjo Gregurić, signed a document that testifies that you 
personally knew about the disappearance of 65 Serbs and 35 
Croats.  
 
AH: There has never been such a document. I did not have a clue 
about this, but even if I did, I am not sure if we would have had 
time to investigate given that thousands of Croats went missing 
during that period. Would a document about 65 missing Serbs have 
caused a stir among us who were engaged in looking for those 
missing Croats, I really cannot say. But personally I have never 
heard about these crimes against the Serbs. I think that the parts of 
our state apparatus that allow such news to circulate around 
newspapers deserve the most severe criticism, especially because 
nowadays nobody writes about innumerable Serbian crimes over 
Croats!
22
   
 
Hebrang’s emphasis is on the pro-European forces that represent democratic 
tendencies but at the same time protect Croatia’s dignity and national interest. The 
two stand in contrast given that ‘dignity’ assumes refusing to collaborate with The 
Hague tribunal and making sure that the Homeland War does not get criminalised at 
any cost. ‘Dignity of Croatian people’ is ensured by clear definitions of subject 
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positions ‘victim’ and ‘aggressor’ according to Tuđman’s nationalist rhetoric. In his 
response to the second question, Hebrang blatantly denies any knowledge about the 
disappearances of the mentioned people and carries on to justify his position by 
calling upon the ‘victim’ and ‘aggressor’ constructions. Croats (victims) suffered on 
a grander scale and thus a few Serbian lives could not have and should not have been 
a matter of investigation. He rejects the particular case of 65 missing Serbs and puts 
them in the same abstract category of Serbs-aggressors.  
Preserving the ‘dignity of Croatian people’ here depends on this 
generalisation and insistence on the radical otherness of Serbia as aggressor. The text 
is positioned around concepts of state sovereignty, dignity of the people and the 
reputation of the country, which stand in direct opposition to investigations of the 
case of missing people. The fact that the investigation is concerned about missing 
Serbs is linked with Croatia’s loses in the war and interpreted in that normative 
context. The conclusion Hebrang comes to is that the Serbs do not deserve such 
attention given that the number of Croatian victims was greater. He also reproduces 
the discourse that positions the ‘Croatian victim’ against the ‘Serbian aggressor’ 
against one another and does not allow the redefinition of subject positions and their 
identities. 
Vladimir Šeks of the HDZ employed the same discursive constructions of 
‘victim’ and ‘aggressor’ during a discussion on the proposed Tenement Bill that was 
to address the problem of the return of private property to Serbian citizens who lost 
their homes during the war:  
 
By supporting this law you are asking the Croatian people to 
pay the generals of the Yugoslav national Army for bullets and 
grenades that killed more than a thousand civilians in Osijek 
only. The law represents the legalisation of Serbian aggression 




His position is representative of the HDZ’s insistence that any allowances 
made to Serbs, both abroad and in Croatia equates the aggressor and the victim. 
Return of property to the Serbian people is explicitly equated with military 
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aggression of the Yugoslav National Army and the killing of Croatian civilians. 
Following from this logic, it becomes apparent that the relations between Serbia and 
Croatia are understood as a zero-sum game, where any kind of gain for Serbian 
people is exclusively Croatia’s loss. A second feature of this discourse is the 
equation of all Serbian people with the Yugoslav/Serbian military and their crimes 
against the Croats.  
A fundamental difference between the official and the opposition discourses 
lies in different constructions of the subject positions of ‘victim’ and ‘aggressor’, and 
their willingness to individualise their subjects rather than generalise. ‘Serbia-
aggressor’ has no element of humanity and should not be treated with sympathy, 
while ‘Serbia-possible victim’ has redeeming qualities and represents a less 
threatening other to Croatia’s identity construction. Opening up the category of 
‘victim’ to include non-Croats who suffered in the war was thus made possible by 
the questioning of the morality of certain military operations undertaken by Croats. 
Sending generals to The Hague to be tried was discursively linked first to Serbian 
civilians who suffered in the war, and consequently to all of the Serbian population 
in Croatia. The acknowledgement of victims of war crimes committed by Croats 
allowed a reassessment of the identity of Serbian people in Croatia as something 
other than the extension of the Serbian aggressor from the early 1990s. 
The following text, an interview with the Deputy Head of Government, 
Goran Granić, demonstrates the tension between subject positions of Croatia-victim, 
Serbia-aggressor and Serbian civilians-victims in the official government discourse: 
 
Q: Tuđman used to say that the return of Serbs would diminish the 
result of the Homeland War. Now we have a situation where his 
vision is interpreted and used to destabilise the ruling coalition. Is 
the coalition ready to reinterpret the aims of the war? 
 
GG: First of all, Croatia suffered aggression and the war was 
imposed. Through that war Croatia achieved its independence and 
for that reason the war will have its place in the history of the 
making of our country, whatever the politicians decide to say about 
the matter. The war was an imperialist attempt and it included an 
ethnic component. Because of that we have to look at the problem 




with the other side. If we are now looking at this problem solely 
through the prism of war, we have to ask ourselves how is it 
possible to live alongside someone who had opted for the other side. 
By doing so it is very easy to criminalise an entire people and to 
press upon them collective responsibility. The point of the matter is 
that war traumas must be overcome and that all citizens have the 
right to return to Croatia and to enjoy their private property. If they 
committed crimes they will have to answer for them. It is on us to 
support Croatia’s future, and that means building a civil, democratic 
society in which national, religious or any other divisions and 




The question asked by the interviewer openly links the return of Serbian 
refugees and the threat to Croatian sovereignty. Tuđman’s articulation of Croatia as a 
nation state for all Croats is brought into dialogue and challenges the speaker to 
reveal an alternative interpretation regarding the Homeland War. The war was 
continuously stressed as being the founding element for Croatia, and the defence of 
the country reinforced the perceived right for state sovereignty. A sovereign nation 
state for Croats was born out of the Homeland War that was fought against Yugoslav 
forces, as I have demonstrated with the previous example. Thus, Serbian presence 
within the country is constructed as a threat to Croatian sovereignty. It was an 
external threat during the 1990s that at the beginning of the new decade turned into 
an internal threat as well. A relatively small number of the Serbian population that 
remained in Croatia
25
 could have been disregarded due to political circumstances, but 
the change that came with the new regime demanded a closer look at the problem of 
Serbs. The prospect of having that particular national minority enjoying rights and 
the protection of the state was problematic at two levels: a threat to Croatian 
sovereignty and still fresh war traumas. These elements were discursively linked in 
all featured examples, both within the government and the opposition discourses.  
Granić points to that factor when asking a rhetorical question about one’s 
ability to live alongside the enemy. He then makes a transition into a discourse that 
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distinguishes between collective and individual guilt and responsibility in the war. 
This articulation mirrors the one of responsibility towards justice and the need to 
distinguish between the legitimate defenders of the Homeland War and war 
criminals. Granić aligns himself with the established discourse on the Serbian 
responsibility in the war and supports the discourse on the war as being one of 
liberation from Serbian aggression. The fundamental difference from the 
oppositional discourse is visible here in the ability to distinguish between the 
responsibility of Serbia, its leaders and its military and the civilian population. This 
feature of the official discourse was radical at the time and deemed to be rather 
controversial. I argue that his discourse demonstrates a maturity that allows the 
expansion of the subject position of ‘victim’ and the questioning of some aspects of 
Croatian’s fight for liberation. And, at the same, time upholds the belief in the 
righteousness of the Homeland War and its importance for Croatia’s identity 
building.
26
   
The text suggests that the Serbs that have stayed in Croatia - as long as they 
are innocent - and those that have chosen to return are here constructed as individuals 
and as human beings who have suffered as much as Croats. They are also constructed 
as citizens of Croatia who, on that basis, have the right to enjoy the protection of the 
law that includes the rightful return of their private property. Understanding their 
rights in this way is a Western and European feature, a sign of Croatia’s democratic 
maturity and a way to build bridges between national groups in the country. 
Including the Serbs into the category of ‘victim’ was here discursively linked with 
the legalist discourse on the nature of citizenship in a democratised Croatia. The 
Serbian radical other thus had to change in intensity and to start occupying a 
different spot on the ‘otherness’ spectrum.   
Addressing the minority question from the position of a civil state discourse 
continued to occupy the ruling coalition.  Željka Antunović, Deputy Head of 
Government, stated: ‘All who suffered in the war are equal to the Government: both 
Croats and Serbs’
27
 Her statement made the headlines and was equally criticised and 
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applauded for its message. The equation of Croats and Serbs and their construction 
as both being victims made a break with the tradition that constructed Croats as 
victims during their conflict with Yugoslavia and Serbs as aggressors. 
Individualisation of responsibility in the war and the re-definition of Croatia as a 
civil state provided grounds for changing the victim-aggressor subject positions. 
Nationality ceased to be the grounds for such definitions and the Serbs as civil 
subjects could hence be equated with the Croats. Furthermore, their positions as 
‘victims’ were legitimised by a moral obligation by the state to cater for those who 
suffered. 
In the same vein, during an official visit to Austria the President called on the 
refugees to return:  
 
Croatia is calling all its citizens to return to their homes. It is our 
obligation to repair all homes ruined in the war. The return of 
the Serbs is of great importance because it shows the maturity of 
our democracy. That means that it is primarily our interest and 




The statement calls on Croatian citizens to return to their homes without 
explicit mention of their nationality. All citizens are equal for the state (and the state 
is civil and democratic) and providing means to help them return home is an 
obligation of the state, which will confirm its identity as being democratic. National 
interest is redefined and instead of sovereignty the President stresses democracy as 
being the main goal. He also reveals an awareness of the process of Westernisation 
and democratisation that Croatia went through. The President stresses that 
recognising the rights of the Serbian population demonstrates that Croatia has indeed 
matured and become a Western country. Acknowledging rights of all its citizens, 
regardless of their ethnicity, is a part of that maturity.  
In another statement the President calls upon democracy and the law to 
ensure the rights of its citizens, regardless of their nationality:  
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Croatia has chosen a democratic system in which all citizens must be 
equal and have equal rights before the law. There must be no 
preferential treatment of any kind. People in Croatia must not feel 




All of these texts demonstrate a unity that is primarily manifested as 
respecting the civil nature of the Croatian state and the equal status of Croatian and 
other nationalities. Furthermore, the question ceases to be the one of nationality but 
is articulated as an exclusively civil matter. The intensity of the statements and the 
resolute tone about such a sensitive issue suggests that perhaps the cracks within the 
discourse on citizenship can be found there. Discourse theory suggests that 
overemphasising a discursive construction and taking it to an extreme demonstrates 
weaknesses within that discourse, rather than cohesion and strength.
30
 It can be 
argued that, because of this, the official government discourse ought to be doubted 
and questioned on the grounds of its authenticity and its purpose. However, I argue 
that despite the obvious cracks within the discourse on citizenship and national 
minorities we can still investigate it as an attempt to embrace Western democratic 
norms on minority protection. All of the debates were an early attempt to address the 
minority question in light of intense cooperation with the European Union and a 
difficult task of reconciling the new discourse on equality with old nationalist 
tendencies. 
The following text represents a discourse rooted in the Tuđmanist tradition 
belongs to Marinko Liović, president of HVIDRA
31
, who expressed his opinion on 
Government decisions regarding the return of Serb refugees:  
 
If we do not establish a dialogue with the Government by the end 
of the month, we will take action and organise protests. We do not 
want the Government to finance the return of Serb refugees at our 
expense. We protest against this insistence on the complete return 
of Serbs who fled Croatia between 1991 and 1995. They have 
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been forgiven, while our defenders are expecting to be called to 
The Hague.
32
   
 
The return of the Serbs refugees is equated with Serbian aggression and their 
responsibility for the war is collective rather than individual. Here we witness a 
radical other that is not capable of transforming. The discourse equates the Serbs 
outside and within Croatia, regardless of their differences in subject positions, which 
are apparent in the official government discourse. Their presence in Croatia is 
constructed as a threat and follows the logic of the Tuđmanist discourse that 
positioned Serbia at the extreme end of civilisational otherness. Assuming that the 
returning Serb refugees have been forgiven for Serbia’s transgressions in the 
Homeland War the text reproduces Serbia’s identity as ‘aggressor’ but at the same 
time insinuates the possibility of their position as ‘victims’ by admitting that they had 
to flee their homes to find safety. At this point it is possible to identify a weakness in 
the oppositional discourse and to find space for the generating of the subject position 
of ‘Serbs – victims of the war’ subject position and the possibility for a change in the 
extent of their otherness. Another element of the oppositional discourse is revealed in 
this example. The discourse on the return of the refugees is here directly linked to the 
discourse on the ICTY and Croatia’s position as ‘victim’ of the international 
community and of the Tribunal in particular is stressed. The discursive links between 
the two rest upon the concepts of endangered freedom, injustice found at home and 
abroad and strong binary oppositions between Croatia and its others. At this point the 
‘victim’ position is twofold: Croatia is a victim of Serbian aggression and of unjust 
trials at The Hague. The relationships between the subject and its others can be 
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6.6 The status of minority languages 
 
The question of minority languages was addressed from the same subject 
position of ‘victim’ towards a more general ‘aggressor’. Drago Krpina of HDZ stated 
that ‘in the course of Croatian history Italian, German and Hungarian languages were 
used as mere instruments by imperialist attempts towards Croatia.’
33
 He implied that 
the hegemons of the past (Italy, Austria, Hungary) imposed their languages upon the 
Croatian people and made them official languages in Croatia. He then linked the past 
with more recent events:  
 
The Serbian minority in Croatia is an example of how a minority 
can become an instrument of aggression in a country. Serbs in 
Croatia have never really spoken Serbian and have not even been 
asked by anyone whether they want to use the Serbian language 




By using an example from Croatia’s past of being under foreign rule for 
centuries, the speaker identifies the present situation where the Serbian minority is 
facing a possibility of officially using their language with imperialist tendencies of 
the past. The use of language is thus constructed as being closely linked to political 
power and expansionist tendencies. Croatia is positioned against two enemies in a 
relationship of othering that revolves around a set of binary oppositions. Both others 
(hegemons of the past and today’s Serbian population) occupy subject positions on 
the extreme points of the othering spectrum. The hegemons of the past and the 
Serbian minority have nothing in common except that they are discursively linked in 
the oppositional/Tuđmanist discourse as enemies of Croatian people and constructed 
as having an inherent identity as such.  
The central point that Krpina makes is the threat that the Serbian minority 
presents in Croatia by its very presence, and consequently by demanding protection 
of minority rights. Preventing the use of Serbian language would silence their 
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presence and make it invisible to the Croatian majority that needs to feel protected 
from possible Serbian imperialism, this time not by acts of aggression from abroad, 
but from their presence inside. The act of using one’s language is thus not merely a 
form of expression in one’s mother tongue, but a subversive instrument that can pose 
a serious threat to the state.  
The oppositional discourse does not offer a clear picture of how that threat 
exists and in what way the Serbs are potentially dangerous, but remains at the level 
of abstraction. It is implied that the Serbian minority is so closely connected with the 
Serbian state that consequently they cannot be primarily seen as Croatian citizens, 
but a part of the radical other. It thus follows that any presence of Serbia at home is 
potentially a threat. In this way, sovereignty is again invoked as being one of the 
central concepts of Croatia’s identity constructions that ties together the ‘victim’, the 
‘aggressor’ and determines a range of self and other positions in-between.  
 An interesting point is made by the speaker when referring to the Serbian 
minority that has never used the Serbian language and the Cyrillic alphabet. The 
claim attempts to reconstruct the Serbian identity and to strip it of all those elements 
that are associated with a national community. If the Serbian minority had never 
really spoken their language in Croatia and used their alphabet then there is no 
reason to start doing so at present times.
35
 Doing so only confirms that the Serbs 
really are a threat by making their presence in Croatia known and so having an 
opportunity to increase their demands. A need for temporal continuity is invoked as a 
legitimating factor in the discourse with the purpose of de-legitimising Serbian 
demands. If suddenly the Serbian minority starts officially using their language and 
alphabet that can only point to a certain weakness of the state and the minority’s 
ambitions to undermine the perceived homogeneity of Croatian citizens.  
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The argument that there is no reason for the Serbian minority to use their 
language is not grounded in anything but fear of the radical other and a lack of a 
constructed continuity between the behaviour of the Serbian community in Croatia in 
the past and present. What the discourse does then achieve is a reconstruction of the 
Serbian radical otherness. If the Serbs ‘naturally’ blend in with the rest of the 
population and are primarily regarded as citizens of Croatia, rather than Serbian 
nationals, in that case it is not possible to speak of the radical otherness as being 
incompatible with the Western, democratic, civilised Croatian identity. The discourse 
of the opposition then becomes weak and contradicts itself given the impossibility of 
the coexistence of the radical other and the naturalised Serbian population in Croatia. 
Their articulation of the relationship between the Croatian majority and the Serbian 
minority demonstrates how contingent factors have discursively been brought 
together and constructed the Serbian minority as an extension of the Serbian radical 
other as well as a link to the hegemonic powers of the past.  
The official discourse did not engage fully with the opposition’s 
constructions of the self and the other but promoted a Western European 
understanding of minority protection and the meaning of a civil state. Failing to 
address the Tuđmanist discourse on minorities and the Serbian minority in particular 
in more depth made it difficult to advocate new understandings and policies without 
appearing anti-Croatian and non-patriotic.  
 
 
6.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The relations between Croatia and the EU and Croatia and the Balkan 
countries dramatically changed in the period of post elections in 2000. Given the 
positive feedback from the EU and other international actors Croatia adopted a role 
of being the generator and an example of positive political change in the region. In 
doing so, it stressed the importance of having good neighbourly relations but insisted 




This case study starts by examining the rearticulation of the concept of 
national minority. Just like the previous case study, the minority question is rooted in 
the civilizational discourse that provides a background for the understanding of the 
question, as well as an ethical element to the case. In the case of minority rights we 
have encountered Serbia as an internal other. Thus, the question of minority rights is 
closely tied to the nature of Croatia’s relations with Serbia given that the most 
numerous minority were the Serbs. Negotiating the solutions to the problem of 
Serbian minority presented the new regime with a difficult task of reconstructing 
their own political identity that would include all Croatian citizens, regardless of 
their nationality. Like in the case of cooperating with the ICTY, discussing the way 
the Croatian state is defined in the Constitution allowed for a clarification about the 
status of its citizens.  Subject positions of Croatian ‘victim’ and Serbian ‘aggressor’ 
could change in that new context and allow for a new interpretation that abandons 
the old construction of the Serbian radical other in favour of a moderate, more 
acceptable otherness. 
The analysis of the minority rights question reveals that the discourse of 
victimization was crucial for the discursive change and the status of the Serbian 
minority in Croatia. Discourse of victimization was also closely linked to the 
discourse of responsibility and required of the Croatian state to treat all its citizens in 
the same way, and in doing so to demonstrate its democratic maturity. It is here that 
once again we see how closely connected the minority rights question was to the 
problem of cooperating with the ICTY, since in both case studies we find the same 
discourse and very similar patterns of its reconstruction. 
The following chapter will summarise the findings of the empirical analysis 
and relate them to the theoretical questions introduced in the introductory chapter of 









This thesis has set out to explore the transformation of Croatian identity after 
the parliamentary and presidential election in the year 2000, within the wider 
framework of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and minority rights protection. During the period of the 1990s Croatia 
experienced significant changes on both the international and domestic levels. At the 
end of the decade it found itself in difficult circumstances with challenges from the 
international community and what was perceived to be the increasingly isolationist 
politics of President Tuđman and his followers. The change of direction after the 
election signified not just a shift on the political level but also an opportunity for 
Croatia to fully develop its Western European identity and take on norms of 
democratisation as defined by the European Union and other international 
institutions.  
The argument put forward in the thesis is that the identity of a political actor 
is crucial for a deeper understanding of political events. Examining political changes 
from a poststructuralist perspective offers an explanation of the way policy and 
identity are mutually constitutive, through examining how identity is discursively 
constructed within a particular social and political context. The thesis argues that 
Croatian understanding of what it means to be a Western European country was 
crucial for the development of a number of political issues that had to be addressed at 
the time. The study looks at the way the West and the East were discursively 
constructed and how these articulations were related to the reconstruction of Croatian 
identity from its journey from the Balkans towards the European Union. The focus of 
the study is the relationship between the Croatian subject and a range of its others, 
and the way that a radical other becomes discursively reconstructed towards a less 





The analysis uses two case studies in order to examine the questions of 
cooperation with the ICTY and minority protection. Both case studies are rooted in a 
basic discourse imbedded in the problem of identity, called the ‘civilisational 
discourse’. It was identified as an overarching discourse which underpinned the way 
discourses around the ICTY and minority protection developed. The analysis of 
discourses surrounding cooperation with the ICTY and the status and protection of 
ethnic minorities that serve as a framework for the study of Croatian identity, 
demonstrates that an interpretive study that focuses on the domestic context is 
necessary to add to the existing knowledge about Croatia, as well as to further 
development in theorising identity in the International Relations field.  
The study uses a discourse analytical method of analysis in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the phenomena. It involved studying primary texts, looking 
for discourses surrounding the topics of analysis and relationships between them. In 
doing so the study revealed the interconnectedness of the texts and the wider social 
setting and the close relationship between language and the context within which it 
exists. The study has confirmed the importance of context specific factors, which in 
this case is the Croatian domestic sphere whose particularities have proved crucial 
for the development of relations with the European Union and adoption of its norms 
and principles.  
This concluding chapter aims to synthesise the findings of the previous 
chapters and discuss their implications for poststructuralist theorising about identity, 
as well as for Croatia and its development. Section 7.2 revisits poststructuralist 
theory and discusses its strengths for a study of this type, and discusses the 
contribution of this thesis to its further development in the area of studying identity. 
Section 7.3 will discuss the contribution of the thesis to other fields of study, and 7.4 








7.2 Revisiting poststructuralist theory and the contribution of the thesis  
 
In order to analyse the reconstruction of Croatian identity during a period of 
significant political change that deeply affected Croatian society, this thesis 
employed a poststructuralist framework and a discourse analytical method of 
analysis. Poststructuralism rejects the distinction between ideational and material, 
discursive and non-discursive, behavioural and linguistic in the social practice and 
suggests that all ‘things’ gain meaning in discourse and that every discursive 
structure has a material character. This approach does not question the reality of 
objects and whether they exist or not, but is focused on meaning of the objects under 
study. In this way discourses include all social and political practice, not just 
language in its most literal form. 
One of the greatest strengths of poststructuralist approaches is the focus on 
language and the way meaning is produced and its ability to theorise the nature of 
interests and identities. In doing so it departs from traditional approaches that assume 
that identities and interests are exogenously given.  
The poststructuralist focus is not simply on the relationship between actors 
who interact and negotiate and seek to win in a given situation, but rather on the way 
that an actor comes into being and develops further, or in other words, how its 
identity is shaped through these processes of interaction with other actors.  This 
makes it possible to understand how the meaning of concepts tied to the actor’s 
identity changes and what the implications of that change are for political decisions. 
For this reason it was crucial for this study to look into the discourses that 
surrounded Croatia’s attempts at Westernisation and de-Balkanisation, so defined by 
the political elites of the time, and how it defined its own identity in the process. In 
concrete policy terms its understanding of democracy was changed and as a 
consequence it reflected in the political practice on several levels, in the question of 
cooperation with The Hague tribunal as well as in relation to the minority question.  
The works of Lene Hansen, David Campbell, Ole Waever, Iver Neumann,  
Michael Shapiro, Michelle Pace and Bahar Rumelili on identity have been a valuable 




of othering allows us to apply poststructuralist approaches to a variety of case studies 
and to analyse the process of political change through complex relationships between 
actors. This study fits within their work and uses their approaches and their findings 
in order to pursue a similar topic. Equally, this study has questioned some of the 
problems and drawbacks found in these authors’ studies, and through its findings 
adds to the existing literature and thinking about identity and politics.   
 
 
7.2.1 The findings on Croatia and theoretical implications of empirical 
analysis 
  
The three data analysis chapters have been structured around several themes. 
Chapter four discusses a civilizational discourse that has been identified as a 
discourse that underpins much, if not all, of Croatian political discussion. The 
civilizational discourse positions the East against the West in terms of the Balkans 
and the European Union, which are discursively constructed to embody the two 
civilisations. Croatia’s aim is to clearly define where it belongs and based on that to 
pursue its goal of becoming an EU member in the near future. The main problem in 
Croatia’s geo-political situation is that is considered to be a Balkan country by the 
Western world, which carries a set of negative connotations and a particular identity, 
as it becomes apparent from a study of Western discourses on the Balkans. The 
following two chapters that address case studies of cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and minority rights protection 
demonstrate how the process of de-Balkanising Croatia’s image is played out within 
these two areas of policymaking, and how Croatian identity is discursively 
reconstructed. 
 The Balkans are central to the discourse on Croatian identity. They are 
presented as a geographical, civilizational and political space. However, taking a 
closer look reveals that there is a difficulty in establishing where that space actually 




This problem of vague definition is present throughout the analysis and further 
demonstrates the problem of linking identity to a particular space. 
In Croatian discourse, Croatia is placed on the border of the Balkans but 
unjustly coupled with it. In order to escape such a placement and to deal with the 
problem of being positioned within that geographical and political space, Croatia 
defines itself as being placed in-between civilisations, between the East and the 
West. Although the solution seemed like a convenient one for the time being, it did 
not solve Croatia’s problem of not having a clearly defined identity that was linked 
to a particular geographical and civilizational space. The analysis reveals that the 
East and the West are discursively constructed as the opposite ends of the identity 
spectrum and as such are mutually exclusive. While the West is constructed as 
progressive, democratic and peaceful, the Balkans are backward, undemocratic and 
violent. Additionally, we find that the Balkans are perceived to have a stable identity, 
which is not capable of change and becoming more Western. The Balkans are thus 
perceived as a threat and as a consequence Croatia’s identity as a Western country in 
the making is threatened as well. 
 The Balkans are even more specifically defined and placed in relation 
to Serbia, which functions as the local embodiment of the Balkans. Serbia stands as 
the opposite of Croatia and functions as its mirror image. Because of the recent war, 
Croatia constantly reproduces the discourse of the Balkan/Serbian threat, in order to 
secure its identity as being essentially different and thus Western European. 
However, a paradox becomes evident in this situation. As long as Croatia is trying to 
free itself from the Balkans and the Balkan image, it is at this very point that the 
discourse of hostility and antagonism is reproduced that actually reinforces its 
Balkan identity. As long as it is locked in this paradox Croatia cannot fully attain 
Western identity that stresses cooperation and peaceful coexistence with its 
neighbours.  
  This feature found in the study confirms the poststructuralist assumption that 
an other is necessary for the discursive construction of identity, as an entity against 
which the subject identifies. Croatia defines itself as being completely opposite to the 




radical other. However, what is not adequately addressed in poststructuralist thinking 
is the possibility of change within this relationship with a radical other. The 
following discussion of cooperation with the ICTY and minority protection will 
reveal what the potential for that is when the identity of one actor begins to change. 
As discussed in chapter three, the principle of mutual constituitivness is 
clearly evident here, where the construction of the other has an effect on the 
construction of the identity of the self. By reproducing certain discourses about the 
Balkans and Serbia, Croatia is tying these discourses to the reconstruction of its own 
identity, where it requires particular discursive constructions of the other to itself. It 
is here that we can learn more about Croatia’s particular identity constructs, as well 
as learn something about the process on a more general level. When engaging in a 
study of identity of this kind it is useful to follow the process of discursive 
construction of identity and to keep a close eye on the details. That includes the way 
things are articulated, the context and the changes to the context within which given 
discourses operate, the nodal points and their role in the discourse, and the way self 
and other relate to one another. Given the nature of poststructuralist work, we can 
never claim to know the fullness of an actor’s identity, but rather we can seek to 
learn about the process of its identity construction, and be able to pinpoint 
developments in the process over time.  
For example, this principle is evident in the way the otherness of the Serbian 
minority in Croatia was discursively constructed. From being identified as aggressor 
and enemy of the Croatian people, the Serbian minority gradually achieved the 
identity of victim and on those grounds became closer to Croatian identity. The 
Homeland War worked as a powerful signifier in the official Croatian discourse and 
determined how discourses of victimisation, responsibility and Westernisation 
developed. By studying closely discourses on the Serbian minority and the gradual 
reconstruction of their identity we can also learn something about Croatia: its fears 
concerning its neighbours in the region, motives behind cooperation and the way it is 
trying to fix its identity as a Western European country, among others.  
 Examining the case of cooperation with the ICTY reveals a discourse that 




change of meaning. It used to be at the centre of Croatian statehood discourse and of 
its independence and quickly became embedded in the construction of Croatian 
identity. This required a radical reconstruction of its meaning if changes were to take 
place. With the new regime, sovereignty started to assume a new meaning but still 
retained a central position in the discourse of cooperation and democratisation, and 
so it remained central to the discursive construction of Croatian identity. The new 
understanding suggested that sovereignty is primarily about a state being willing to 
cooperate with other states and international institutions and to make sacrifices for 
the greater good. In this, cooperation with the ICTY, which was a difficult and 
controversial question at the time as the analysis reveals, could be justified and even 
presented as a positive development. This cooperation with the ICTY was presented 
as something that depended on whether Croatia was Western or Balkan.  
 At this point the political space of the Balkans was discursively connected to 
the temporal element. There were several aspects of this move that were closely 
connected during the process. First, a dichotomy between the Croatian past and 
present was set up, and second, the past was discursively linked to the civilizational 
aspect of the Balkans. The new regime articulated a division between the actors who 
were keeping Croatia at the Balkans, and those who were seen as leading it forward, 
towards EU membership. The previous regime was linked to the Balkans on the basis 
of their political practice. It was presented as being backward and undemocratic, 
which was based on their unwillingness to cooperate with international institutions. 
The ten years of Franjo Tuđman being in the office were discursively linked to the 
so-called “Balkan period” of the forty-five years spent in the Yugoslav federation. 
This was not openly stated but only implied through the use of coded language that 
would not put the new government in a difficult situation.  
Cooperation with the ICTY demanded a new interpretation of what it means 
to be a Western European country and a mature democracy, which was quite 
different from the old Tuđmanist discourse. This division between the two forces 
demonstrates an ethical as well as temporal dimension of identity construction, 




back to ‘backward ways’, as well as an ethical one that implies inferiority of such a 
move.  
 The ICTY cooperation question resulted in another set of oppositional 
relationships that were created. On the one side there were the ‘legitimate defenders’ 
of the Homeland War and on the other there were the ‘war criminals’. In the new 
official discourse the war criminals were constructed as having put shame on the war 
that was a defining feature of contemporary Croatia and its identity, so the 
questioning of the nature of the Homeland War seemed to question the very essence 
of the Croatian identity of its citizens. As a consequence the old constructions of 
Croatian victims of the war and the Serbian aggressor were to be reconstructed as 
well, in order to fit with the new articulations.  
 These developments were further discursively legitimised through the 
civilizational discourse of Western cooperation and justice. The validity of ICTY 
was articulated primarily through the necessity to cooperate with the tribunal because 
that was interpreted as a European way of acting. Furthermore, it showed the 
democratic maturity to voluntarily accept the standards of international justice. The 
question of cooperation was turned into that of liberation from internal corruption 
and dishonesty that damaged the status of the war and its meaning for the Croatian 
people.  
 It is here that we encounter the repetition of the Western discourse of inherent 
compatibility between democracy and freedom and the Western world, and 
subsequently them being opposed to the perceived inherent incompatibility between 
the Balkans and those values. This discursive construct led to a further identification 
of ICTY of being good in itself because of its promotion of the norms of justice on 
the international scale and because that feature could help Croatia purge the 
Homeland war from all negative connotations.  
 Another interesting feature developed at that point that concerned the 
individualisation of guilt and responsibility for unlawful behaviour during the war. 
The distinction and understanding that individuals were to be put on trial, rather than 
the whole country, was soon discursively developed and widely accepted. The 




and broke the law. By doing so the new regime discursively shaped its identity as 
being law-abiding and honest. Their discourse invoked the signifiers of the Western 
civilisation, linked in the cooperation-democracy-justice chain. It was this step that 
further helped legitimise the developing Western identity of Croatia. 
 It is visible from these developments that they carried a highly ethical 
dimension. Temporal and spatial components are complemented by the question of 
ethics, and thus they reveal how deeply interconnected they were at the time. We can 
conclude that the three components always co-exist to a certain degree, depending on 
the case in question. Furthermore, this confirms the hypothesis that the political 
space in the Croatian case primarily depends on the question of ethics, most clearly 
revealed in the civilizational discourse discussed earlier.   
This discursive shift was present in the discourse on minority rights as well. 
One of the crucial features is that the Serbian element here became an internal 
feature, unlike in the previous case where Serbia was external to Croatia. This 
situation brought the Balkans within Croatia and the official discourse presented it as 
endangering its civilizational status as an (aspiring) Western European country. In 
this way, minorities immediately assumed the role of an other and were discursively 
constructed as being different from Croatian nationals, and as a consequence a 
potential threat to the society and the state. Also, the Serbs formed the most 
numerous national minority group and were linked to Milošević and the Serbian 
expansionist politics of the early 1990s.  
The minority rights question witnessed a development of several discourses. 
The immediate concern of the political elites was a number of parliamentary debates 
about the Constitution and the advantages of defining Croatia as a civil state, as we 
found in the ICTY cooperation discourse as well. Supporters of the civil state 
discourse stressed its flexibility in accommodating a multi-ethnic community, as 
were seen in a number of EU member states. However, the official discourse 
presented the EU policy towards minorities to be a unified approach. They neglected 
to discuss the facts about different approaches to the subject. This reveals their 




case of cooperation with the ICTY, particular construction of the EU and the West 
are promoted, as a unified entity whose internal differences are not relevant.  
 Another interesting discourse that emerged regarding minorities was the case 
of Istria, a region with a relatively high percentage of Italian population. The case of 
Istria is interesting because it is very different from other regions and other 
minorities. Their articulation of their identity was at the time quite sophisticated and 
multi-layered. Their discourse was more in tune with that of the majority of EU 
member states on the question of national minorities. The Istrian population 
apparently offered a Western element to Croatia and made it easier to identify itself 
as already Western European. The Italians in Istria were thus not a radical other but 
an other closer to the Croatian subject and they held the identity Croatia wanted to 
attain. However, the focus on Istria did not last and the debate on minorities very 
quickly turned away from discussing general principles, to the very specific case of 
the Serbian minority and their status in the country. This reveals that the question 
was indeed problematic because it was the Serbs who made up the most numerous 
minority group, rather than it being the question of minorities on a more general 
level. This is quite telling about the role the Serbs had in the creation of Croatian 
identity and again, how they were discursively constructed. Another interesting thing 
about the Istrian case was the relationship between the concepts of nationalism and 
that of the state. A new discourse emerged that separated the idea of one 
homogenous nation from that of a state and in doing so followed a trend compatible 
with a number of EU member states.  
 Another discourse, familiar from the previous analysis, is the belief that 
Croatia should work as a factor of stabilisation in the region and that it should work 
as a promoter of democracy. The question of national minorities and their status 
brought an additional layer of meaning to the complex relationship between Croatia 
and its neighbours. Because the Serbs were constructed as a radical other their 
presence in Croatia challenged Croatian identity as a ‘Western European country’ in 
two ways. Serbs were not Western people but belonged to the Balkan civilisation, 
and their identification with the Serbian aggressor made it impossible to include 




remained in the position of the radical other and occupied a marginal space within 
the discursive structures on Croatia, while at the same time it grew increasingly 
obvious that their identity was becoming less stable and that a change was necessary. 
 Finally, the minority question generated another discourse that leads us back 
to the ICTY cooperation case. It was the ‘victim’ – ‘aggressor’ relationship that was 
discursively rearticulated in this context as well. The same pattern was found in this 
case study. The discursive change was based on the readiness to assume 
responsibility and a more critical attitude towards Croatia’s recent past and actions. 
Accepting responsibility for war crimes against Serbian civilians in Croatia, allowed 
for the reconstruction of the discourse about the Serbian minority and more 
particularly, on their identity as a radical other. During the 1990s the official 
discourse explicitly linked Serbia’s role in the Homeland War and Serbian national 
minority in Croatia. The Serbs thus functioned as a radical other that was an external 
and an internal threat to Croatian safety and stability. Preserving the subject position 
of ‘Croatia-victim’ depended on the radical otherness of Serbia and its apparent 
inability to change. Just like in the ICTY case, the stability of this discourse and of 
the subject positions depended on the willingness to either generalise responsibility 
in the war, or to individualise it. While ‘Serbia-aggressor’ was perceived to have no 
redeeming qualities and thus should not be treated with sympathies according to the 
official discourse, it was agreed that ‘Serbia-victim’ possesses a high degree of 
humanity within the discursive construction and so presents an acceptable, less 
threatening other. Acknowledging common suffering and status of victims allowed 
the Serbian minority to become something else than a threatening other and 
extension of the Serbian aggressor from the previous decade. This articulation of 
justice mirrors the one of responsibility towards justice in the case of ICTY, and the 
need to distinguish between the legitimate defenders of the Homeland War and the 
war criminals. The radical other thus assumes an aspect of the identity of the subject. 
The Serbs that have suffered in the war and who were innocent were constructed as 
human beings and individuals. They also shared the identity of Croatian citizens, 
obvious in the discourse surrounding the Constitution. Understanding their rights in 
this way was seen as a Western and a European feature and a sign of Croatia’s 




country. Furthermore, it was argued that the state had a moral obligation to take care 
of all its citizens who required help. We see that the discourse on ethics was crucial 
here, and that it was linked with the temporal element of othering.  
 The following section will address the theoretical findings that were gathered 
from the above discussion on the case study. The theory employed in the thesis was 
based on a number of works discussed in chapter two and the following discussion 
will build upon the existing knowledge and suggest some further avenues for 





The above study has led to several theoretical insights concerning the 
poststructuralist approach and the study of identity. There are also several 
poststructuralist assumptions about identity that have been confirmed in this study 
that need to be stressed before proceeding on to discuss new findings. First, identity 
is not stable. Changes in the Croatian discourse bear witness to this as the country 
progresses from one point towards the other in its journey of redefining its identity. 
 There is an active role played by politicians, diplomats and other players on 
the domestic scene that contribute to the development of an identity, but their 
conscious efforts cannot be separated from a number of processes of socialisation 
these actors are engaged in, as well as a wider discursive sphere in which the actors 
operate. All contribute in their particular ways to a transformation of identity in a 
particular context and show its complexity. The interplay of these elements allows 
for new transfigurations, given that it is not possible to maintain a discourse once 
they start changing. New situations and new discursive constructions open up 
avenues for changing other features in this web of relations, and so they confirm the 
poststructuralist principle of mutual constituency, discussed in chapter two.  
Another poststructuralist principle that was confirmed in this study is that an 




In the Croatian case we see an other – Serbia, which embodies what Croatia does not 
want to be, according to the official government discourse, and an identity that it 
perceives to be contrary to its own. An other serves a purpose to establish a series of 
points where the subjects differs and establishes its own parameters of how it defines 
itself, and where those boundaries are. As discussed previously, analysis of identity 
tends to consider an other to be a radical other: an actor that possesses an identity 
radically different and impossible to reconcile to that one that the subject of analysis 
holds about itself. In the Croatian case, Serbia is a perfect example of a radical other 
that is on the opposite side of identity spectrum from Croatia and is considered to be 
incapable of change for a variety of reasons.  What this study confirms is a principle 
outlined by Lene Hansen, that an other does not necessarily have to be a radical one, 
and that in a study of identity we are likely to encounter a whole range of otherness. 
This last point rests on the assumption that it is not possible to single out one 
set of relationships and analyse them as the only factor that plays a part in identity 
construction. Looking more critically into a subject matter reveals that the 
possibilities are endless in terms of the number of factors to be taken into 
consideration when studying identity and that the researcher needs to establish 
boundaries of what should and can be included into a research project. This study 
started as an analysis of Croatian identity change within the framework of the 
European Union where the number of others was not determined in advance. I argue 
that this kind of approach has strength because the analysis was built on empirical 
findings, rather than a set of preconceived notions on how the process of othering 
takes place. 
 Analysing a wider network of relationships and a number of discourses, it is 
likely that we will find several others who hold different degrees of otherness and 
have different roles to play when it comes to identity of our subject of analysis. It is 
necessary to be careful when looking at these articulations in order to recognise 
otherness in a different guise. In the Croatian case two non-radical others have been 
identified: the European Union and Croatia’s past. 
The European Union serves as a wider venue for analysing identity change in 




under the EU requirements for accession. The analysis demonstrated that in the 
Croatian case the EU plays a role of both a political space where Croatia wants to 
belong, and a model of political life that Croatia wants to follow and eventually 
achieve. I argue that the EU functions a kind of aspirational identity in this context 
and so it does not present a typical other given that identification is positive. Our 
subject does not define itself against the other, but identifies with it regardless of a 
number of differences in their identities. This allows the aspirational identity to keep 
the transformation on track in the desired direction and to feature as a role model 
throughout the process of identity change. 
The second non-radical other that was identified in this study is Croatia’s 
past. Analysis has demonstrated that the process of identity change is a deeply 
reflexive process during which an actor clarifies which features are important for its 
identity and reacts accordingly. It requires a detailed look within, and in a case of a 
political actor we can identity this reflexive process as examining one’s actions and 
interaction with the international community. The poststructuralist principle of 
socialisation as essential for identity construction should be stressed at this point. 
Given that social and political actors do not have an essence, it is through social and 
political action and interaction through other actors that they learn about themselves 
and become capable of assessing questions that are relevant for their existence.   
  The point made previously was that an actor can look to its future and 
identify where it wants to be and what it wants to be like. For Croatia it was the 
European Union. An actor can also look into its past and determine how the past fits 
with the plans for the future and with the reality of the present moment. Both looking 
at the past and the future have a strong normative dimension to it and encompass 
both temporal and ethical features of identity construction. In the Croatian case the 
result of critically assessing its past was negative in that it was deemed incompatible 
with its present stage of identity construction, as well as with the future. The result of 
this incompatibility was a split in the subject’s identity, which then became divided 
into two distinct elements: the past and the present. The past was tied to the radical 
other of the Balkans and Serbia in the Croatian case, while the present and future 




The analysis suggests that reconstructing the meaning of the past and its role 
in the discourses concerning identity was required in order to maintain a unity of the 
discourse of development and progress that was crucial for reaching the desired goal. 
This finding demonstrates that it is impossible for an actor to hold conflicting 
identities when a strong normative element underpins the identity development. In 
other words, Croatia could not at the same time hold on to the meaning of the 
Homeland war as defined by the previous regime, and aspire to become an EU 
member, faithful to their discursive constructs.   
The othering of the past revolved around a change of meaning of a signifier 
crucial for Croatian identity: sovereignty. Reconstructing the meaning of important 
signifiers allows an actor to begin a change within the entire discourse, given that all 
signifiers are connected and revolve around a nodal point. From this follows that a 
change in one element  influences all other elements that are linked to it to a certain 
degree. By establishing a web of relations and identifying signifiers and nodal points 
and their role in the creation of meaning, we can trace changes in discourses and how 
they affect other discourses. When the Croatian past is identified as being Balkan, it 
follows from this that it is necessary for signifiers that revolve around the nodal point 
of civilisation to assume new meanings. In this way sovereignty underwent radical 
discursive change and allowed for a new articulation of important political questions, 
and equally, for a new stage of identity change to begin.  
Another relevant finding that emerged from this study is that a radical other 
has the capacity to change into a non-radical other under certain conditions. This 
finding contributes to our understanding of the othering process, as well as to the 
understanding that identity tends to be unstable, despite seemingly sedimented 
discourses. The Croatian case has shown that there is a link between the identity of 
the subject that is studied and its others. Following from the previous point that a 
change in one segment influences other segments to a certain degree, it is logical that 
the way that identity undergoes a change influences the construction of the other. In 
this study the Serbian radical other follows the discursive change within the Croatian 
identity discourse and slowly starts occupying a position closer to the one of Croatia. 




conflicting discourses tend to arise and instabilities in discourse become more 
apparent. Change became possible when the radical other assumed a feature that 
made it possible to relate to the Croatian subject. In this case it was the suffering of 
innocent civilians in the war. This discourse of suffering was found in both the ICTY 
and minority protection case studies and it was articulated in very similar ways. This 
suggests that when a radical other is beginning to be defined in positive terms, it is 
when the possibility of lessening of its negative identity starts to develop. Again, this 
is closely connected to the normative aspect of identity building.  
Looking closely at the process we can see that we are not encountering a one-
way process, but that the actors constitute each other. The changed identity of the 
previously radical other gains the capacity to interact with the subject of analysis in a 
new way. In this case, acknowledging an aspect of Serbia to be close to Croatia 
through common suffering of innocent people, allows Serbia to speak with a new 
voice. This new aspect of Serbia’s identity further strengthens the new relationship, 
as well as the developing identity of Croatia, that included cooperation and a 
growing positive attitude to its neighbours in the Balkans. Also,  
As I mentioned earlier, certain requirements have to be met in order for a 
change of this type to happen. If there is no external input that will help a new 
discourse to develop, there must be an internal struggle that will generate the same 
development. In this study the European Union provided a framework that required 
specific norms to be accepted by the aspiring member state. Since the EU was 
perceived as a positive role model for Croatia to follow, its requirements were 
considered to be reasonable and justifiable to a certain degree. Adjustment was far 
from easy and the official discourse had to battle opposing discourses that seek to 
challenge new requirements from abroad. However, we can claim with a degree of 
certainty that when a discourse that is perceived to be superior and positive enters 
into the domestic sphere, it helps mobilise actors to engage with it more closely and 
to work towards a normalisation of the new discursive constructions.  
This thesis has demonstrated the complexity of the othering process by 
examining two cases of othering where the other is constructed in a negative way. 




with a radical other, such as we normally encounter when studying foreign policy. 
This internal othering brought the subject of analysis into a new position. We can 
define it as the splitting of the subject’s identity into two along both the temporal and 
ethical axis. The process is similar to that of external othering except that it is more 
reflexive and less exclusive. For example, the othering of the Balkans is always 
expressed in very negative terms and it is very clear on the construction of the 
Balkans and its position in Europe. The othering of the past, on the other hand, is a 
more sensitive issue and demands a different tone and different imagery. While the 
Balkans are dangerous to the whole state at a political and civilisational level, the 
past is a more personal issue because it affects people on a more local level and 
therefore can never be completely rejected. The language used is quite different as 
well. While the othering of the Balkans is done in explicit terms, the othering of the 
past requires a certain degree of anonymity and uses codes such as ‘those people’. 
The civilisational discourse is present in this process as well and provides a basis for 




7.3 Concluding remarks and future research 
  
This study shows how new circumstances enabled alternative discursive 
configurations of Croatia and offered a possibility to rearticulate the meaning of 
concepts that were fundamental to its identity through the process of cooperation 
with the ICTY and its reconstruction of the minority rights protection norm. 
Signifiers ‘democracy’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘responsibility’, ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ 
underwent a radical transformation through discursive rearticulations around the 
nodal point of the ‘western civilisation’. The argument put forward in the study 
claims that the concept of the western civilisation that is embodied in the European 




political developments in the immediate post-Tuđman period, and that it was a 
crucial element for Croatian identity reconstruction in the same period. 
 The two case studies provided interesting and fruitful material and 
demonstrated the relevance of poststructuralist research in the field. The method of 
discourse analysis used in this thesis allowed me to closely look into the text and to 
relate it to the wider sphere of Croatian social and political context. My findings both 
strengthen the poststructuralist approach by confirming its applicability and 
relevance, and raise a few questions with theoretical implications, as discussed in the 
previous section. 
 The data that I collected for this study has not been exhausted and offers 
more material to be studied in the future. The results of this work provide a solid 
foundation for further work on Croatia and its relationship with the European Union, 
as well as its Balkan neighbourhood. Also, several points have emerged during the 
analysis that are worth looking into and developing further. 
 A feature that is relevant for the process of identity change is the process of 
temporal othering. In this study temporal othering of Croatian identity was one of the 
findings during the analysis of cooperation with the ICTY and of Tuđman’s legacy. 
The study has contributed to the theorising of temporal othering and the empirical 
work of Thomas Diez, Iver Neumann and Ole Waever. A more detailed focus on this 
phenomenon would increase existing knowledge of the question. An entire study on 
temporal othering in Croatia could be built on the foundations that this thesis offers 
at the moment. 
 Second, more can be done in further studying processes of othering in the 
context of aspirational identity. This feature has been revealed in this study in the 
relationship between Croatia and the European Union. Looking more closely into 
this relationship and analysing it over a longer period of time would provide useful 
insight into the nature of such a positive process of othering. Such a study would 
greatly contribute to poststructuralist work that places identity at its centre and would 
provide a deeper understanding of the process in different contexts.  
 Finally, this study could be deepened by looking at Serbian discourses on the 




study has focused on the Croatian discourse and did not consider the Serbian side. 
Examining the Serbian discourse would shed more light on the developments of 
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